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September 7, 2010. The hearing on motions inliminesetforFriday, July30,2010, at9:00 a,m.,may 
also be vacated. 
DA TED this __ day of July, 2010. 
DATED this l1. ~ July, 2010. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
TIIOMAS, WII.LIAMS & PARK, LLP 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants 
STIPULATION TO VACATE AND RESEf TRIAL DATE AND HEARING DATE, P. 2 
\ 
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Ada County Clerk 
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@twplegal.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Fl LED 
~~DA.M-r~ P.M .. __ _ 
AUG O 4 2010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and ) 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
ORDER TO 
VACATE AND RESET 
TRIAL DATE AND 
HEARING DATE 
The Court having reviewed the parties' Stipulation to Vacate and Reset Trial Date and 
Hearing Date, and the records and files in this matter, and good cause appearing; 
ORDER TO VACATE AND RESET TRIAL DATE AND HEARING DATE, P. 1 
001004
... 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
That the trial of this matter scheduled to begin on August 2, 2010, shall be vacated and 
reset to begin on September 7, 2010; and that the hearing on motions in limine set for Friday, 
July 30, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., is hereby vacated. 
DATED this _!j_ day of___..1,..c,:~~4'-<X-4-• 2010. 
ORDER TO VACATE AND RESET TRIAL DATE AND HEARING DATE, P. 2 
001005
-
DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliarnslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
AUG 2 5 2010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff , ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and ) 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
PRETRIAL ORDER 
Pursuant to the Pretrial Conference conducted by the Court on July 21, 2010, the Parties 
' 
are hereby ordered: 
PRETRIAL ORDER, P. 1 
001006
-
1. Exhibit Lists. In accordance with the Court's Notice of Trial Setting and Order 
Governing Further Proceedings filed December 15, 2009, the parties shall each 
file a list of the exhibits the party intends to offer into evidence by Tuesday, 
August 31, 2010. 
2. Motions in Limine. Motions in Llmine shall be filed by Friday, September 27, 
2010, which shall be heard by the Court on Tuesday, August 31, 2010, at 1:30 
p.m, along with any other pretrial motions. 
3. Counsel to confer re: Exhibit Lists and other matters. Counsel are directed to 
confer in person by Friday, September 3, 2010, and to attempt in good faith to 
reach a stipulation as to the admissibility of exhibits. Toe parties should indicate 
those exhibits for which there is no objection as to admissibility, those exhibits for 
which there is no objection as to foundation, and those exhibits for which there is 
no agreement at all. The parties shall lodge the stipulation with the Court on the 
first day of trial. 
A. If the exhibit list indicates that counsel have stipulated to the admission of 
the exhibit, the exhibit will be admitted into evidence upon being offered 
by counsel. If such a stipulation is noted, opposing counsel will not be 
asked if they have any objection to the exhibit. 
B. If the exhibit list indicates that counsel have reached a partial stipulation as 
to an exhibit (e.g., foundation, authenticity, business record exception to 
the hearsay rule), it will not be necessary for counsel to cover such matters 
with a witness. Counsel should note the partial stipulation, and offer the 
exhibit so that the Court can rule on opposing counsel's remaining 
objections. 
4. Trial Witnesses. By Wednesday, September 1, 2010, Plaintiff is directed to 
provide to Defendants a list of those witnesses whom Plaintiff actually intends to 
subpoena for trial, as well as those whom Plaintiff intends to call without need for 
subpoena. Plaintiff must also provide a good faith estimate of the time expected 
for its direct examination of such witnesses. 
By Friday, September 3, 2010, Defendants are directed to provide to Plaintiff a list 
of those witnesses whom Defendants actually intend to subpoena for trial, as well 
as those whom Defendants intend to call without need for subpoena. Defendants 
must also provide a good faith estimate of the time expected for their direct 
examination of such witnesses. 
PRETRIAL ORDER, P. 2 
001007
-
Said lists are subject to Rule ll(a)(l), I.R.C.P. 
5. Jury Instructions. The Parties shall file their proposed jury instructions and 
form of verdict by Tuesday, August 31, 2010. 
DATED thi~ day of ¥-WlO 
j}Jj_flill~ 
Darla S. Williamson ? 
District Judge 
PRETRIAL ORDER, P. 3 
001008
,. 
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-
DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St, Suite 300 
P. O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) ) 
Plaintiff , } 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corpontion, JOHN E. BERRYHILL Ill and ) 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) ) 
Defendants. ) 
MOTION 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
DEFENDANTS' MOTJON 
INLIMINE 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby move this Court for an order 
instructing Plaintiff, its counsel, representatives and witnesses to refrain from making mention, 
directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, during the voir dire of the jury, opening 
statement, interrogation of witnesses, objections, arguments, closing statements, and pleadings 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE, P. 1 
001009
AIJG. 27. 2010 3:07PM NO. 9124 P. 3 
submitted to jurors or at any other time while in the presence of prospective jurors or impaneled 
jurors, of any of the matters set forth below, without first approaching the Bench and obtaining a 
ruling of the Court outside the presence and hearing of all prospective or impaneled jurors in 
regard to any alleged theory of admissibility of such matters. 
This motion is made on the grounds that the matters identified below would be 
inadmissible for any purpose upon proper and timely objection and that they have no bearing on 
the issues of this action or on the rights of the parties to this action, and on the further grounds 
that permitting mention of any such matters would prejudice and confuse the jury, and sustaining 
of objections due to mention of such matters would not cure the prejudice, but rather would 
reinforce the impact of such prejudicial matters on the jurors. 
This motion is supported by the memorandum below and by all matters of record in this 
action. 
MEMORANDUM 
1. The letter of Defendants' counsel dated April 2, 2009. 
The Court has already ruled on the substance of this motion by striking this same exhibit 
during summary judgment. 1 As the Court then noted, this exhibit was a letter written by 
Defendants' counsel, Daniel Williams, to Paul R. Mangiantini~ Plaintiff's former counsel. The 
letter is in response to the letter set forth at Exhibit 9 to the Affidavit of Glenn E. Mo sell, which 
is a letter from Mangiantini to John and Amy Berryhill dated February 20, 2009, demanding 
repayment of ~400,000. In ruling Defendants' letter struck, the Court cited Millenkamp v. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Cross Motions for Summary 
Judgment, Motions to Strike, Motion to Amend Complaint, and Motion to Compel filed April 
30, 2010, pp. 5-6. At the time, the subject letter was referred to as Exhibit 10 to the Affidavit of 
Glenn E. Mosell of March 22, 2010. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE, P. 2 
001010
A~G.27.2010 3:08PM NO. 9124 P. 4 
Davisco Foods Int'/, Inc., 562 F .3d 97~ (9th Cir. 2009), in which the Ninth Circuit held that the 
district court erred by admitting a letter that was in response to a request for a settlement prior to 
the suit. The Nh1th Circuit ruled that under Rule 408, Federal Rules of Evidence, it was error to 
admit such a response into evidence: This Court noted that the Idaho version of Rule 408 is 
nearly identical to the federal rule. 
Accordingly, under Rule 408, I.RE., the reasoning of Millenkamp, and this Court's prior 
ruling, Defendants' counsel's letter dated April 2, 2009, is inadmissible. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Court grant their Motion in 
Limine and enter an appropriate order. 
DA TED this [ 9-~f August, 201 O. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE, P. 3 
001011
ALJG.27.2010 3:08PM N0.9124 P. 5 
CERTIFEA TE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ziay of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing cowsel as indicated below: 
· ... '• 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMlNE, P. 4 
Via Hand Delivery 
V--Via Facsimile: 939-7136 
Via U.S. Mail 
001012
** INBOUND NOTIFICATION : FAX RECEIVED SUCCESSFULLY** 
TIME RECEIVED - REMOTE CSID -TION PAGES 
·August 27, 2010 4:15:50 PM MDT 208-939-7136 91 3 
STATUS 
Received 
8/27/2010 4: 14 PM FROM: 208-939-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW TO: 2876919 PAGE: 001 OF 003 
ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
''::,, ____ _ 
A.M ____ _ 
J. Df:Vi~, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, 
VS. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Counter Claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT 
EVIDENCE: OTHER LITIGATION 
Judge Goff 
* * * * * * 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Mosell Equities, LLC, by and through its 
undersigned counsel, and requests that this Court exclude testimony or documents relating to any 
prior or continuing legal matter or litigation to which Glenn Mosell, a non-party, may have been 
involved. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: OTHER 
LITIGATION - 1 
'l •. ; _.,,.' ~-
001013
- -8/27/2010 4:14 P~ FROM: 208-939-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW TO: 2876913 PAGE: 002 OF 003 
ARGUMENT 
During the deposition of Glenn Mosell, the Defendants inquired about prior or 
contemporaneous legal matters or litigation involving Glenn Mosell. The Plaintiff believes the 
Defendants may try to introduce evidence of legal conflicts or litigation involving Mr. Mosell 
regarding real estate or prior business dealings with other parties not involved in this case. 
The Plaintiff, Mosell Equities, and Defendant John Berryhill, were involved in litigation 
as co-plaintiffs in John Berryhill, and Masell Equities, LLC., v. Broadway Park, Inc., and 
lvfichael G. Matzek, Ada County Case No. CV OC 07-00987, and the proceedings in that case are 
relevant to the issues raised in this case. However, Glenn Mosell personally was not a party to 
the Broadway Park case. 
Any legal proceedings involving Mr. Mosell personally, or Plaintiff Mosell Equities, 
other than the Broadway Park case, are irrelevant to these proceedings and therefore should be 
excluded according to Rule 402, IRE. Moreover, even if such evidence is somehow relevant, 
any probative value would be outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice, or the potential to 
confuse or mislead the jury, and therefore should be excluded according to Rule 403, IRE. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of August, 2010. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Plaintiff 
001014
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of August, 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via facsimile transmission to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
TIIOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
ERIC R. CLARK 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: OTHER 
LITIGATION - 3 
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Counter Claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT 
EVIDENCE: ASSIGNMENT OF 
POTENTIAL PROCEEDS AS 
COLLATERAL FOR LOAN 
Judge Goff 
* * * * * * 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Mosell Equities, LLC, by and through its 
undersigned counsel, and requests that this Court exclude testimony or documents relating to any 
assignment or pledge of the Plaintiff's potential recovery in this case by the Plaintiff's sole 
member, Glenn Mosell, to Glenn Mosell's in-laws as collateral for loans Mosell obtained from 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: ASSIGNMENT 
OF POTENTIAL PROCEEDS AS COLLATERAL FOR LOAN - 1 
= 
001016
8/27/2010 4:10 PM FR0-8-939-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW- 2876919 PAGE: 002 OF 003 
his in-laws necessitated by the Defendants refusal to repay the loans Mosell Equities made to the 
Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
During the deposition of Glenn Mose II, the Defendants inquired about a possible pledge 
or assignment of the potential proceeds from this case. Glenn Mosen is the sole member of the 
Plaintiff LLC, and has pledged some of his interest in the LLC; part of the the potential proceeds 
from a successful verdict in this case, to Mosell's in-laws as collateral for a loan the in-laws 
made to Mosen. Mosen, the sole member, and the assignor or pledger, is not a party to the case. 
Any alleged pledge or assignment by Mosell would be in-elevant to the proceedings 
before the Court and therefore should be excluded according to Rule 402, IRE. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of August, 2010. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: ASSIGNMENT 
OF POTENTIAL PROCEEDS AS COLLATERAL FOR LOAN - 2 
001017
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of August, 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via facsimile transmission to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
ERIC R. CLARK 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: ASSIGNMENT 
OF POTENTIAL PROCEEDS AS COLLATERAL FOR LOAN - 3 
001018
AUG.30.2010 4:46PM 
DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
N0.9138 P. 2 
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AUG 3 O 2010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & C01\1PANY, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL m and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 0909974 
) 
) DEFENDANTS' l\fEMORANDUM 
) IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
) MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
) OTHER LITIGATION 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Benyhill III, by and through their 
counsel of re.cord, hereby respond to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Re: Other Litigation. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
IN LIM1NE RE: OTHER LITIGATION, P. 1 
001019
AUG.30.2010 4:47PM NO. 9138 P. 3 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff moves to exclude evidence relating to .. any prior or continuing legal matter or 
litigation to which Glenn Mos ell, a non-party, may have been involved." Without analysis, 
Plaintiff swnmarily states that any legal proceedings, other than the "Broadway Park" case, are 
irrelevant If relevant, on the other hand, Plaintiff argues that an unexplained risk of unfair 
prejudice or potential to confuse the jury nonetheless exists under Rule 403. 
Glenn Masell is the managing and sole member of Plaintiff Mosell Equities, ILC. He 
graduated from U.C, San Diego with a bachelor's degree in economics.1 He obtained a Series 
Six seculities license and worked for Prudential-Bache, exploring a financial services 
stockbroker career (Mosell: 11). He also obtained real estate licenses in California and Colorado 
(Mosell: 11). He worked as a sales associate broker with Marcus and Millichap, a national finn 
dealing in investment sales (Mosell: 14). He then worked for Sperry Van Ness as an investment 
broker (Mosel!: 15). He has worked on many millions of dollai·s worth of transactions (Mosell: 
19). He has also worked as a commercial real estate developer (Mosell: 23). 
Despite this background, Mosen claims in this litigation that he and his limited liability 
company were fraudulently induced by John Benyhill to provide funds based on the use of the 
Deposition of Glenn E. Mosell of February 5, 2008, at p. 10 in the action entitled 
John Berryhill and Mosell Equities, L.L.C., v. Broadway Park, Inc., and Michael G. Matzek, 
Case No. CV QC 07-00987 in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, In and For the County of Ada. Pertment excerpts are attached to the Affidavit of Daniel E. 
Williams Re: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, as Exhibit ''A", Subsequent 
references to this deposition testimony are cited to "Mosell" by page number. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
IN LIMINE RE: OTHER LlTIGATION, P. 2 
001020
AUG. 30. 2010 4:47PM N0.9138 P. 4 
term "loan"2 in the handwritten note set forth at Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 
Defendants obviously contend that any supposed reliance on the part of Plaintiff to the reference 
to "loan" in the handwritten note was not reasonable or justifiable in part because of his own 
background and familiarity with business, notes and bona fide loans. Plaintiff had the kind of 
"special knowledge, experience and competence" so as to make it unreasonable for him to rely 
on any such stray and ambiguous expression as the handwritten note. See, e.g., W. Page Keeton, 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 108, at 751 (5th ed. 1984), quoted in, Stanley Weiss Assocs., LLC 
v. Energy Mgmt., 2004 R.I. Super. lEXIS 72 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004). 
Mr. Mosell's expertise in business and financial matters extends to his experience in 
litigation with former business partners. Mr. Mosell knew or should have known, based in pait 
on his many disputes and lawsuits with his former partners and associates in business, of the 
importance of clear contract language. He simply bad no right to rely on the handwritten note if 
he really intended that a bona fide loan be created. Defendants should not be denied the right to 
point out relevant experiences in Mosell's background, including his prior litigation, which 
combine to make his alleged reliance on any misrepresentation completely unjustified. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion in Ii.mine should be denied. 
DATED w& ~ugust, 2010. 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants 
2 
transitioned." 
The handwritten note goes on to state quite clearly that the pwported loan 11will be 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
IN LIMINE RE: OTHER LITIGATION, P. 3 
001021
AUG.30.2010 4:47PM NO. 9138 P. 5 
• 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thi~ ~gust, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P, 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Via Hand Delivery 
V Via Facsimile: 939-7136 
_ Via U.S. Mail 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
IN LIMINE RE: OTHER LlTIGATION, P. 4 
001022
ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
- NO. ___ F1ii:m°'i?T~--
AM ____ F_1L1~. Y2Aq = 
AUG 3 1 2010 
J. OAVlj NAIA ·. a_gi Ol~t!( 
,¥ ,1f P-* t;i~ Rt: .., 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Counter Claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
PLAINTIFF'S DRAFT JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT 
FORM 
Judge Goff 
* * * * * * 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Mosell Equities, LLC, by and through its 
undersigned counsel, and hereby provides its Draft Jury Instructions and Proposed Verdict Form. 
PLAINTIFF'S DRAFT JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORM - 1 
001023
• 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of August, 2010. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of August, 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via hand delivery to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
ERIC R. CLARK 
PLAINTIFF'S DRAFT JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORM - 2 
001024
-
IDJI 1.20.1 - Burden of proof - preponderance of evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a 
proposition, or use the expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I 
mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably true 
than not true. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001025
-
IDJI 1.20.2 - Burden of proof - clear and convincing evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
-
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by 
clear and convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is 
highly probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher burden 
than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than 
not true. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001026
-
IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
On plaintiffs' claim of breach of contract against the defendant, 
the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following 
propositions: 
1. A contt-act existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
2. The defendant breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
The Court has previously determined that the document 
presented as Plaintiff's Exhibit _, constitutes a valid contract. The 
Court has also ruled that although the document represents a valid 
contract, the terms are ambiguous, and therefore it is for you the Jury 
to decide what the parties intended. 
The Court has also previously ruled that the jury must decide, as 
these documents are separate from and created after Plaintiff's Exhibit 
__ _.. if the parties intended that the checks presented as Plaintiff's 
Exhibits _ through __ amended the parties contract presented as 
Exhibit 
---
You will be asked the following questions on the jury verdict form: 
1. Regarding the contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit ) did the 
parties intend the money Mosell Equities provided, 
$50,000.00, to be a loan? 
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-
2. Regarding the contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit __ _,) did the 
parties intend the money Mosell Equities provided 
$50,000.00 to be a loan to remain a loan pending Mosell 
Equities' "buy in" of an entity formed by the parties? 
3. Did the "buy in" referenced in Plaintiff's Exhibit __ 
occur? 
4. Did the check presented as Exhibit ___ _.. modify the 
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract? 
5. Did the check presented as Exhibit ___ _, modify the 
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract? 
6. Did the check presented as Exhibit ___ _, modify the 
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract? 
7. Did the check presented as Exhibit ___ _, modify the 
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract? 
8. Did the check presented as Exhibit ___ _.. modify the 
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract? 
9. Did the check presented as Exhibit ___ _, modify the 
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract? 
10. Did the check presented as Exhibit ___ _.. modify the 
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract? 
11. Did the check presented as Exhibit ___ _, modify the 
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract? 
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-
12. Did the check presented as Exhibit ___ _, modify the 
contract (Exhibit ___) and become part of that contract? 
13. Has the Berryhill & Company, Inc. breached the contract? 
Yes -No 
14. Has Mosen Equities been damaged as a result of Berryhill & 
Companies' breach? Yes __ -No __ . 
15. The amount of damages? $ __________ _ 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that 
propositions 1 and 2 have been proved, then you should answer these 
questions "yes". 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that 
proposition 3, no "buy in" occurred, then you should answer this 
question "no". 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that 
propositions 4 th.rough 12 have been proved, then you should answer 
these questions "yes". 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that 
propositions 4 through 12 have not been proved, then you should 
answer the particular question "no". 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that 
propositions 13 and 14 occurred, then you should answer these 
questions "yes", and answer question 15. 
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-
Comment: 
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A 
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of 
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence 
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which 
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it 
relates. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
On plaintiffs' claim of implied-in-fact contract against the 
defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following 
propositions: 
1. The circm;nstances imply a request by the defendant for performance by 
plaintiff; and 
2. The circumstances imply a promise by the defendant to compensate the 
plaintiff for such performance; and 
3. The plaintiff performed as requested. 
You will be asked the following questions on the jury verdict 
form: 
1. Did an implied-in-fact contract exist between Mosell Equities 
and Berryhill & Company, Inc.? Yes -No 
2. Has the Berryhill & Company, Inc. breached the contract? 
Yes -No 
3. Has Mosell Equities been damaged as a result of Berryhill & 
Companies' breach? Yes - No . 
-- --
4. The amount of damages? $ __________ _ 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that each 
of the propositions has been proved, then you should answer the 
questions "yes" and complete question 4. If you find from your 
consideration of all of the evidence that any of these propositions has not 
been proved, then you should answer that question "no." 
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Comment: 
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A 
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of 
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence 
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which 
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it 
relates. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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-
IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
On plaintiffs' claim of uniust enrichment against the defendant, 
the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following 
propositions: 
1. The plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant; 
2. The defendant accepted the benefit; and 
3. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the defendant to retain 
the benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value. 
The Court has ruled that Mosell Equities had proven 
propositions 1 and 2. Consequently, you will only be asked the following 
questions on the jury verdict form: 
1. Under the circumstances, would it be unjust for the defendant to 
retain the benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value? 
Yes -No 
2. If you answered the preceding question ''yes," please identify 
the amount of defendant's unjust enrichment. 
$ 
-----------
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that the 
proposition has been proved, then you should answer the question"yes" 
and complete question 2. If you fmd from your consideration of all of 
the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then 
you should answer that question "no." 
Comment: 
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A 
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of 
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence 
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which 
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is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it 
relates. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001034
-
IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
On plaintiffs' claim of conversion against the defendant, the 
plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That the defendant took and has kept Mosell Equities' 
furniture and fixtures without a right to do so; 
2. The nature and extent of the damages to Mosell Equities and 
the amount thereof. 
You will be asked the following questions on the jury verdict 
form: 
1. Did the Defendant take or keep Mosell Equities' furniture and 
fixtures without a right to do so? 
Yes -No 
--
2. If you answered the preceding question ''yes," please identify 
the amount of Mosell Equities' damages. 
$ __________ _ 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the 
proposition has ,been proved, then you should answer the question 
"yes" and complete question 2. If you find from your consideration of 
all of the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, 
then you should answer that question "no." 
Comment: 
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A 
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of 
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence 
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which 
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it 
relates. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
On Mosell Equities' claim of fraud against John Berryhill and 
Berryhill & Company, Inc., Mosell Equities has the burden of proof on 
each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That John Berryhill stated a fact to Mosell Equities; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The John Berryhill either knew the statement was false or was 
unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement 
was made. 
5. Mosell Equities did not know that the statement was false; 
6. John Berryhill intended for Mosell Equities to rely upon the 
statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. Mosen Equities did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. Mosen Equities' reliance was reasonable under all the 
circumstances; 
9. Mosen Equities suffered damages proximately caused by 
reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to Mosen Equities, and the 
amount thereof. 
You will be asked the following questions on the jury verdict 
form: 
1. Did John Berryhill state a fact to Mosell Equities? 
001036
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Yes -No 
2. Was the statement false? Yes -No 
3. Was the statement material? Yes - No 
4. Did John Berryhill know the statement was false or was he 
unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the 
statement was made. Yes -No 
5. Mosell Equities did not know that the statement was false? 
Yes -No 
6. John Berryhill intended for Mosell Equities to rely upon the 
statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably 
contemplated? Yes __ - No __ . 
7. Mosell Equities did rely upon the truth of the statement? 
Yes -No 
8. Mosell Equities' reliance was reasonable under all the 
circumstances? Yes -No 
9. Mosell Equities suffered damages proximately caused by 
reliance on the false statement? Yes -No 
10. The amount of damages: $ __________ _ 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that each 
of the propositions has been proved, then you should answer questions 
1 - 9 "yes" and complete question 10. If you fmd from your 
consideration of all of the evidence that any of these propositions has not 
been proved, then you should answer that question "no." 
001037
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Comment: 
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A 
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of 
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence 
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which 
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it 
relates. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001038
IDJI 6.08.1 - Interpretation of contracts - intention of parties 
Note: The court must first decide whether determination of the intent of the parties is 
properly a jury issue. If it is not, obviously the instruction would not be given. Should 
the court determine that issue is properly before the jury, the following instruction may 
be appropriate: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The terms of the contract are in dispute as to the following 
provisions: 
Whether the parties intended the funds Mosell Equities provided 
were loaned funds? 
If the parties intended the funds to be loaned, whether the 
parties intended the funds Mosell Equities provided would transition 
into Mosell or Mosell Equities' buy in of Berryhill & Company, Inc. or 
some other entity created by Mosell and Berryhill? 
If the parties intended the funds Mosen Equities provided were 
loaned funds, and the parties intended the funds Mosen Equities 
provided would transition into Mosen or Mosen Equities' buy in of 
Berryhill & Company, Inc. or some other entity created by Mosell and 
Berryhill, did the buy in occur? 
If the buy in did not occur, do the funds remain as loans to 
Berryhill & Company, Inc.? 
If Berryhill & Company, Inc. denies the funds it accepted were 
loaned funds, and refuses to repay the loaned funds, is Berryhill & 
Company, Inc. in breach of the parties' contract? 
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You must determine what was intended by the parties as 
evidenced by the contract in this case. In making this determination 
you should consider, from the evidence, the following: 
1. The contract must be construed as a whole, including all 
of the circumstances giving rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every 
part of it. 
2. Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you 
fmd from the evidence that a special meaning was intended. 
3. Any communications, conduct or dealings between the 
contracting parties showing what they intended and how they construed 
the doubtful language may be considered, provided that such may not 
completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently 
with the remainder of the terms. 
4. The contract should be construed to avoid any 
contradiction or absurdities. 
[Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted 
with reference to any generally known and customarily accepted 
language in that field, unless you find from the evidence that this was 
not intended]. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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IDJI 6.08.2 - Interpretation of contract - witness's testimony, ambiguity of contract 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the 
contract offered by any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties 
occurring before execution of the written agreement, which is 
inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement. 
While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to 
clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to completely 
change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a 
fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or 
parts. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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IDJI 6.08.3 - Interpretation of contract - ambiguity resolved against drafter 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Where there is ambiguous language in a contract, and where the 
true intent of the parties cannot be ascertained by any other evidence, 
the ambiguity can be resolved by interpreting the contract against the 
party who drafted the contract or provided the ambiguous language. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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IDJI 6.08.4 - Interpretation of contract - definition of material fact 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A "material fact" is one which constitutes substantially the 
consideration of the contract, or without which it would not have been 
made. 
Comments: 
Black's Law Dictionary (West Pub; Fifth Ed., 1979) 
Offered: 
Given: 
Refused: 
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-
IDJI 6.08.5 - Interpretation of contract - materiality 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in 
determining the party's course of action. A representation is material if 
(a) a reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or 
nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the transaction in 
question, or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to 
know that the recipient is likely to regard the matter as important in 
determining the choice of action, whether or not a reasonable person 
would so consider. 
Comments: 
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616 (1998) (tort standard, referring to Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, Sections 538(2).) 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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IDJI 6.09.1 - Amendments to contracts 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A contract may be amended or modified by an agreement of the 
parties. This requires all of the elements of any other contract. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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-
IDJI 6.10.1 - Breach of bilateral contract - general case - no affirmative defenses 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions: 
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
2. The def end ant breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each 
of the propositions required of the plaintiff has been proved, then you 
must consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised by the 
defendant, and explained in the next instruction. If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this 
instruction has . not been proved, your verdict should be for the 
defendant. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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IDJI 6.11 - Material bre~ch 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these 
instructions, means a breach that def eats a fundamental purpose of the 
contract. 
Offered: 
Given: 
Refused: 
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IDJI 6.13 - Performance of contract - substantial performance 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When I say that a party must have "substantially performed" 
the contract or that "substantial performance" of the contract is 
required, I mean that the important and essential benefits called for by 
the terms of the contract have been delivered or performed. A contract 
may be substantially performed even though there may have been some 
deviations or omissions from the performance called for by the precise 
language of the contract. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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IDJI 6.14.1 - Time for performance of a contract 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Where a contract does not specify a time for performance, the 
law will imply a requirement that it be performed within a reasonable 
time, as is determined by the subject matter of the contract, the 
situation of the parties, and the nature of the performance required. In 
such case, it is for the jury to determine what a reasonable time would 
be under the circumstances, given all of the evidence in the case. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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IDJI 6.41.1 - Agent's act binds principal - agency admitted 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
There is no dispute in this case that John Berryhill was the agent 
of the principal, Berryhill & Company, Inc., at the time of the 
transaction described by the evidence. Therefore, Berryhill & 
Company, Inc., the principal, is responsible for any act of John 
Berryhill, the agent, within the scope of the agent's authority. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001050
-· 
IDJI 6.43.2 - Ratification 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If an agent acts outside the scope of authority, a principal may 
still become bound by the agent's actions if the principal ratifies the 
agent's actions. Ratification may be express or implied. Implied 
ratification requires: 
1. Knowledge on the part of the principal of the material 
facts connected with the transaction; and 
2. Word or conduct on the part of the principal indicating 
an intention to adopt the acts of the agent; 
Comments: 
See Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., 122 Idaho 47, 54 (1992); Twin Falls 
Livestock v. Mid-century Ins., 117 Idaho 176, 182-183 (1998). 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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IDJI 9.03 - Damages for breach of contract- general format 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the 
defendant, the jury must determine the amount of money that will 
reasonable and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any of the following 
elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the 
defendant's breach of contract: 
Special Damages: The the value of the money that Mosell 
Equities provided to Berryhill & Company, Inc., plus accumulating 
interest. 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for 
you to determine. 
Given: 
001052
Modified: 
Refused: 
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STATUTORY INTEREST 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
LEGAL RA TE OF INTEREST. When there is no express contract in writing fixing a 
different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on the 
hundred by the year on money lent. 
Idaho Code Section 28-22-104. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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-
IDJI 6.07 .1- Equitable theories - implied in facts contract 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
-
An implied-in-fact contract is a contract where the terms and 
existence of the contract are demonstrated by the conduct of the parties, 
with the request of one party and the performance by the other often 
being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance. To 
fmd an implied-in-fact contract, the facts must be such that the intent of 
the parties to make a contract can be inferred from their conduct. An 
implied-in-fact contract is given the same legal effect as any other 
contract. 
To establish an implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The circumstances imply a request by the defendant for 
performance by plaintiff; and 
2. The circumstances imply a promise by the defendant to 
compensate the plaintiff for such performance; and 
3. The plaintiff performed as requested. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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-
IDJI 6.07.2 - Unjust enrichment - equitable theories 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
-
Even though there is no agreement between the parties, under 
certain circumstances where a party has been unjustly enriched by the 
actions of another the law will require that party to compensate the 
other for the unjust gain. To recover under this theory, the plaintiff has 
the burden of proving each of the following: 
1. The plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant; 
2. T~e defendant accepted the benefit; and 
3. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the 
defendant to retain the benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its 
value. 
Comment: 
For the elements of unjust enrichment, see Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456, 567 
P.2d 1 (1977); Common Builder, Inc. v. Rice, 126 Idaho 616,888 P.2d 790 (App. 1995). 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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IDJI 4.50 - Conversion -- issues 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions: 
1. That the defendant took and has kept plaintiff's furniture 
and fixtures without a right to do so; 
2. The nature and extent of the damages to plaintiff and the 
amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each 
of these propositions has been proved, then your verdict should be for 
the plaintiff; but, if you find from your consideration of all the evidence 
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then your verdict 
should be for the defendant. 
Comment: 
Those conversions covered by the Uniform Commercial Code are not necessarily 
covered by this form. The Committee recommends that in cases covered by that Code, 
this form be used but that, in addition, the relevant portion of the appropriate Code 
section be read or paraphrased as a definition, description, or explanation of the phrase 
"exercised dominion over" or of the phrase "deprived of possession." 
See Carver v. Ketchum, 53 Idaho 595, 26P.2n 139; Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho 
171, 118 P.2d 729; Adair v. Freeman, 92 Idaho 773, 451 P2d 519. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001057
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IDJI 4.60 - Fraud - issues 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The defendant either knew the statement was false or was 
unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement 
was made. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the 
statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the 
circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by 
reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and 
the amount thereof. 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that the 
elements of fraud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, 
then your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this issue. If you fmd 
from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing 
001058
- -
propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then 
your verdict should be for the defendant. 
Comment: 
A definition of materiality can be found in IDJI 6.08.5. 
See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, P.2d 303 
(2000); Watts v. Krebbs, 131 Idaho 616,962 P.2d 387 (1998); Magic Lantern Prods. Inc. 
v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 805,892 P.2d 480 (1995). 
See also, Witt v. Jones, 111 ldao 477, 722 P.2d 474 (1986); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 
Idaho 700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387,613 P.2d 1338 
(1980); Smith v. King. 100 Idaho 331 597 P.2d217 (1979); King v. McNeel, Inc., 94 
Idaho 444,489 P.2d 1324. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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Defense to Fraud - statements or promises as to future events. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future events." 
"[T]here is a general rule in [the] law of deceit that a representation consisting of [a] 
promise or a statement as to a future event will not serve as [a] basis for fraud .... " 
"[T]he representation forming the basis of a claim for fraud must concern past or existing 
material facts." 
A "promise or statement that an act will be undertaken, however, is actionable, if it is 
proven that the speaker made the promise without intending to keep it." 
Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604,615, 114 P.3d 974, 973 (2005). (Cites 
omitted) 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
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Proposed verdict Form 
COUNT ONE - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
1. Regarding the contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit __ _,) did the parties intend 
the money Mosen Equities provided, $50,000.00, to be a loan? 
Yes -No 
2. Regarding the contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit __ _,) did the parties 
intend the money Mosen Equities provided $50,000.00 to be a loan to 
remain a loan pending Mosen Equities' "buy in" of an entity formed by 
the parties? Yes __ - No __ . 
3. Did the "buy in" referenced in Plaintiff's Exhibit __ occur? 
Yes -No 
4. Did the check presented as Exhibit ____ , modify the contract 
(Exhibit__) and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
5. Did the check presented as Exhibit ___ _, modify the contract 
(Exhibit __) and become part of that contract? 
Yes - No 
6. Did ~e check presented as Exhibit ____ , modify the contract 
(Exhibit__) and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
7. Did the check presented as Exhibit ____ , modify the contract 
(Exhibit__) and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
1 
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- -
8. Did the check presented as Exhibit ____ ., modify the contract 
(Exhibit_) and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
9. Did the check presented as Exhibit ____ , modify the contract 
(Exhibit_) and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
10. Did the check presented as Exhibit ____ , modify the contract 
(Exhibit_) and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
1 1. Did the check presented as Exhibit ____ , modify the contract 
(Exhibit_) and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
12. Did the check presented as Exhibit ____ , modify the contract 
(Exhibit_) and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
13. Has the Berry~ll & Company, Inc. breached the contract? 
Yes -No 
14. Has Mosell Equities been damaged as a result of Berryhill & 
Companies' breach? Yes __ - No __ . 
15. The amount of damages? $ __________ _ 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
propositions 1 and 2 have been proved, then you should answer these 
questions "yes". 
2 
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If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
proposition 3, no "buy in" occurred, then you should answer this question 
"no". 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
propositions 4 through 12 have been proved, then you should answer these 
questions "yes". 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
propositions 4 through 12 have not been proved, then you should answer the 
particular question "no". 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
propositions 13 and 14 occurred, then you should answer these questions 
"yes", and answer question 15. 
COUNT TWO-BREACH OF AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT 
1. Did an implied-in-fact contract exist between Mosell Equities and 
Berryhill & Company, Inc.? Yes - No 
2. Has the Berryhill & Company, Inc. breached the contract? 
Yes -No 
3. Has Mosell Equities been damaged as a result of Berryhill & 
Companies' breach? Yes __ - No __ . 
4. The amount of damages? $ __________ _ 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
the propositions has been proved, then you should answer the questions 
"yes" and complete question 4. If you find from your consideration of all of 
3 
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the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you 
should answer that question "no." 
COUNT THREE - UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
1. Under the circumstances, would it be unjust for the defendant to retain the 
benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value? 
Yes -No 
. --
2. If you answered the preceding question ''yes," please identify the amount 
of defendant's unjust enrichment. $ __________ _ 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the 
proposition has been proved, then you should answer the question "yes" and 
complete question 2. If you find from your consideration of all of the 
evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should 
answer that question "no." 
COUNT FOUR- CONVERSION 
1. Did the Defendant take or keep Mosell Equities' furniture and fixtures without 
a right to do so? Yes - No 
2. If you answered the preceding question "yes," please identify the amount 
ofMosell Equities' damages.$ 
-----------
COUNT FIVE - FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT 
1. Did John Berryhill state a fact to Mosell Equities? 
Yes -No 
2. Was the statement false? Yes - No 
3. Was the statement material? Yes - No 
4 
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4. Did John Berryhill know the statement was false or was he unaware of 
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made. Yes 
-No 
5. Mosell Equities did not know that the statement was false? Yes __ -
No 
6. John Berryhill intended for Mosell Equities to rely upon the statement 
and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated? Yes __ - No 
7. Mosell Equiti~s did rely upon the truth of the statement? 
Yes -No 
8. Mosell Equities' reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances? 
Yes -No 
9. Mosell Equities suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the 
false statement? Yes - No 
10. The amount of damages: $ __________ _ 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
the propositions has been proved, then you should answer questions 1 - 9 
"yes" and complete question 10. If you find from your consideration of all of 
the evidence that" any of these propositions has not been proved, then you 
should answer that question "no." 
5 
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-ORIGINt.~ 
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-
:'--·· J£ ..... -·  .......... " ... i--~ .... t/.,... -l',,...,s~2'1"r-" 
AUG 3 1 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. RANDALL 
OEPUlY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYIDLL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYIDLL III and ) 
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
DEFENDANTS' 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill III hereby submit their 
proposed form of Special Verdict. 
DATED this:). ~of August, 2010. 
DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 1 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
7/~ 
I hereby certify that on this~ day of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
~Via Facsimile: 939-7136 
Via U.S. Mail 
Daniel E. Williams 
DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) Case No. CV OC 0909974 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) SPECIAL VERDICT 
) 
BERRYIDLL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYIDLL III and ) 
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
ALLEGED BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT 
Question No. 1: Was there a written contract between Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, 
and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., which demonstrated a meeting of the minds between 
the parties on all essential elements of the parties' agreement? 
Answer to Question No. 1: Yes[_] No[_] 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 1 
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If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 5. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 2: Did Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., breach the contract? 
Answer to Question No. 2: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 3: Was Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, damaged on account of the breach? 
Answer to Question No. 3: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 4: What is the amount of damages incurred by Plaintiff Mosell Equities, 
LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.'s breach? 
Answer to Question No. 4: $ ____ _ 
If you answered Question No. 4, skip to Question No. 13. 
ALLEGED BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT 
Question No. 5: Did the conduct of the parties give rise to an implied contract, which 
demonstrated a meeting of the minds between the parties of all essential elements of the parties' 
agreement? 
Answer to Question No.5: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 9. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 2 
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Question No. 6: Did Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., breach the implied contract? 
Answer to Question No. 6: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 7: Was Plaintiff Mosen Equities, LLC, damaged on account of the breach 
of an implied contract? 
Answer to Question No. 7: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 8: What is the amount of damages incurred by Plaintiff Mosen Equities, 
LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, lnc.'s breach of an implied contract? 
Answer to Question No. 8: $ ____ _ 
If you answered Question No. 8, skip to Question No. 13. 
ALLEGED UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Question No. 9: Was there a benefit conferred upon Defendant Berryhill & Company, 
Inc., by the plaintiff? 
Answer to Question No. 9: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 10: Was there appreciation by Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., of 
such benefit? 
Answer to Question No. 10: Yes[_] No[_] 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 3 
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If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 11: Is it inequitable and unjust for Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., 
to retain the benefit without payment to the Plaintiff of the value of the benefit? 
Answer to Question No. 11: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 12: What is the value of the benefit conferred upon Defendant Berryhill & 
Company, Inc., by Plaintiff? 
Answer to Question No. 12: $ ____ _ 
Continue to Question No. 13. 
ALLEGED CONVERSION 
Question No. 13: Did Plaintiff Mosen Equities, LLC, prove that it owned or had a 
superior right to materials in the possession of Berryhill & Company, Inc.? 
Answer to Question No. 13: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 17. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 14: Did Plaintiff Mosen Equities, LLC, demand their return? 
Answer to Question No. 14: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 17. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 4 
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Question No. 15: Did Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., refuse to deliver them? 
Answer to Question No. 15: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 17. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 16: What is the value of the materials? 
Answer to Question No. 16: $ ____ _ 
Continue to Question No. 17. 
ALLEGED FRAUD 
(Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, against Defendant John Berryhill) 
Question No. 17: Did Defendant John Berryhill make a false statement of then-existing 
fact to Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC? 
Answer to Question No. 17: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 18: Was the statement material? 
Answer to Question No. 18: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 19: Did Defendant John Berryhill know that the statement was false? 
Answer to Question No. 19: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 5 
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Question No. 20: Did Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, know that the statement was false? 
Answer to Question No. 20: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 21: Did Defendant John Berryhill intend for the Plaintiff Mosell Equities, 
LLC, to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated? 
Answer to Question No. 21: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 22: Did Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, rely upon the truth of the 
statement? 
Answer to Question No. 22: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 23: Was Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC' s reliance reasonable and 
justifiable under all the circumstances? 
Answer to Question No. 23: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 24: Did Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC suffer damages proximately caused 
by reliance on the false statement? 
Answer to Question No. 24: Yes[_] No[_] 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 6 
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ff you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 25: What is the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiff Mosen Equities, 
LLC, proximately caused by Plaintiff's reliance of the false statement? 
Answer to Question No. 25: $ ____ _ 
Continue to Question No. 26. 
ALLEGED FRAUD 
(Berryhill & Company, Inc., against Mosen Equities, LLC) 
Question No. 26: Did Plaintiffs agent, Glenn Mosen, make a false statement of then-
existing fact to Berryhill & Company, Inc? 
Answer to Question No. 26: Yes[_] No[_] 
ff you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. ff you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 27: Was the statement material? 
Answer to Question No. 27: Yes[_] No[_] 
ff you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. ff you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 28: Did Glenn Mosen of behalf of Mosen Equities, LLC, know that the 
statement was false? 
Answer to Question No. 28: Yes[_] No[_] 
ff you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. ff you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 7 
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Question No. 29: Did John Berryhill on behalf of Berryhill & Company, Inc., know that 
the statement was false? 
Answer to Question No. 29: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 30: Did Glenn Mosell of Mosell Equities, LLC, intend for Berryhill & 
Company, Inc., to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated? 
Answer to Question No. 30: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 31: Did Berryhill & Company, Inc., rely upon the truth of the statement? 
Answer to Question No. 31: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 32: Was Berryhill & Company's reliance reasonable and justifiable under 
all the circumstances? 
Answer to Question No. 32: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 33: Did Berryhill & Company, Inc., suffer damages proximately caused by 
reliance on the false statement? 
Answer to Question No. 33: Yes[_] No[_] 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 8 
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If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 34: What is the amount of damages suffered by Berryhill & Company, Inc., 
proximately caused by Plaintiffs reliance of the false statement? 
Answer to Question No. 34: $ ____ _ 
Now, sign the verdict form below. 
DATED this __ day of September, 2010. 
Foreperson 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 9 
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-ORIGINAL 
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-
:! ~-' .,_, -·· ,. ,~3_,~ ...,1.9;.;...:3 _____ :;>_ 
AUG 3 1 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. RANDALL 
OEPU1't' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff , ) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYIDLL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYIDLL III and ) 
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill III hereby submit their 
Requested Jury Instructions, numbers 1 through 26, in addition to the customary IDJls. 
DATED thisli ~f August, 2010. OMAS, W~S&m 
Attorney for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, P. 1 
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CERT~E OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thi~ day of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
~a Facsimile: 939-7136 
__ Via U.S. Mail 
Daniel E. Williams 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, P. 2 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if 
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably 
true than not true. 
IDJl2d 1.20.1. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
1. A contract existed between Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, and Defendant 
Berryhill & Company, Inc.; 
2. The defendant breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions 
required of the plaintiff has been proved, then you must consider the issue of the affirmative 
defenses raised by the defendant, and explained in the next instruction. If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been 
proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. 
IDJl2d 6.10.1.(modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do or not do something that is 
supported by consideration. 
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four 
elements. The four elements are: 
1. Competent parties; 
2. A lawful purpose; 
3. Valid consideration; and 
4. Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms. 
It is not disputed that the following elements are present in the contract alleged in this 
case: The parties were competent to enter into a contract, the alleged contract was for a lawful 
purpose and there was valid consideration. The parties do dispute whether there was mutual 
agreement between them to all essential terms 
IDJ12d 6.01.1. (modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
In order for a contract to be formed, there must be a meeting of the minds on all material 
terms to the contract. 
Panike & Sons Fanns, Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562, 567 (Idaho 2009); Barry v. Pacific West 
Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 831, 103 P.3d 440,444 (2004). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
A contract must be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain 
provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty. 
Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346,348,670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983) (citations omitted) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
In this case, Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., claims that all parties did not agree to 
all essential terms of the contract. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the "meeting of 
the minds," and means that all parties to a contract must have understood and accepted all of the 
essential terms of the contract. 
There is no contract unless all of the essential terms have been communicated to all 
parties, understood by all parties, and accepted by all parties. 
IDJI2d 6.05.1. (modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
If the provisions of a contract are ambiguous, the interpretation of those provisions is a 
question of fact which focuses upon the intent of the parties. The determination of the parties' 
intent is to be determined by looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the 
document, the circumstances under which it was made, the objective and purpose of the 
particular provision, and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by 
their conduct or dealings. 
J.R. Simplot v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006): Univ. of Idaho Found., 
Inc. v. Civic Partners, Inc. (In re Univ. Placelldaho Water Ctr. Project), 146 Idaho 527, 536 
(Idaho 2008) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
In this case the defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., has asserted certain affinnative 
defenses. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted. 
Defendant has raised the affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel and waiver. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions 
required of the defendant has been proved, then your verdict should be for the defense. If you 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions has not been proved, 
then the defendant has not proved the affirmative defense in this case. 
IDJI2d 6.10.4. (modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
The defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., has asserted the affirmative defense of 
equitable estoppel. This is a legal term which means the plaintiff may be prevented from 
enforcing a contract or term of contract by reason of the plaintiffs own conduct. 
To establish the defense of equitable estoppel, the defendant has the burden of proof on 
each of the following propositions: 
1. The plaintiff falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the defendant; 
2. The plaintiff knew or should have known the true facts; 
3. The defendant did not know and could not discover the true facts; 
4. The defendant relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the defendant's 
prejudice. 
IDJI2d 6.22.1. (modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by conduct, 
by words, or by acquiescence. 
IDJI2d 6.24.1. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
001088
-
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the contract 
are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the performance by 
the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance. The 
implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding. 
Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 287, 869 P.2d 1378, 1382 (1994) (citing Clements v. 
Jungert, 90 Idaho 143,153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965)). Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584,587, 
930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
A 'course of dealing' is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular 
transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for 
interpreting their expressions and other conduct. 
Idaho Code § 28-1-205( 1) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
001090
INS"rRUCTION NO. 13 
In order to establish unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show that there was: (1) a 
benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such 
benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the 
defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof. 
King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 910 (Idaho 2002), citing, Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. 
Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999), citing, Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378,382, 
941 P.2d 350, 354 (Ct. App. 1997). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
001091
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
The measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim is not the actual amount of the 
enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between two parties it would be unjust for 
one party to retain. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant received a benefit 
and of proving the amount of the benefit which the defendants unjustly retained. The value of 
services rendered can be used as evidence of the value of the benefit bestowed under the theory 
of unjust enrichment. Although damages need not be proven with mathematical precision, the 
damages, i.e., the value of any benefit unjustly received by the defendant in an action based upon 
unjust enrichment, must be proven to a reasonable certainty. 
Gray v. Tri-Way Constr. Servs., 147 Idaho 378, 389 (Idaho 2009), citing and quoting, Barry v. 
Pacific West Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004), Blaser v. Cameron, 
121 Idaho 1012, 1017, 829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct. App. 1992), Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock 
Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463,466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990), Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 
101 Idaho 663,667,619 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1980) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
001092
• 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
To prevail for unjust enrichment, plaintiff must show not simply that Berryhill & 
Company, Inc., benefitted from the efforts of plaintiff; instead, it must be shown that a party was 
unjustly enriched in the sense that the term 'unjustly' could mean illegally or unlawfully. 
Schumacher v. Schumacher, 627 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); see also, Knight v. 
Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1988) ("misleading act" or something similar necessary) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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• 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
To sustain a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must show that the party against 
whom recovery is sought either wrongfully secured or passively received a benefit that it would 
be unconscionable for her to retain. However, a claim for unjust enrichment requires more than a 
showing that the defendant may have benefitted in some way from the disputed conduct. 
2008 Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 181 (3rd Cir.) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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• 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
Not every possession constitutes conversion. To prove conversion, the plaintiff must 
show facts establishing that he owned or had a superior right to the materials in question, that he 
demanded their return, and that defendant refused to deliver them. A conversion action cannot 
be based on a mere breach of a contractual obligation. 
Priel v. Heby, 2004 NY Slip Op 50820U, 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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• 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendant John Berryhill stated a fact to the plaintiff[s]; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it 
in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false 
statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud have 
been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff on 
this issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing 
propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be 
for the defendant 
1 
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IDJI2d 4.60. (modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED ___ _ 
COVERED ___ _ 
OTHER 2 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing 
evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true. 
This is a higher burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than 
not true. 
IDJI2d 1.20.2. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced_ the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the 
damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the 
injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
IDJ12d 2.30.1. (modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
As a general rule, fraud cannot be based upon statements promissory in nature that relate 
to future actions or upon the mere failure to perform a promise or an agreement to do something 
in the future. The allegedly false representation must concern past or existing material facts. 
DeVries v. DeLaval, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41599, 21-22 (D. Idaho 2006) (construing 
Idaho law), citing, Pacific States Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Addison, 45 Idaho 270, 261 P. 683 (1927), 
Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 114 P.3d 974 (2005); see also, In re Syntex 
Corp. Secs. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 1996) (Predictions proved to be wrong in hindsight 
do not render the statements untrue when made) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INS"rRUCTION NO. 22 
The representation forming the basis of a claim for fraud must concern past or existing 
material facts. Representations concerning future events are usually not considered actionable. 
A promise or statement that an act will be undertaken, however, is actionable, if it is proven that 
the speaker made the promise without intending to keep it. 
Magic Lantern Prods. v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 805,807 (1995), overruled on other grounds, 
Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466 (2001); First Sec. Bank of Idaho 
v. Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 268, 805 P.2d 468,474 (1991). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
A plaintiff is not justified in relying upon a misrepresentation regarding a matter of law 
that misrepresents only the legal consequences of facts, just as the plaintiff would not be justified 
in relying upon any other representation of any other opinion. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), Section 545 (2); Elliot Megdal & Assoc. v. Hawaii 
Planning Mill, 814 F.Supp. 898 (D. Hawaii 1993) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
For the plaintiff to recover against defendant for fraud, plaintiff must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the plaintiff's loss resulted from plaintiffs justifiable reliance on the 
misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action. The plaintiff relied on the 
misrepresentation if it caused the plaintiff to act in a way that plaintiff would otherwise not have 
acted without this misrepresentation. The plaintiff's reliance is justified if the situation makes it 
reasonable to accept the representation made, in light of the circumstances and the plaintiff's 
intelligence, experience and knowledge. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), Section 537; Slaymaker v. Westgate State Bank, 739 P.2d 
444 (Kan. 1987) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
'One who has special knowledge, experience and competence may not be permitted to 
rely on statements for which the ordinary man might recover, and that one who has acquired 
expert knowledge concerning the matter dealt with may be required to form his own judgment, 
rather than talce the word of the defendant.' 
W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 108, at 751 (5th ed. 1984), cited in, 
Stanley Weiss Assocs., LLC v. Energy Mgmt., 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 72 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to 
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
IDJl2d 9.00. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) Case No. CV OC 0909974 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and ) 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
------~----------) 
Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill III hereby submit their Trial 
Brief. 
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FACTUAL SUMMARY 
This case arises from a failed business relationship. Plaintiff was the developer of a 
proposed development near Sunnyslope in Canyon County, Idaho, to be known as "Polo Cove." 
According to the Plaintiff's sole owner and managing member, Glenn E. Mosell, he approached 
John Berryhill initially about building a restaurant within the development: 
In 2005 I - Mosell Equities secured a purchase of a vineyard on Homedale 
Road, and then went under contract on several adjacent properties to that 
vineyard. My vision to build a restaurant in the Idaho wine country on that site 
prompted me to contact John Berryhill for the first time. He was actually my first 
choice as the celebrity chef in town with the right flair, to anchor my wine country 
restaurant idea. 1 
Mosell first contacted Mr. Berryhill in the summer of 2005 (Mosell: 41). Asked about the 
evolution of his relationship with Mr. Berryhill "relative to his restaurant and Polo Cove," Mosell 
answered: 
Again, John as a restaurateur, we looked to him as a consultant to design a wine 
country restaurant; seating, layout. Worked with Sherry McKibben, architect; also 
Andy Erstad and Ken Reed, architects. And we have now a restaurant designed 
for Polo Cove. 
*** 
I was tapping into his expertise, using him as a consultant to design a wine 
country restaurant. That was the focus of our relationship. We discussed further 
involvement in the Polo Cove project beyond just being a restaurateur. So there is 
value that if a restaurant is built in a vineyard, the surrounding property's value is 
enhanced. I introduced that concept to John, that he could then participate in 
some of those profits beyond daily restaurant operation and cash flow. 
Deposition of Glenn E. Mosell of February 5, 2008, at p. 39 in the action entitled 
John Berryhill and Masell Equities, L.L.C., v. Broadway Park, Inc., and Michael G. Matzek, 
Case No. CV OC 07-00987 in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, In and For the County of Ada. Pertinent excerpts are attached to the Affidavit of Daniel E. 
Williams Re: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, as Exhibit "A". Subsequent 
references to this deposition testimony are cited to "Mosell" by page number. 
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*** 
So we discussed ways of compensating John Berryhill for his talents, his culinary 
talents, his name recognition, his personality and flair as a restaurateur. It was not 
required that he build the restaurant himself or invest monies to participate in that 
enhancement of value to real estate. 
We then discussed during that time period, time allocation of his services. If I 
take him from his catering and downtown restaurant efforts out to Polo Cove, 
what would the compensation formula be; how much time would he have to 
dedicate to Polo Cove versus his downtown restaurant endeavors? That was the 
evolution of which it made sense for me to buy into Berryhill and Company so 
that there was no competing activity. It's all blended. that Mosell business into 
Berryhill. We talked about Moberry Ventures as that entity, and that entity would 
operate a restaurant downtown; would operate a restaurant at Polo Cove. And 
we'd operate catering businesses around the valley, services. 
(Mosell: 41-43) (emphasis added). 
The following exchange confirms Mosell' s intention of incorporating Berryhill & 
Company, Inc., within the Polo Cove effort: 
Q. Well, let me ask you to please follow up on that, cause I think I understand 
you correctly, that Mr. Berryhill had his name recognition and his flair and 
his culinary talents to offer to Polo Cove, right? 
A Correct. 
Q. Although it doesn't sound like you contemplated his, Mr. Berryhill's, that is, 
direct investment in Polo Cove; you wanted to compensate him somehow-
A Correct. 
Q. -is that correct, for his time? 
A Correct. 
Q. And in order to eliminate any competition, as you put it, or tension between his 
various activities, you undertook some sort of blending of operations; is that 
right? 
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A. Exactly. 
Q. Please describe for me the contracts and legal agreements that memorialize that 
blending, please, and that relationship. 
A. Trout Jones had put together documents for Maberry Ventures, Inc., that we never 
finalized. 
Q. Why were they not finalized? 
A. Our focus was opening the restaurant downtown at the Plaza 121 during the 
second half of 2006, and we just haven't gotten to finalization of that Maberry 
entity. In lieu of my purchasing equity, I have loaned Berryhill and Company 
$385,000. 
Q. Mr. Masell, you said in lieu of the purchase of equity you have loaned Berryhill 
$385,000. Do you mean that as a permanent substitute or is that an interim? 
A. Interim substitute. 
(Masell: 43-44) (emphasis added). 
On approximately June 28, 2007, Plaintiff provided Berryhill & Company, Inc., with a 
check for $50,000. In a handwritten note on a copy of the check, which is signed by John 
Berryhill and Glenn Masell, there appears the following: 
This is a loan from Masell Equities to cover some misc. downtown expenses 
during our bookeeper transition. It will go into the general check register & be 
used for any billing of payables needed for downtown or Berryhill & Co. 
It will be transitioned into part of Glenn's "buy in" of Maberry Venture Corp. Inc.2 
Subsequently, Masell Equities provided $405,000 in funds to Berryhill & Company, Inc. Asked 
again about the terms of their arrangement, Glenn Masell testified on February 5, 2008: "We 
have no contractual arrangement on Polo Cove. We have no contractual arrangement with 
Berryhill and Company at this point. No contract exists" (Masell: 62). 
2 Exhibit A to Amended Complaint filed September 14, 2009 (emphasis added). 
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For roughly three years, Mr. Berryhill devoted substantial amounts of time to the Polo 
Cove venture, meeting with architects, designers, potential vendors, vintners, hotel developers, 
county commissioners and others about the proposed restaurant, hotel and other parts of the 
developments. 3 Mr. Berryhill did so upon his understanding with Glenn Mosen, as Mosen 
testified above, that Berryhill & Company, Inc. would participate in the Polo Cove profits beyond 
operation of the restaurant. As part of their effort, Berryhill & Company, Inc., moved to 
downtown Boise at the Plaza 121 location. Mr. Mosell encouraged the move, wanting to "splash 
the pot," that together they had "big things" to do. Throughout the construction of the new 
Berryhill & Company, Inc., restaurant, Mr. Mosen told Mr. Berryhill not to "cheap out," not to 
worry about the cost of the buildout, saying "go big" and "do it sexy" (Berryhill: <JI 5). Mr. 
Berryhill would not have agreed to the move downtown without Mosen' s encouragement and 
promised financial support (Berryhill: <JI 6). A large portion of the funds provided by Mr. Mosen 
went to the buildout of the new downtown space (Berryhill: <JI 7). Mr. Mosen signed a personal 
guaranty with the landlord at Plaza 121, guaranteeing payment of the lease, including any 
modification. 4 
Mosell signed a letter of intent with the Plaza 121 landlord for additional space near the 
restaurant for a Polo Cove showroom, although Mr. Berryhill warned him it was too big and 
would significantly increase ongoing liabilities. Mosen responded that Mr. Berryhill was not 
3 Affidavit of John Berryhill Re: Motion for Summary Judgment, <JI 3. Subsequent 
references to this Affidavit are cited to "Berryhill" by paragraph number. 
4 Exhibit A to Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial filed December 
21, 2009. 
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looking at "the big picture." Mr. Mosell could use the space for Polo Cove promotions during 
the day and Berryhill & Company, Inc., could use it for banquets and receptions in the evening 
(Berryhill: <JI 8). Although Mosell paid rent for this area, he did not cover the Polo Cove portion 
of the buildout of the space. In late summer, 2008, Mosell discontinued paying rent altogether 
(Berryhill: <JI 9). Berryhill & Company, Inc., is still paying rent on this additional space 
(Berryhill: <JI 10). In answer to discovery requests, Berryhill & Company, Inc., has identified 
approximately $927,415 in costs associated with move of the restaurant downtown, expansion 
space including the Polo Cove showroom, and ongoing rent obligations (Berryhill: <JI 11). 
On May 28, 2009, Plaintiff filed this action, initially alleging breach of oral contract and 
other claims. 
REMAINING CLAIMS 
Defendants first address two claims not before the Court: (1) individual liability of John 
and Amy Berryhill for the alleged loan; and (2) any ownership interest of Plaintiff in Berryhill & 
Company, Inc. Defendant then reviews those claims remaining and at issue. 
1. No theory of individual liability remains on the alleged indebtedness. 
Originally, at Count Five of its Complaint, Plaintiff sued John and Amy Berryhill 
individually, along with Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., for unjust enrichment regarding 
the alleged "loan" to Berryhill & Company, Inc. Ruling on Defendant's first motion to dismiss, 
the Court found that Plaintiff had not even pled corporate veil piercing so as to impose individual 
liability and the individual count was dismissed. 5 In its Amended Complaint, Plaintiff attempted 
5 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed July 
28, 2009. 
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to impose individual liability on John Berryhill through its Count Six, in which it attempted to 
plead corporate-veil piercing. Agreeing with Defendants' second motion to dismiss, the Court 
again dismissed the corporate veil-piercing claim.6 
Plaintiff attempted a third time to amend and assert a corporate veil-piercing theory. 7 At 
hearing, however, Plaintiff withdrew this motion upon learning that the Court would delay trial, 
if leave to amend was granted, so that Defendants could bring a summary judgment motion on 
this new claim. 
Accordingly, the only individual theory of liability remaining is stated against John 
Berryhill at Count Five of the Amended Complaint for alleged "fraud in the inducement." 
2. Plaintiff has affirmatively disclaimed any ownership interest in Defendant 
Berryhill & Company, Inc. 
At no time in these proceedings has Plaintiff asserted a claim for any kind of ownership 
interest in Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., whether based on constructive partnership or 
any other potential theory. In fact, Plaintiff has pled and admitted just the opposite: "However, 
the parties never formed MOBERRY and Mosell Equities never acquired its 50% ownership 
interest in Berryhill & Company" (Amended Complaint: <JI 10). 
Accordingly, there is no legal or equitable issue as to ownership in Berryhill & Company, 
Inc. Plaintiffs claims focus exclusively on the alleged "loan." 
6 Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Defendants' Second Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion to Strike Three Day Notice of Intent to Take Default filed December 4, 
2009. 
7 Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint filed June 2, 2010. 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF, P. 7 
001112
3. Breach of written contract. 
At summary judgment, the Court noted that "[c]ontract formation is generally a question 
of fact to be determined by the trier of fact," citing, P.O. Ventures, Inc., v. Loucks Family 
Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007).8 After analysis, the Court 
stated that "the Court finds that the June 2008 agreement does constitute a valid contract; 
however, its terms are ambiguous and its interpretation is a question of fact" (Summary 
Judgment Decision: 8). It also stated that two checks out of the ten checks, those of October 9, 
2007, and April 30, 2008, totaling $80,000, "are not contracts as a matter of law" (Summary 
Judgment Decision: 9). 
In conclusion, however, the Court specifically stated: 
The question of whether the contract or contracts were breached hinges on 
whether the trier of fact determines that there was a binding contract formed and 
what a reasonable time for performance of the contract is. If the trier of fact 
determines that there was a contract and that the reasonable time for performance 
(repayment) has passed, then Berryhill & Co is in breach of the contracts. 
There remains material questions of fact. The court therefore denies the 
Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment as to Count One. 
(Summary Judgment Decision: 9-10). Here, it appears that the Court has left the issue of 
contract formation where it belongs - with the jury. 
"If a breach of contract is alleged, the burden is upon the claimant to show 'the making of 
the contract, an obligation assumed by defendants, and their breach or failure to meet such 
obligation."' Reynolds v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 362, 365 (1988), quoting, 
8 Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Cross Motions for Summary 
Judgment, Motions to Strike, Motion to Amend Complaint, and Motion to Compel filed April 
30, 2010, p. 7. Subsequent references to this decision are cited to "Summary Judgment 
Decision," by page number. 
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Thomas v. Cate, 78 Idaho 29, 31,296 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1956). "[A] contract must be complete, 
definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in 
themselves of being reduced to certainty." Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99 (Idaho 2002), 
quoting Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346,348,670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983); see also, 
Kidd Island Bay Water Users Coop. Ass'n v. Miller, 136 Idaho 571, 574 (Idaho 2001) (The terms 
of a contract must be sufficiently definite and certain in order to be enforceable). 
Idaho's contract law is no different from that of other jurisdictions: 
'A contract is an agreement between two or more parties for the doing or not 
doing of some specified thing.' O.C.G.A. § 13-1-1. 'In order that it may allege an 
agreement, a petition must set forth a contract of such certainty and completeness 
that either party may have a right of action upon it.' Peachtree Med. Bldg. v. 
Keel, 107 Ga. App. 438,440 (130 S.E.2d 530) (1963). 'The requirement of 
certainty extends not only to the subject matter and purpose of the contract, but 
also to the parties, consideration, and even the time and place of performance 
where these are essential. When a contract is substantially alleged, some details 
might be supplied under the doctrines of reasonable time or reasonable 
requirements. But indefiniteness in subject matter so extreme as not to present 
anything upon which the contract may operate in a definite manner renders the 
contract void ... .' (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Peachtree Med., supra at 
441. Furthermore, "[t]he first requirement of the law relative to contracts is that 
there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties, and mutuality, and in order for 
the contract to be valid the agreement must ordinarily be expressed plainly and 
explicitly enough to show what the parties agreed upon. A contract cannot be 
enforced in any form of action if its terms are incomplete or incomprehensible." 
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bagwell-Hughes, Inc. v. McConnell, 224 Ga. 
659, 661-662 (164 S.E.2d 229) (1968); see also Green v. Zaring, 222 Ga. 195 
(149 S.E.2d 115) (1966); Patel v. Gingrey Assoc., 196 Ga. App. 203 (2) (395 
S.E.2d 595) (1990). 
Jackson v. Williams, 209 Ga. App. 640, 642-643 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). 
Plaintiff relies on Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint as the alleged written contract at 
issue in this case. Exhibit A is a handwritten note on a copy of a $50,000 check from Mosell 
Equities to Berryhill & Company, Inc., indicating that "this" is a loan that "will be transitioned" 
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into a "buy in." The document is silent as to the parties' intent as to what happens if, for any 
reason, the transition does not occur. Plaintiff pretends that it is clear that the $50,000 remains a 
loan regardless of whether the "transition" occurs or not, but the note does not state anything of 
the sort. 
Thus, the element of definiteness is entirely lacking, demonstrating a lack of a meeting of 
the minds of the parties. Defendant is entitled to have the trier of fact decide as a factual matter 
whether there was an adequate meeting of the minds to form a bona fide contract. Defendants' 
proposed jury instructions reflect this remaining dispute. 
4. Breach of implied-in-fact contract. 
Although a contract may be implied by the conduct of the parties, nevertheless it is 
"grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding." Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 
587,930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997). Where, as here, even the conduct of the parties demonstrated 
that they had no agreement or tacit understanding as to what would occur if the "loan" was not 
transitioned, an essential term is missing and there was no meeting of the minds implied by 
conduct so as to constitute such an implied-in-fact contract. By Plaintiffs own earlier admission, 
the "loan," if it can be called one, was meant as a temporary and "interim" step, not as a 
permanent lender-debtor relationship. 
5. Unjust enrichment. 
According to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
in order to establish the prima facie case for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must 
show that there was: (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; 
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit 
under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the 
benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof. 
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King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 910 (Idaho 2002), citing, Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. 
Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88,982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999), citing, Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378,382, 
941 P.2d 350,354 (Ct. App. 1997). 
In King, the Court sustained a district court's grant of summary judgment on this theory, 
explaining that it would not be inequitable for the defendants to retain any benefit, because the 
plaintiff was represented by a real estate agent in the real property transaction at issue and could 
not show that she justifiably relied on any alleged misrepresentations. Similarly, Plaintiff cannot 
show any bona fide inequity based on its own failure to require appropriate documents of 
indebtedness prior to advancing funds. Plaintiff cannot claim that its own business dealings with 
Berryhill & Company, Inc., were inequitable, when its agent, Glenn Mosell, possessed the 
superior financial experience and knowledge. 
Moreover, not every benefit provided by a party, especially viewed in isolation, amounts 
to unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Schumacher v. Schumacher, 627 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2001) ("An action for unjust enrichment does not lie simply because one party benefits 
from the efforts of others; instead, 'it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the 
sense that the term 'unjustly' could mean illegally or unlawfully") (citation omitted). 
Defendants' proposed jury instructions set forth this authority. 
6. Conversion. 
Not every possession constitutes conversion. See, e.g., Priel v. Heby, 2004 NY Slip Op 
50820U, 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) ("To properly plead a cause of action for conversion, it is 
incumbent upon plaintiff to allege facts establishing that he owned or had a superior right to the 
materials in question, that he demanded their return, and that defendant refused to deliver them .. 
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. . 'A conversion action cannot be predicated on an equitable interest or a mere breach of a 
contractual obligation"') ( citations omitted). 
Plaintiff must prove a "superior" right, not merely a breach of contract, as Defendants' 
proposed jury instruction explains. 
7. Fraud in the inducement. 
At summary judgment, the Court found that the only alleged fraudulent statement made 
by John Berryhill that was properly at issue was the statement "this is a loan ... " in Exhibit A to 
the Amended Complaint (Summary Judgment Decision: 13). The Court found that there was "a 
question of fact as to Berryhill's intent at the time the agreement was entered in to." Although 
Defendants respectfully disagree with the Court's conclusions, they acknowledge that those 
claims remain against John Berryhill individually and Berryhill & Company, Inc., as his 
principal. 
A. John Berryhill made no false representation of fact. 
Under clear Idaho authority, 
Fraud requires: (1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its 
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that 
there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) 
reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury. 
Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., 141 Idaho 604,615 (2005), citing, Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 
226, 46 P.3d 518, 522 (2002). The party alleging fraud must support the existence of each of the 
elements of the cause of action for fraud by pleading with particularity the factual circumstances 
constituting fraud. I.R.C.P. 9(b); Theriault v. A.H. Robins, 108 Idaho 303,307,698 P.2d 365, 
369 (1985); Galaxy Outdoor Advertising v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 109 Idaho 692, 710 P.2d 602 
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(1985); Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 722 P.2d 474 (1986). Furthermore, the party alleging an 
action for fraud has the burden of proving all these elements at trial by clear and convincing 
evidence. Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387,613 P.2d 1338 (1980); Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 
331,597 P.2d 217 (1979); Gneiting v. Clement, 96 Idaho 348,528 P.2d 1283 (1974). 
Obviously, a statement or representation of fact must be made that is false. The statement 
Plaintiff complains about is not a recital or warranty by John Berryhill or Berryhill & Company, 
Inc. The statement in Exhibit A that the $50,000 in funds was a "loan" that "will be transitioned" 
into part of Mosell's buy-in to a new entity to be formed simply is not a representation of fact, 
much less one that is false. A loan that "will be transitioned" is, quite simply, not a loan at all. 
And the language set forth in Exhibit A is not a representation of fact, but, if anything, an 
attempted legal characterization of the parties' intent. 
Moreover, Exhibit A correctly and accurately set forth both of the parties' then-current 
intent, as confirmed by the sworn testimony of Glenn Mosen himself: 
Q. Please describe for me the contracts and legal agreements that memorialize that 
blending, please, and that relationship. 
A. Trout Jones had put together documents for Moberry Ventures, Inc., that we never 
finalized. 
Q. Why were they not finalized? 
A. "Our focus was opening the downtown at the Plaza 121 during the second half of 
2006, and we just haven't gotten to finalization of that Moberry entity. In lieu of 
my purchasing equity, I have loaned Berryhill and Company $385,000. 
Q. Mr. Mosell, you said in lieu of the purchase of equity you have loaned Berryhill 
$385,000. Do you mean that as a permanent substitute or is that an interim? 
A. Interim substitute. 
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(Mosell: 44) ( emphasis added). Here, Glenn Mosell confirms that the "loan" was a temporary 
and interim substitute for a full agreement, rather than a permanent arrangement. Based on 
Mosell' s own testimony, no statement in Exhibit A is false. 
Even to whatever extent Exhibit A could be read to state anything false, any alleged 
misstatements of opinion or of the law are not representations of fact and cannot serve as the 
basis for a fraud claim. 
The principle that fraud must rest on a misrepresentation of fact, and cannot be 
supported by a misstatement of opinion, is based on the theory that 'everyone is 
equally capable of determining the law, is presumed to know the law and is bound 
to take notice of the law and, therefore, in legal contemplation, cannot be deceived 
by representations concerning the law or permitted to say he or she has been 
misled.' Williston on Contracts, Misstatements of Law, § 69: 10 (4th Ed.)(2004). 
Equal Justice Found. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 412 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795 (S.D. Ohio 
2005). 
B. Fraud cannot be based simply upon a failure to perform a contractual 
duty. 
Under Idaho law, as is generally the case, fraud cannot be based upon the failure to 
perform a contractual promise. 
As a general rule, fraud cannot be based upon statements promissory in nature that 
relate to future actions or upon the mere failure to perform a promise or an 
agreement to do something in the future. Pacific States Auto. Fin. Corp. v. 
Addison, 45 Idaho 270, 261 P. 683 (1927). The allegedly false representation 
must concern past or existing material facts. Maroun v. Wyre less Systems, Inc., 
141 Idaho 604, 114 P.3d 974 (2005); see also, In re Syntex Corp. Secs. Litig., 95 
F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 1996) (Predictions proved to be wrong in hindsight do not 
render the statements untrue when made). 
DeVries v. DeLaval, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41599, 21-22 (D. Idaho 2006) (construing 
Idaho law). The reason for this general rule is obvious: 
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Fraud is an intentional tort, the plaintiff claims to have been cheated. Put more 
succinctly, there is a fundamental difference between 'a statement that is false 
when made and a promise that becomes false only when the promisor later fails to 
keep his word.' City of Richmond v. Madison Mgt. Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438,447 
(4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Lissmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 50, 53 (4th 
Cir. 1988)). The law regards the former as a more serious wrong. Fraud, of 
course, is easily and often claimed, but the many elements which must be proved 
by the higher standard of "clear, satisfactory and convincing" evidence make fraud 
more difficult to prove as it should be given the gravity of the allegation. 
Emplrs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Collins &Aikman Floor Coverings, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7192, 
55-56 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 13, 2004). Or, as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained, 
A Supreme Court of Virginia case, not cited by the parties or the district court, 
nicely sets the distinction between a statement actionable as a breach of contract 
and a statement actionable as a fraud. Colonial Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. 
Schneider, 228 Va. 671,325 S.E.2d 91(1985). Colonial Ford distinguishes 
between a statement that is false when made and a promise that becomes false 
only when the promisor later fails to keep his word. The former is fraud, the latter 
is breach of contract. A promise to perform an act in the future is not, in a legal 
sense, a representation as that term is used in the fraud context. Soble v. Herman, 
175 Va. 489, 9 S.E.2d 459 (1940). The reason is obvious. Without that rule 
almost every breach of contract could be claimed to be a fraud. 
Lissmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 50, 53 ( 4th Cir. 1988) ( emphasis added). 
C. Plaintiff does not sustain a claim for fraud in the inducement. 
The sole exception to the line of authority set forth above occurs when a party makes a 
contractual promise it has no present intention of keeping. As the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained: 
Generally, the representation forming the basis of a claim for fraud must concern 
past or existing material facts. Representations concerning future events are 
usually not considered actionable. First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Webster, 119 Idaho 
262,268, 805 P.2d 468,474 (1991). A promise or statement that an act will be 
undertaken, however, is actionable, if it is proven that the speaker made the 
promise without intending to keep it. Id. Therefore, CPP's representations as to 
future events would be actionable only if Magic Lantern could show that CPP 
made these representations without intending to honor them. 
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CPP presented evidence that CPP had intended to do business with Magic Lantern 
as represented and that CPP abandoned the project only after the negotiations with 
Magic Lantern did not produce an agreement. Magic Lantern did not produce any 
evidence suggesting that at the time of the alleged representations CPP did not 
intend to carry out the project and to include Magic Lantern as represented. 
Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment dismissing 
the fraud claim. 
Magic Lantern Prods. v. Dolsot, 126 ldaho 805, 807 (1995), overruled on other grounds, 
Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466 (2001). 
Here, Plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that John Berryhill had a 
present intention not to perform the alleged agreement set forth at Exhibit A to the Amended 
Complaint. It cannot rely simply on the fact of non-payment. 
D. Plaintiff had no right to rely upon the alleged misrepresentations. 
Even if Plaintiff could somehow conjure an actionable representation, it cannot sustain its 
burden of demonstrating ''justifiable reliance" on such a representation. Plaintiff's sole owner 
and managing member, Glenn Mosell, graduated from U.C. San Diego with a bachelor's degree 
in economics (Mosell: 10). He obtained a Series Six securities license and worked for 
Prudential-Bache, exploring a financial services stockbroker career (Mosell: 11). He also 
obtained real estate licenses in California and Colorado (Mosell: 11). He worked as a sales 
associate broker with Marcus and Millichap, a national firm dealing in investment sales (Mosell: 
14). He then worked for Sperry Van Ness as an investment broker (Mosell: 15). He has worked 
on many millions of dollars worth of transactions (Mosell: 19). He has also worked as a 
commercial real estate developer (Mosell: 23). 
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As a sophisticated businessman, Mosell simply had no right to rely on the handwritten 
statements set forth at Exhibit A. He is presumed to understand what a note is, if he really 
intended a simple loan and nothing more. He could have required a note or some other 
manifestation of the parties' intent prior to advancing funds. For a sophisticated businessman to 
provide funds in the amounts at issue in reliance upon such a vague and flimsy basis as Exhibit A 
is not in any sense justifiable. 
Reasonable reliance is measured objectively, yet consideration is given to certain 
subjective attributes of the individual, such as his or her sophistication. 'One who 
has special knowledge, experience and competence may not be permitted to rely 
on statements for which the ordinary man might recover, and that one who has 
acquired expert knowledge concerning the matter dealt with may be required to 
form his own judgment, rather than take the word of the defendant.' W. Page 
Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts§ 108, at 751 (5th ed. 1984). 
Stanley Weiss Assocs., LLC v. Energy Mgmt., 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 72 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004). 
Thus, to the extent that anything at all represented by John Berryhill in Exhibit A is false, 
Plaintiff will not be able to show that it reasonably had any right or justifiable reasons for relying 
upon it. 
8. Fraud counterclaim. 
Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., has stated a fraud counterclaim against Plaintiff. 
Naturally, the authority cited above applies to the fraud counterclaim, as well as to Plaintiffs 
own claim. 
Specifically, Defendant claims that Mosell Equities represented that it owned substantial 
real estate holdings in the proposed Polo Cove development, which was false.9 Defendant also 
9 Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial filed December 21, 2009, Cj[ 7. 
Subsequent references to this filing are cited to "Counterclaim" by paragraph number. 
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\ claims that Mosell Equities induced Berryhill & Company to add additional space to its existing 
obligation to his landlord based on all of the representations made by Plaintiff regarding the joint 
interest in Polo Cove (Counterclaim: <J[ 18). By insisting on calling the funds a "loan," while 
simultaneously assuring Defendant that they would not remain such, Plaintiff induced Defendant 
to accept the funds under false pretenses (Counterclaim: <J[ 22). 
Because fraud depends on "all the circumstances," see, e.g., Fuchs v. Lloyd, 80 Idaho 114 
(1958), Defendants are entitled to explore a wide-ranging series of subjects, including Glenn 
Mosell's background and development experience, as well as his acquaintance with notes, 
contracts and those subjects set forth in Defendants' Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion 
in Limine re: other litigak-
DATED this J:.. day of September, 2010. 
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Attorney for Defendants 
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CERT~ATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this -X day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
i.----- Via Facsimile: 939-7136 
Via U.S. Mail 
Daniel E. Williams 
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SEP. 3. 2010 2:32PM 
-
N0.9173 P.2 
·,() __________ --JJN--~ 
FlcED 
AIL"". -- -- ---- M; . 
DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
SEP D 3 2010 
J. UAviD NAVAnHV, (:,;jQr~ 
Av L.AM&O 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswillia.mslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) Case No. CV OC 0909974 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
t)fl'UTV 
) DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
vs. ) WITNESS DISCLOSURES 
) 
BERRYHILL & COMP ANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and ) 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
COMES NOW, Defendants, by and through counsel of record. and hereby supplements it 
disclosure of witnesses as follows: 
John Berryhill 
Berryhill & Co. Restaurant 
121 No. 9th St 
Boise, ID 83702 
GlennMosell 
2233 No. Aldercrest Pl 
Eagle, ID 83616 
(4 hours) 
(Likely cross examination) 
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Ron M. Bitner, Ph.D. 
Bitner Vineyards 
16645 Plum Road 
Caldwell, ID 83607 
Amy Dempsey 
Riche Demfsey & Assoc. 
205 No. 10 , Suite 300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Kim Gourley 
-
Trout Jones Gledhill & Fuhrman 
225No 9th St 
Boise, ID 83702 
Steve Inch 
Propel Communications Inc. 
2265 So. Swallowtail Lane 
Boise, ID 83706 
(1 hour) 
(1.5 hours) 
(1 hour) 
(2hours) 
James Tomlinson (1 hour) 
Tomlinson & Associates, Inc. 
205 No. 101h St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
~ 
DATED this 3 day of September, 2010. 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants 
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NO. 9173 P. 4 
C~'"9-~TE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this __ day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0, Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
VViaFacsimile: 939-7136 
Via U.S. Mail 
Daniel E. Williams 
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
• 
SEP O 1 2(}10 
By ~yfro, Clerk 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
MOSELL EQUITIES' DISCLOSURE 
OF TRIAL EXHIBITS 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and by and through its counsel of record and hereby provides 
the Court with its disclosure of its Trial Exhibits the Plaintiff will present for admission at trial. 
No Description Stipulation Offered Admitted 
Foundation Admission 
1 Loan Agreement with first loan check X X 
2 Check No. 5127 - June 28, 2007 "Loan" X X 
"$50,000" 
3 Check No. 5137 - July 30, 2007 "Loan" X X 
"$25,000" 
4 Check No. 5139-August 7, 2007 "Loan - X X 
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TI' s" "$25,000" 
5 Check No. 5140 - August 16, 2007 "Loan #4" X X 
"$25,000" 
6 Check No. 5141 - August 16, 2007 "Loan #5" X X 
"$25,000" 
7 Check No. 5196 - October 9, 2007 "Kitchen X X 
Equip Loan" "60,000" 
8 Check No. 5201 - October 26, 2007 "Loan" X X 
"100,000" 
9 Check No. 5154 - December 4, 2007 "Loan" X X 
"$25,000" 
10 Check No. 5164 - December 19, 2007 "Loan" X X 
"$50,000" 
11 Check No. 5247-April 30, 2008 "Suite 101 X X 
TI' s" "20,000" 
12 Check No. 5009 - September 21, 2005 John X X 
Berryhill Consulting "$5000" 
13 Check No. 5046 - May 9, 2006 John Berryhill X X 
Consulting "$5000" 
14 Check No. 5070 -August 7, 2006 John X X 
Berryhill Consulting "$10000" 
15 Check No. 5102 - February 13, 2007 X X 
Berryhill & Co Consulting "$5000" 
16 Check No. 5112 - May 1, 2007 "General X X 
Account" "$10000" 
17 Check No. 5117 - May 29, 2007 " " X X 
"$10000" 
18 Berryhill's "BCO Development" Outline X X 
"Vision" 
19 Berryhill's Offer No. 1 X X 
20 Berryhill' s Offer No. 2 X X 
21 Berryhill's Offer No. 3 X X 
22 $50,000 Deposit Summary X X 
23 Check from Berryhill & Co to John Berryhill 
X X 1-25-08 "$50,000" 
24 Personal Guarantee for lease space X X 
25 "Berryhill & Co. is moving back X X DOWNTOWN" Flyer 
26 Berryhill E-mail to Sam Gerberding May 14, X X 2007 
27 Polo Cove Business Card - Berryhill X X 
28 Berryhill Affidavit signed March 22, 2010 
with Exhibits 
29 Berryhill Affidavit signed April 7, 2010 with 
Exhibits 
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30 Boise Urban Liaison Article re Berryhill Move X X Downtown 
31 Mosell Comps X X 
32 Berryhill Comps X X 
33 Berryhill & Company, Inc. "Register Mosell X X Equities LLC" 
34 Kim Gourley Documents X X 
35 Victoria Meier Documents X X 
36 Victoria Meier 2008 Meeting Notes X X 
37 Dempsey - Berryhill E-mail March 5, 2008 X xx 
38 Mosell Berryhill E-mails String re Defendants' "MMM" 
investment/divestment Sept/ Oct 2008 
39 Epitome Bill for Furniture X X 
40 Master site plan for Polo Cove Defendants' "BBB" 
41 Vicki Meier bill X X 
42 Sherry McKibben E-mail February 20, 2007 re 
meeting with Berryhill re the restaurant at Polo X X 
Cove 
43 Restaurant Lease Summary Defendants' "G" I 
44 Polo Cove Executive Summary Dated X X February 29, 2008 
45 Polo Cove Executive Summary Dated June 18, X X 2008 
46 BH&Co Transaction account - Polo Cove X X 
space 
47 Berryhill's Day Planner 
48 Berryhill Deposition Transcript - Broadway 
Park Litigation (excerpts) 
49 Mosell Deposition Transcript - Broadway Park 
Litigation (excerpts) 
50 BH&Co Balance Sheet December 31, 2005 X X 
51 BH&Co Balance Sheet December 31, 2006 X X 
52 BH&Co Balance Sheet December 31, 2007 X X 
53 BH&Co Balance Sheet June 30, 2008 X X 
54 BH&Co Balance Sheet December 31, 2008 X X 
55 BH&Co Profit - loss 2005 X X 
56 BH&Co Profit - loss 2006 X X 
57 BH&Co Profit - loss 2007 X X 
58 BH&Co Profit - loss 2008 X X 
59 BH&Co Profit - loss 2009 X X 
60 BH&Co Annual Meeting of the Board of X X Directors and Shareholders -2005 
61 BH&Co Annual Meeting of the Board of X X Directors and Shareholders -2006 
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62 BH&Co Annual Meeting of the Board of X X Directors and Shareholders -2007 
63 BH&Co Annual Meeting of the Board of X X Directors and Shareholders -2008 I 
64 BH&Co Annual Meeting of the Board of X X Directors and Shareholders -2009 
65 Defendant's Answers To Plaintiffs First Set Of 
Interrogatories And Requests For Production 
Of Documents 
66 Defendant's Supplemental Answers To 
Plaintiffs First Set Of Interrogatories And 
Requests For Production Of Documents 
67 Defendants' Answers And Responses To 
Plaintiffs Second Set Of Interrogatories And 
Requests For Production Of Documents 
68 Defendants' Responses To Plaintiffs Third Set 
Of Requests For Production Of Documents I 
I 
69 Defendants' Responses And Answers To 
Plaintiffs First Set Of Requests For 
Admissions, Third Set Of Interrogatories And 
Fourth Set Of Requests For Production Of 
Documents To Plaintiff 
70 BH&Co Taxes 2004 
71 BH&Co Taxes 2005 
72 BH&Co Taxes 2006 
73 BH&Co Taxes 2007 
74 BH&Co Taxes 2008 
75 Berryhill's deposition transcript in this case 
76 Idaho Statesman - July 7, 2007 article X X 
All Exhibits identified by the Defendants 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of September, 2010. 
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS 
~-: -f\-U-L 
Eric R. Clark 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day of September, 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy hand delivered to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 345-7894 
ERIC R. CLARK 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 
Defendants' Exhibit List 
CASE NAME: 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation, JOHN 
E. BERRYHILL III and AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Docket No: Trial Date: 
CV OC 0909974 September 7, 2010 
Presiding Judge: 
Hon. Dennis E. Goff 
Party Offering Exhibits: 
Defendants, John E. Berryhill and Berryhill & Company, Inc. 
FILED P.M ____ _ 
Plaintiffs Attorney: 
Eric R. Clark 
Defendant's Attorney: 
Daniel E. Williams 
Courtroom Deputy: 
Court Reporter: 
B 20 Berryhill Memorandum-Subject: JB, Glenn Mosell-Berryhill's/MBlnc/Polo 
Cove Partiall Revised 3/6/07 
C 21 
D 18 
E 24 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
M 
N 27 
0 
p 39 
DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST - 1 
Berryhill Memorandum-Subject: JB, Glenn Mosell-Berryhill's/MBinc/Polo 
Cove 
Be hill Memorandum - Sub ·ect: BCO Develo ment 
WITHDRAWN 
John B hill Business Card 
Letter from Mosell to Dennis Charne 12/22/07 
Email from Mosell to Be hill 7 /3/07 
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R v v Email from Mosell to Beckman, Berrvhill, Bitner 7 /l 0/07 
s 
" " 
Email from Mosell to Berrvhill 6/28/07 
T v v Email from Mosell to Foerstel, Berrvhill 6/28/07 
u v v Email from Mosell to Bitner, Berryhill 2/12/07 
V v v Email string from Mo sell to Angie Riff 2/7 /07 
w v v Email from Mosell to Berryhill 2/23/07 
X 
" 
I 
" 
Email from Mosell to McKibben 2/20/07 
y v v Email from Mosell to Berryhill l/ 12/07 
z v v Email from Mosell to Berryhill 12/28/06 
AA v v Email from Mosell to Foerstel 11/10/06 
BB v v Email from Mosell to Berryhill & McKibben 2/6/07 
cc 
" " 
Email from Mosell to Berrvhill 11/3/07 
DD v v Email from Mosell to Sherry (McKibben), Berryhill & Bitner 9/26/06 
EE v v Email from Mosell to Berryhill l Oil 0/06 
FF v v Email from Mosell to Berrvhill 8/30/06 
GG v v Email from Mosell to Berryhill 7 /20/06 
HH 
" " 
Email from Mosell to Berrvhill 7 /14/06 
II v v Email from Mosell to Berryhill l/31/06 
JJ 
" " 
Email from Mosell to Bitner, Berryhill, Kraus 2/10/06 
KK v 
" 
Email from Mosell to Berrvhill l/31/06 
LL v v Email from Mosell to Berryhill l/20/06 
MM 
" " 
Email from Berryhill to Erstad, Mosell, Reed, McKibben (meeting recaps 
and Polo Cove) 
NN 55-59 Berryhill & Co P &L Ledgers 
00 
" " 
Invoice from Berrvhill & Co to Polo Cove/Glenn Mosell l/l/08 
pp v v Berryhill - Rent breakdown for Restaurant/Polo Cove Showroom 
QQ 36 Memo to file from Victoria Meier l/22/08 
RR WITHDRAWN 
ss Employee Earnings Summarv l/06-12/09 
TT 
" " 
Invoice from credit card re: Polo Cove trip (Mosells & Berryhills) 
uu v v Polo Cove Executive Overview 5/6/08 
w 
" " 
Email from Berrvhill to Erstad, Mosell, Reed, McKibben l/28/06 
WW v v Email from Berrvhill to McKibben 7/19/06 
xx v v Ron Bitner Polo Cove Business Card 
YYl * * Emails 
YY2 
YY3 
YY4 
YY5 
YY6 
YY7 
YY8 
YY9 
YYl0 
zz 
" " 
Letter from Tomlinson to Berrvhill 8/18/10 
AAA 
" " 
Tenant Improvement Plans (McKibben & Cooper) 11/29/07 
BBB v v Concepts and Illustrations of Polo Cove (10/1/05, 2/20/06, 11/30/07) 
CCC * * Berrvhill Quickbooks Transaction Detail Reports 
DDD v v Polo Cove Executive Overview 6/18/08 
EEE 
" " 
Polo Cove Executive Overview 2/29/08 
FFF WITHDRAWN 
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GGG -v Web Site Designs (Foerstel) 
HHH ,/ Spreadsheets with Polo Cove Offers and earnest money (prepared by Cathy 
Smith/Prudential Jensen) 
III ,/ ,/ Narrative by Lakey submitted to Canyon County P&Z 
JJJ -v -v Report on Potential Market Demand for a Proposed Hotel to be located in 
the Snake River Wine Valley, Idaho (Prenared by PKF Consulting 12/5/05) 
KKK ,/ ,/ Polo Cove Executive Overview 3/10/08 
LLL ,/ -,J Polo Cove Executive Overview 3/12/08 
MMM -v -v Email from Masell to Berryhill 9/3/08 
NNN 37 Emails from Amy Dempsey to Berryhill 3/5/08 
000 * * Email from K Gourley re: MoBerrv Corporation 
PPP 1 Copy of $50,000 check number 5127 with note written by John Berryhill 
000 2 Copy of$50,000 check number 5127 (memo-loan) 
RRR 3 Copy of $25,000 check number 5137 (memo-loan) 
sss 4 Copy of $25,000 check number 5139 (memo - loan Tis) 
TIT 5 Coov of$25,000 check number 5140 (memo-Loan #4) 
uuu 6 Copy of$25,000 check number 5141 (memo-Loan #5) 
vvv 7 Copy of $60,000 check number 5196 (memo-Kitchen equip 
WWW 8 Copy of $100,000 check number 5201 (memo-Loan) 
XXX 9 Copy of$25,000 check number 5154 (memo-Loan) 
yyy IO Copy of$50,000 check number 5164 (memo-Loan) 
zzz 11 Copy of $20,000 check number 5247 (memo-Suite 101 Tis) 
AAAA * * Plaintiff's Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial 
BBBB -,J -,J Executive Overview 
cccc * * Sunnyslope, Id Google Map 
DDDD * * Berryhill Logo 
* Pending further discussions between counsel. 
~~ 
DATED this ____j_ day of September, 2010. 
OMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
r: 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thi:s ~t::-f Acrgtfs~ true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark ~a Hand Delivery 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys X via Facsimile 
P. 0. Box 2504 ___ via U.S. Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616 ___ via Email 
Daniel E. Williams 
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
- NO._-,~"'l"J"'lrT"Am.----
A.M ¥ ~ '3 0 FIL~~----... 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Counter Claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
TRIAL BENCH BRIEF: 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S 
PRIOR INCONSISTENT 
STATEMENT 
Judge Goff 
* * * * * * 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Mosell Equities, LLC, by and through its 
undersigned counsel, and requests that this Court allow the admission of extrinsic evidence of 
Defendant John Berryhill's prior deposition testimony from the Broadway Park Case. 
TRIAL BENCH BRIEF: ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
INCONSISTENT ST A TEMENT - 1 
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Berryhill now contends the "buy in" agreement involved a cash component, and some 
"interest" in Polo Cove. Mosell Equities denies the additional term and contends the correct 
terms are stated succinctly in the document drafted by tax attorney Victoria Meier. (P.35) 
ARGUMENT 
Mosell Equities contends that the Court should admit the excerpts of Berryhill' s prior 
testimony (P.48) as the statements appear to contradict Berryhill's contention now that the "buy 
in" involved terms other than cash for equity. Rule 613, IRE, specifically allows for the 
admission of extrinsic evidence to establish a prior inconsistent statement if the declarant is a 
party-opponent as defined by the hearsay rule. 
Rule 613. Prior statements of witnesses. 
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. In examining a witness 
concerning a prior statement made by the witness, whether written or not, the 
statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time, 
but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. 
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Extrinsic 
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless 
the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the 
opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the 
interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions 
of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801 { d){2). 
During Berryhill's deposition in January 2008, after meeting with Attorney Victoria 
Meier, but before she finishe'd drafting the "buy in" documents, Berryhill testified regarding the 
terms of Mosell Equities' "buy in." 
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9 Q. So what are the approximate total amounts of 
10 those payments? 
11 A. Little under half million dollars. 
12 
13 
14 
Q. For ease of discussion I'm going to call it 
500,000; but I'm noting that you said it's slightly 
under. 
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15 A. Okay. 
16 O. What did Mosell Equities get in exchange for 
17 this half 'a million dollars? 
18 [Berryhilll A. Fifty percent of Berryhill and Company. 
19 O. So today Mosell Equities owns fifty percent of 
20 Berryhill and Company? 
21 A. There's actually -- No. That paperwork is 
22 being drawn up. 
23 0. But that's your understanding? 
24 [Berryhill] A. Yes. 
25 Q. So you're having somebody do the paperwork? 
78 
1 A. Yes. 
Berryhill's testimony clearly states cash for equity, and nothing more. If Berryhill is 
going to testify to any other terms, which based on his Counsel's opening statement is his intent, 
Mosell Equities is entitled to admission of its Exhibit 48, the relevant excerpts of Berryhill' s 
Broadway Park deposition testimony. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of September, 2010. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of September, 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy hand delivered to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
ERIC R. CLARK 
TRIAL BENCH BRIEF: ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENT - 4 
001140
,. 
SEP. 13. 2010 2:30PM 
• 
DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
P. 7 /11 
NO.------~-A.M. ___ Fl_.LE C. M Q 
SEP~11 ·3 2010' 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By KATHY BIEHL 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMP ANY, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN E. 
BERRYHILL ill and AMY 
BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
AFF1DA VIT OF SERVICE 
OF SUBPOENA 
I, CHASE RODGERS, a resident of Idaho, over the age of eighteen (18) years, and not a 
party to this action, served a Subpoena on Kimbell Gourley at 3:40 o'clock p.m. on the 10th day 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 1 
001141
SEP. 13. 201) 2:3HM 
-
NO.9195 P. 8/11 
of September, 2010, at the following address: 225 No 9th Street, Suite 820, Boise, Idaho, by 
personally handing a copy to Kimbell Gourley. 
Chase Rodgers 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 13th day of September, 20 I 0. 
Residing at Meridian, 
My commission expires: 5/15/13 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA- 2 
001142
SEP. 13. 2010 2:31PM NO. 9195 P. 9/11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was seived on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 3 
~- via Hand Delivery 
X via Facsimile 
__ via U.S. Mail 
via Email 
--
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SEP. 13. 2010 2:31PM N0.9195 P. 10/11 
• 
DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, Wll.,LIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345 .. 7g94 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff , ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYlllLL & CO:MPANY,INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL ill and ) 
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: KIM GOURLEY 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
SUBPOENA 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear in Court at the place, date and time 
specified below to testify in the above case: 
SUBPOENA, P. 1 
001144
SEP. 13. 2010 2:31PM N 0. 919 5 P. 11111 
• 
DATE: September 14, 2010. 
TIME: 2:00 p.m. 
PLACE: Ada County Courthouse 
Courtroom 510 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, 
you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum 
' 
of $100 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. , --V--
i ·, ~ 
DATED this~ day of September, 2010. 
SUBPOENA, P. 2 
THOMAS, WIWAMS.& PARK, UP 4 \ ._ ) C ~ ): /I// 
l J~ 2. l:··· . ~~ 
Danie] E. Williams 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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SEP. 13. 2010 2:32PM 
.. 
DANIEL E. WILLIA.'1S QSB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswill.iamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-
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SEP. r1 3 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, C1ert< 
By KATHY BIEHL 
OEPl.:JTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURIB JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMP ANY, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN E. 
BERRYHil.L ID and AMY 
BERRYHILL, indiYidually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
OF SUBPOENA 
I, CHASE RODGERS, a resident ofldaho, over the age of cighteen (18) years, and not a 
party to this actjon, served a Subpoena on Ron Bitner at 11 :00 o'clock a.m. on the 11 lh day of 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 1 
001146
SEP. 13. 2010 2:32PM 
-
NO. 9196 P. 3/6 
September, 2010, at the following address: 16645 Plum Rd., Caldwell, Idaho, by personally 
handing a oopy to Ron Bitner. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 13th day of September, 2010. 
Residing at Meridian, ID 
My commission expires: 5/15/13 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA- 2 
001147
SEP. 13. 2010 2:32PM 
-
NO. 9196 P. 4/6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA-3 
__ via Hand Delivery 
X via Facsimile 
__ via U.S. Mail 
via Email 
--
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SEP. 13. 2010 2: 32PM 
• -
N0.9196 P. 5/6 
• 
DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff , ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYIDLL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYIDLL III and ) 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
THE STATE OF ~AHO TO: RON BITNER 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
SUBPOENA 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear in Court at the place, date and time 
specified below to testify in the above case: 
SUBPOENA, P. 1 
001149
SEP. 13. 2010 2:33PM 
• 
NO. 9196 P. 6/6 
• 
DATE: September 14, 2010. 
TIME: 2:30 p.m. 
PLACE: Ada County Courthouse 
Courtroom 510 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
You are fwther notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, 
you may be held in contempt of court and th.at the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum 
of $100 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
DATED this L.1_~ of September, 2010. 
SUBPOENA, P. 2 
· THOMAS, WIILIAMS & PARK, Ll.P 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorneys for Defendants 
... 
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SEP.13. 2010 2:27PM 
DANIEL E. WD.,LIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-
NO. 9194 P 2/11 
. ""·' Fll£0 ~ Pr,,,, w ••.•• ---
SEPJl 3 2010 
J. OAVlD NAVARRO, Clerk 
-----.__ 8y KATHY BIEHL 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited~ 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMP ANY, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN E. 
BERRYHILL III and AMY 
BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
OF SUBPOENA 
I, SHERRIE WYATT. a resident ofldaho, overthe age of eighteen (18) years, and not a 
party to this action, served a Subpoena on Steve Inch at 3 :00 o'clock p.m. on the 10th day of 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 1 
001151
SEP. 13. 2010 2:27PM 
• -
N0.9194 P. 3/11 
September, 2010, at the following address: 121 No. 9th St., Suite 300, Boise, Idaho, by 
personally handing a copy to Steve Inch. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 13t1i day of September, 2010. 
Residing at 1se, ID 
My commission expires: //- 7-CL--
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 2 
001152
SEP. 13. 201~ 2:27PM N0.9'194 P. 4/11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 3 
__ via Hand Delivery 
X via Facsimile 
__ via U.S. Mail 
__ viaEmail 
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SEP, 13. 201 0 2 : 2 7 J M 
DANIELE. "WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
raOMAS, W'aLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NO. 9194 P. 5/11 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff , ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYIDLL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and ) 
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: STEVE INCH 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
SUBPOENA 
YOU ARE HEREBY C01\1MANDED to appear in Court at the place, date and time 
specified below to testify in the above case: 
SUBPOENA, P. 1 
001154
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DATE: September 14, 2010. 
TIME: 10:30 a.m. 
PLACE: Ada County Courthouse 
Courtroom 510 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
N0.9194 P 6/11 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, 
you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum 
of $100 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena . 
. ~ 
DATED this l[--aay of September, 2010. 
SUBPOENA, P. 2 
THOMAS, WII..LIAMS &PARK,LLP 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attomeys for Defendants 
' 
-
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-
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-
N0.9194 P. 7/11 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN E. 
BERRYHILL III and AMY 
BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
OF SUBPOENA 
I, SHERRIE WY A TI, a resident ofldaho, over the age of eighteen (18) years, and not a 
party to this action, served a Subpoena on Amy Dempsey at l 0:00 o'clock a.m. on the 13 ui day of 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 1 
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SEP. 13. 2010 2:28PM NO. 9194 P. 8/11 
September, 2010, at the following address: 121 No. 9th St., Suite 300, Boise, Idaho, by 
personally handing a copy to Amy Dempsey. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me th1s 13th day of September, 2010. 
Resid" t Boise, ID 
My commission expires: /J-7- /2. r ~ , 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 2 
001157
S,EP. 13. 2010 2:28PM N0.9194 P. 9/11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ins1I'llment was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
AFFIDAVIT OF SER VICE OF SUBPOENA - 3 
__ via Hand Delivery 
X via Facsimile 
__ via U.S, Mail 
--
via Email 
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. 
DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345~7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff , ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYHILL & COMP ANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and ) 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: AMY DEMPSEY 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
SUBPOENA 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear in Court at the place, date and time 
specified below to testify in the above case: 
SUBPOENA, P. 1 
001159
SEP. 13. 2010 2:29PM 
• 
N0.9194 P. 11/1' 
~ 
DATE: September 14, 2010. 
TIME: 1:15 p.rn. 
PLACE: Ada County Courthouse 
Courtroom 510 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, 
you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum 
of $ 100 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena 
~ 
DA TED this ~ day of September, 2010. 
ROMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LI.P 
Attorneys for Defendants 
SUBPOENA, P. 2 
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.. 
DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St, Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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SEPJl3 20fll.) 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk' 
By KATHY BIEHi. ) 
DEPUTY _ 1 
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IN THE DJSTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR IBE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
BERRYHILL & COMP ANY, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN E. 
BERRYHILL Ill and AMY 
BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
OF SUBPOENA 
I, CHASE RODGERS, a resident ofldaho, over the age of eighteen (18) years, and not a 
party to this action, served a Subpoena on James Tomlinson at 4:10 o'clock p.rn. on the 10th day 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 1 
001161
SEP. 13. 2010 2:29PM NO. 919 5 P. 3/ 11 
of September, 2010, at the following address: 205 No. Tenth Street, 2nd Floor, Boise, Idaho, by 
personally handing a copy to James Tomlinson. 
ChaseRodg 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 13lh day of September, 2010. 
~filJ];p 
~y PUBLIC FcittiDAHO 
Residing at Meridian, ID 
My commission expires: 5/15/13 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 2 
001162
SEP. 13. 2010 2:30PM 
• 
NO. 9195 P. 4/11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated. below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
__ via Hand Delivery 
X via Facsimile 
__ via U.S. Mail 
via Email 
--
c!:awimff5lt eme. yatt 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 3 
001163
SEP. 13. 2010 2:30~M 
• -
1~0.9195 ~ 5/11 
.. 
DANIELE. 'WaLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
moMAS, WILLIAMS & p ARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345~7800 
Fax: (208) 345~7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff , ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYHILL & COMP ANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and ) 
AMY BERRYIIlLL, indhidually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: JAMES TOMLINSON 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
SUBPOENA 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear in Comt at the place, date and time 
specified below to testify in the above case: 
SUBPOENA, P. 1 
001164
• 
SEP. 13. 2010 2:30PM 
• 
DAIB: September 14, 2010. 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
PLACE: Ada County Courthouse 
Counroom 510 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
-
NO. 9195 P. 6/11 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, 
you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved pmty may recover from you the sum 
of $ 100 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
v 
DATED this lh.a~y of September, 2010. 
SUBPOENA, P. 2 
THOMAS, WII..llAMS & PARK, UP 
\ . () <;7'~ B \v.,.____,/ . t:-
.. aniel E. Williams 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOC IA TES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
• 
NO, f~ A."'--· ·---"M----
AUG 3 1 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
t3y ~-Et-j 
NO. ~tj.t}m%t 
A.M .Ml __L..:.CX_.__'J __ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Counter Claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
PLAINTIFF'S DRAFT JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT 
FORM 
Judge Goff 
****** 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Mosel! Equities, LLC, by and through its 
undersigned counsel, and hereby provides its Draft Jury Instructions and Proposed Verdict Form. 
PLAINTIFF'S DRAFT JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORM - 1 
001166
- • 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of August, 20 I 0. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of August, 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via hand delivery to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box I 776 
Boise, ID 83701 
ERIC R. CLARK 
PLAINTIFF'S DRAFT JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORM - 2 
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-
IDJI 1.20.1 - Burden of proof - preponderance of evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
• 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a 
proposition, or use the expression "if you fmd" or "if you decide," I 
mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably true 
than not true. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001168
IDJI 1.20.2 - Burden of proof - clear and convincing evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
• 
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by 
clear and convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is 
highly probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher burden 
than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than 
not true. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001169
-
IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
On plaintiffs' claim of breach of contract against the defendant, 
the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following 
propositions: 
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
2. The defendant breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
The Court has previously determined that 
w:eseuted as PJaiptiff's:-F;amiblt~ constitutes a valid contract. The 
Court has also ruled that aUhough the docuroeut repnseets e valid 
&f-t"'8..C1ln,..,-¾'~, -~ 
contF~ the terms~re ambiguous~antl there~ is for you the Jury 
to decide what the parties intended.ow/ f ~ ~ ~ up<J 
The reviousl ruled that the ·u ~ 
these documents are separate from and created afte 
, if the parties intended that th 
---
Exhibits _ through __ ended the parties contract presented as 
Exhibit 
lowing questions on the jury verdict form: 
1. Regard· g the contract (Pia· · s Exhibit _J _Jfid the 
Mosell Equities provi~ 
$ ,000.00, to be a loan? 
001170
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2. Regarding the co tract (Plaintiff's Exhibit ) did the 
parties intend the mo ey Mosen Equities provided 
$50,000.00 to be a loan t remain a loan pending Mosen 
3. Did the "buy in" referenced laintiff's Exhibit 
occur? 
4. Did the check presented as Exhi ___ _, modify the 
contract (Exhibit __J and become rt of that contract? 
5. Did the check presented a Exhibit ___ _, modify the 
contract (Exhibit __J and b come part of that contract? 
6. Did the check presented as E ibit modify the ___ _, 
contract (Exhibit 
7. Did the check presen 
---~ modify the 
contract (Exhibit __J an become part of that contract? 
8. ibit modify the ___ _, 
contract (Exhibit __J nd become part of that contract? 
9. Did the check presented Exhibit ___ _, modify the 
contract (Exhibit __J and be ome part of that contract? 
10. Did the check presente as Exhibit ___ _, modify the 
contract (Exhibit __J and ecome part of that contract? 
11. Did the check presented as E ibit ___ _, modify the 
contract (Exhibit__) and b~e part of that contract? 
001171
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12. Did the check presente as Exhibit ____ ,. modify the 
contract (Exhibit ) a d become part of that contract? 
ny, Inc. breached the contract? 
Yes -No 
14. Has Mosell Equi ·es been damaged as a result of Berryhill & 
Yes -No 
15. The amount of dama es? $ 
------------
If you find from your of all the evidence that 
propositions 1 and 2 have bee proved, then you should answer these 
questions "yes". 
If you fmd of all the evidence that 
proposition 3, no "buy in" occurre , then you should answer this 
question "no". 
If you fmd of all the evidence that 
propositions 4 through 12 have been proved then you should answer 
these questions "yes". 
If you find from your consideration o all the evidence that 
propositions 4 through 12 have not 
answer the particular question "no". 
If you fmd from your consideration 
propositions 13 and 14 occurred, then 
questions "yes", and answer question 15. 
then you should 
001172
- • 
Comment: 
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A 
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of 
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence 
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which 
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it 
relates. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001173
- • 
IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories 
~ INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
~in tiffs' -f im of implied-in-fact contract against the 
defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following 
propositions: 
1. The circw;nstances imply a request by the defendant for performance by 
plaintiff; and 
2. The circumstances imply a promise by the defendant to compensate the 
plaintiff for such performance; and 
3. The plaintiff performed as requested. 
You will be asked the ti lowing questions on the jury verdict 
form: 
1. Did an implied-in-fact con act exist between Mosell Equities 
and Berryhill & Company, I c.? Yes -No 
2. Has the Berryhill & Company, nc. breached the contract? 
Yes -No 
--
3. Has Mosell Equities been damaged s a result of Berryhill & 
Companies' breach? Yes __ - No-+--
4. The amount of damages? $ ____ __, _____ _ 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the vidence that each 
of the propositions has been proved, then you sh answer the 
questions "yes" and complete question 4. If you ti from your 
consideration of all of the evidence that any of these propositi ns has not 
been proved, then you should answer that question "no." 
001174
• 
Comment: 
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A 
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of 
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence 
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which 
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it 
relates. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001175
• 
IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
On plaintiffs' claim of unjust enrichment against the defendant, 
the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following 
propositions: 
1. The plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant; 
2. The defendant accepted the benefit; and 
3. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the defendant to retain 
the benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value. 
The Cou as ruled that Mosell Equities had proven 
propositions 1 and 2. Cons uently, you will only be asked the following 
questions on the jury verdict fo 
1. Under the circumstan es, would it be unjust for the defendant to 
retain the benefit with t compensating the plaintiff for its value? 
Yes -No 
2. If you answered the prece ing question ''yes," please identify 
the amount of defendant's njust enrichment. 
$ 
-----------+-
If you find from your conside tion of all the evidence that the 
proposition has been proved, then you hould answer the question"yes" 
and complete question 2. If you find f om your consideration of all of 
the evidence that any of these proposi ons has not been proved, then 
you should answer that question "no." 
Comment: 
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A 
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of 
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence 
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which 
001176
• 
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it 
relates. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001177
• • 
IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
On plaintiffs' claim of conversion against the defendant, the 
plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
form: 
1. That the defendant, _t,ook and~1s kept Mosell Equities' 
~ 
furniture and fixture~ithout a right to do so; 
The nature and extent of the damages to Mosell Equities and 
the amount thereof. 
You will be asked th following questions on the jury verdict 
" 
1. Did the Defendant take r keep Mosell Equities' furniture and 
fixtures without a right do so? 
Yes -No 
2. If you answered the precedin question "yes," please identify 
the amount of Mosell Equities damages. 
$ 
-----------
If you find from your consideration o 
proposition has .been proved, then you should nswer the question 
"yes" and complete question 2. If you find from yo r consideration of 
all of the evidence that any of these propositions has 
then you should answer that question "no." 
Comment: 
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrog tories. A 
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of 
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence 
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which 
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it 
relates. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001178
• 
IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
On Mosell Equities' claim of fraud against John Berryhill and 
Berryhill & Company, Inc., Mosell Equities has the burden of proof on 
each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That John Berryhill stated a fact to Mosell Equities; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The John Berryhill either knew the statement was false or was 
unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement 
was made. 
5. Mosen Equities did not know that the statement was false; 
6. John Berryhill intended for Mosen Equities to rely upon the 
statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. Mosen Equities did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. Mosen Equities' reliance was reasonable under all the 
circumstances; 
9. Mosen Equities suffered damages proximately caused by 
reliance on the false statement. 
{iii: The natu~e and extent of the damages to Mosen Equities, and the 
/ amount thereof. 
---
you will be asked the fi lowing questions on the jury verdict 
form: 
1. Did John Berryhill state a f: t to Mosell Equities? 
001179
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Yes -No 
--
2. Was the state ent false? Yes -No 
--
3. Was the statem t material? Yes -No 
--
4. Did John Berryhi know the statement was false or was he 
unaware of whethe the statement was true at the time the 
statement was made. Yes -No 
--
5. Mosen Equities did n t know that the statement was false? 
Yes -No 
--
6. John Berryhill intended r Mosen Equities to rely upon the 
statement and act it in a manner reasonably 
contemplated? Yes __ - No __ . 
7. Mosen Equities did rely upo the truth of the statement? 
Yes -No 
8. Mosen Equities' reliance 
circumstances? Yes - No 
9. Mosen Equities suffered damages 
reliance on the false statement? Yes 
under all the 
caused by 
-No 
--
10. The amount of damages: $ _______ ,,__ __ _ 
If you find from your consideration of all thJ;Y'evidence that each 
/ 
/ 
of the propositions has been proved, then you ~ould answer questions 
1 - 9 "yes" and complete question 0. If you find from your 
consideration of all of the evidence th t any of these propositions has not 
been proved, then you should answer that question "no." 
001180
• • 
Comment: 
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A 
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of 
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence 
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which 
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it 
relates. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001181
• • 
IDJI 6.08.1 - Interpretation of contracts - intention of parties 
Note: The court must first decide whether determination of the intent of the parties is 
properly a jury issue. If it is not, obviously the instruction would not be given. Should 
the court determine that issue is properly before the jury, the following instruction may 
be appropriate: 
' 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The terms of the contract are in dispute1 as- ta the followinr 
Whether the parties intended the funds Mosell Equ· es provided 
were loaned funds? 
If the parties intended the funds to be oaned, whether the 
parties intended the funds Mosell Equities D ovided would transition 
into Mosen or Mosell Equities' buy in of Berryhill & Company, Inc. or 
some other entity created by Mosell and Berryhill? 
If the parties intended the fonds Mosell Equities provided were 
I 
loaned funds, and the parties intended the funds Mosell Equities 
I 
provided would transition into. MoselJ or Mosell Equities' buy in of 
Berryhill & Company, Inc. or some other entity created by Mosell and 
I 
Berryhill, did the buy in oct;~r? 
. ' 
If the buy in dicynot occur, do the funds remain as Joans to 
/ 
Berryhill & Compan~'Jnc.? 
I 
If BerryhilV& Company, Inc. denies the funds it accepted were 
loaned funds, nd refuses to repay the loaned funds, is Berryhill & 
Company, I . in breach of the parties' contract? 
001182
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You must determine what was intended by the parties~ as,.... 
, nee, 
~ f?;;,ntract must be const a as a whole, including all 
of the circumstances giving rise to it, to · e consistent meaning to every 
part of i}( ,,<, 
A:' L / f:..n~~ be giv n its ordinary meaning, unless you 
find from the evidence that a spec· I meaning was intendeiJ 
,J:- 0._y communicat ons, conduct or dealings between the 
contracting parties showing w at they intended and how they construed 
the doubtful language ma be considered, provided that such may not 
completely change the reement or construe one term inconsistently 
with the remainder of e termsJ 
y should be construed to avoid any 
contradiction or ab urditi~ 
\Persons w thin a specialized field are deemed to have contracted 
with reference any generally known and customarily accepted 
language in tha field, unless you find from the evidence that this was 
not intended .. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001183
• • 
IDJI 6.08.2 - Interpretation of contract - witness's testimony, ambiguity of contract 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the 
contract offered by any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties 
occurring before execution of the written agreement, which is 
inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement. 
While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to 
clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to completely 
change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a 
fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or 
parts. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001184
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IDJI 6.08.3 - Interpretation of contract - ambiguity resolved against drafter 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Where there is ambiguous language in a contract, and where the 
true intent of the parties cannot be ascertained by any other evidence, 
the ambiguity can be resolved by interpreting the contract against the 
party who drafted the contract or provided the ambiguous language. 
Given: 1 
Modified: 
-·-Refused: 
001185
-
IDJI 6.08.4 - Interpretation of contract - definition of material fact 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A "material fact" is one which constitutes substantially the 
consideration of the contract, or without which it would not have been 
made. 
Comments: 
Black's Law Dictionary (West Pub; Fifth Ed., 1979) 
Offered: 
Given: 
Refused: 
001186
• • 
IDJI 6.08.5 - Interpretation of contract - materiality 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in 
determining the party's course of action. A representation is material if 
(a) a reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or 
nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the transaction in 
question, or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to 
know that the recipient is likely to regard the matter as important in 
determining the choice of action, whether or not a reasonable person 
would so consider. 
Comments: 
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616 (1998) ( tort standard, referring to Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, Sections 538(2).) 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001187
• • 
IDJI 6.09.1 -Amendments to contracts 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A contract may be amended or modified by an agreement of the 
parties. This requires all of the elements of any other contract. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001188
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IDJI 6.10.1 - Breach of bilateral contract - general case - no affirmative defenses 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions: 
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
2. The defendant breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
from your consideration of all the evidence that each 
of the propositions re ired of the plaintiff has been proved, then you 
must consider the issue o e affirmative defenses raised by the 
defendant, and explained in the nex · struction. If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any f the propositions in this 
instruction has . not been proved, your verdic should be for the 
defendant. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001189
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IDJI 6.11 - Material breach 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these 
instructions, means a breach that defeats a fundamental purpose of the 
contract. 
Offered: 
Given: 
Refused: 
001190
-
IDJI 6.13 - Performance of contract - substantial performance 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
• 
When I say that a party must have "substantially performed" 
the contract or that "substantial performance" of the contract is 
required, I mean that the important and essential benefits called for by 
the terms of the contract have been delivered or performed. A contract 
may be substantially performed even though there may have been some 
deviations or omissions from the performance called for by the precise 
language of the contract. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001191
IDJI 6.14.1 - Time for performance of a contract 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
• 
Where a contract does not specify a time for performance, the 
law will imply a requirement that it be performed within a reasonable 
time, as is determined by the subject matter of the contract, the 
situation of the parties, and the nature of the performance required. In 
such case, it is for the jury to determine what a reasonable time would 
be under the circumstances, given all of the evidence in the case. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001192
-
IDJI 6.41.1 - Agent's act binds principal - agency admitted 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
• 
There is no dispute in this case that John Berryhill was the agent 
of the principal, Berryhill & Company, Inc., at the time of the 
transaction described by the evidence. Therefore, Berryhill & 
Company, Inc., the principal, is responsible for any act of John 
Berryhill, the agent, within the scope of the agent's authority. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001193
• 
IDJI 6.43.2 - Ratification 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If an agent acts outside the scope of authority, a principal may 
still become bound by the agent's actions if the principal ratifies the 
agent's actions. Ratification may be express or implied. Implied 
ratification requires: 
1. Knowledge on the part of the principal of the material 
facts connected with the transaction; and 
2. Word or conduct on the part of the principal indicating 
an intention to adopt the acts of the agent; 
Comments: 
See Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., 122 Idaho 47, 54 (1992); Twin Falls 
Livestock v. Mid-century Ins., 117 Idaho 176, 182-183 (1998). 
Given: 
Modified: 
~11. 
Refused: 
001194
IDJI 9.03 - Damages for breach of contract- general format 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
• 
If the jury decide~e plaintiff is entitled to recover from the 
ow its e,ld_\~ &(lo,€6J:t f>dv ~(u,d ~ 
defendant, ~he jury must determini the amoubt of money that will 
reasonable and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any of the following 
elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the 
defendant's breach of contract: 
Special Dambg.::r. The the value of the money that Mosell 
Equities provided to Berryhill & Company, Inc.~ pies aeeumulatmg 
isier~ 
~ Wbethr any of these elements of damage has been proved is for lY ;ou to det-f ine. 
Given: 
001195
- • 
Modified:_/ 
--Refused: 
001196
- • 
STATUTORY INTEREST 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
LEGAL RATE OF INTEREST. When there is no express contract in writing fixing a 
different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on the 
hundred by the year on money lent. 
Idaho Code Section 28-22-104. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001197
IDJI 6.07 .1- Equitable theories - implied in facts contract 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
-
An implied-in-fact contract is a contract where the terms and 
existence of the contract are demonstrated by the conduct of the parties, 
with the request of one party and the performance by the other often 
being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance. To 
fmd an implied-in-fact contract, the facts must be such that the intent of 
the parties to make a contract can be inferred from their conduct. An 
implied-in-fact contract is given the same legal effect as any other 
contract. 
To establish an implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The circumstances imply a request by the defendant for 
performance by plaintiff; and 
2. The circumstances imply a promise by the defendant to 
compensate the plaintiff for such performance; and 
3. The plaintiff performed as requested. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001198
-
IDJI 6.07.2 - Unjust enrichment - equitable theories 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Even though there is no agreement between the parties, under 
certain circumstances where a party has been unjustly enriched by the 
actions of another the law will require that party to compensate the 
other for the unjust gain. To recover under this theory, the plaintiff has 
the burden of proving each of the following: 
1. The plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant; 
2. T~e defendant accepted the benefit; and 
3. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the 
defendant to retain the benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its 
value. 
Comment: 
For the elements of unjust enrichment, see Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456, 567 
P.2d 1 (1977); Common Builder, Inc. v. Rice, 126 Idaho 616, 888 P.2d 790 (App. 1995). 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001199
IDJI 4.50 - Conversion -- issues 
,Q . INSTRU~TION.NO. __ 
rut~~~ 
~e plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions: 
That the defendant took aniJas kept plaintiffs furniture 
-.. 
1. 
~\-u:tur~thout a right to do so; 
~ The nature and extent of the damages to plaintiff and the 
amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each 
of these propositions has been proved, then your verdict should be for 
the plaintiff; but, if you find from your consideration of all the evidence 
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then your verdict 
should be for the defendant. 
Comment: 
Those conversions covered by the Uniform Commercial Code are not necessarily 
covered by this form. The Committee recommends that in cases covered by that Code, 
this form be used but that, in addition, the relevant portion of the appropriate Code 
section be read or paraphrased as a definition, description, or explanation of the phrase 
"exercised dominion over" or of the phrase "deprived of possession." 
See Carver v. Ketchum, 53 Idaho 595, 26P.2n 139; Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho 
171, 118 P.2d 729; Adairv. Freeman, 92 Idaho 773,451 P2d 519. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001200
IDJI 4.60 /~ issues 
L~ \\ >- INSTRUCTION NO. --
~ ~ ~~ w ~ 'fbe plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The def end ant either knew the statement was false or was 
unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement 
was made. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the 
statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the 
circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by 
reliance on the false statement. 
r-w· The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and 
~mount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of aU the evidence that the 
elements of fraud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, 
then your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this issue. If you find 
from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing 
001201
-
propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then 
your verdict should be for the defendant. 
Comment: 
A definition of materiality can be found in IDJI 6.08.5. 
See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, P.2d 303 
(2000); Watts v. Krebbs, 131 Idaho 616,962 P.2d 387 (1998); Magic Lantern Prods. Inc. 
v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 805, 892 P.2d 480 (1995). 
See also, Witt v. Jones, 111 ldao 477, 722 P.2d 474 (1986); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 
Idaho 700,682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Fawv. Greenwood, IOI Idaho 387,613 P.2d 1338 
(1980); Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331 597 P.2d 217 (1979); King v. McNeel, Inc., 94 
Idaho 444, 489 P.2d 1324. 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001202
-
Defense to Fraud - statements or promises as to future events. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future events." 
"[T]here is a general rule in [the] law of deceit that a representation consisting of [a] 
promise or a statement as to a future event will not serve as [a] basis for fraud .... " 
"[T]he representation forming the basis of a claim for fraud must concern past or existing 
material facts." 
A "promise or statement that an act will be undertaken, however, is actionable, if it is 
proven that the speaker made the promise without intending to keep it." 
Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604,615, 114 P.3d 974,973 (2005). (Cites 
omitted) 
Given: 
Modified: 
Refused: 
001203
-
Proposed verdict Form 
-
TONE - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
1. Regarding the cont act (Plaintiff's Exhibit __ _,) did the parties intend 
the money Mosell E uities provided, $50,000.00, to be a loan? 
Yes -No 
---+ 
2. Regarding the contr t (Plaintiffs Exhibit __ _,) did the parties 
intend the money Mos 1 Equities provided $50,000.00 to be a loan to 
remain a loan pending sell Equities' "buy in" of an entity formed by 
the parties? Yes __ - o 
3. Did the "buy in" reference in Plaintiff's Exhibit occur? 
Yes -No 
4. Did the check presented as E 
(Exhibit_) and become p 
____ , modify the contract 
Yes -No 
5. Did the check presented as E 
(Exhibit_) and become part o 
Yes - No 
____ , modify the contract 
6. Did the check presented as Exhib t ____ , modify the contract 
(Exhibit___) and become part of th contract? 
Yes -No 
7. Did the check presented as Exhibit ---+---' modify the contract 
(Exhibit_) and become part of that con 
Yes -No 
1 
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-
8. Did the check presented as Exhibit ____ , modify the contract 
(Exhibit __J and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
9. Did the check presented as Exhibit ____ , modify the contract 
(Exhibit __J and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
10. Did the check presented as Exhibit , modify the contract 
----
(Exhibit __J and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
11. Did the check presented as Exhibit ____ , modify the contract 
(Exhibit __J and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
12. Did the check presented as Exhibit ____ , modify the contract 
(Exhibit __J and become part of that contract? 
Yes -No 
13. Has the Berry!rill & Company, Inc. breached the contract? 
Yes -No 
14. Has Mosell Equities been damaged as a result of Berryhill & 
Companies' breach? Yes __ - No __ . 
15. The amount of damages? $ __________ _ 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
propositions 1 and 2 have been proved, then you should answer these 
questions "yes". 
2 
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.. 
-
If you fi'nd from your consideration of all the evidence that 
proposition 3, no "buy in" occurred, then you should answer this question 
"no". 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
propositions 4 through 12 have been proved, then you should answer these 
questions "yes". 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
propositions 4 through 12 have not been proved, then you should answer the 
particular question "no". 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
propositions 13 and 14 occurred, then you should answer these questions 
"yes", and answer question 15. 
COUNT TWO - BREACH OF AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT 
1. Did an implied-in-fact contract exist between Mosell Equities and 
Berryhill & Company, Inc.? Yes - No 
2. Has the Berryhill & Company, Inc. breached the contract? 
Yes -No 
3. Has Mosell Equities been damaged as a result of Berryhill & 
Companies' breach? Yes __ - No __ . 
4. The amount of damages? $ __________ _ 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
the propositions has been proved, then you should answer the questions 
"yes" and complete question 4. If you find from your consideration of all of 
3 
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the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you 
should answer that question "no." 
COUNT IBREE - UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
I. Under the circumstances, would it be unjust for the defendant to retain the 
benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value? 
Yes - No 
2. If you answered the preceding question "yes," please identify the amount 
of defendant's unjust enrichment. $ __________ _ 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the 
proposition has been proved, then you should answer the question "yes" and 
complete question 2. If you find from your consideration of all of the 
evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should 
answer that question "no." 
COUNT FOUR - CONVERSION 
I. Did the Defendant take or keep Mosell Equities' furniture and fixtures without 
a right to do so? Yes - No 
2. If you answered the preceding question "yes," please identify the amount 
of Mosell Equities' damages.$ __________ _ 
COUNT FIVE - FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT 
I . Did John Berryhill state a fact to Mosell Equities? 
Yes -No 
2. Was the statement false? Yes - No 
3. Was the statement material? Yes - No 
4 
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4. Did John Berryhill know the statement was false or was he unaware of 
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made. Yes 
-No 
5. Mosell Equities did not know that the statement was false? Yes __ -
No 
6. John Berryhill intended for Mosell Equities to rely upon the statement 
and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated? Yes __ - No 
7. Mosell Equitiys did rely upon the truth of the statement? 
Yes -No 
8. Mosell Equities' reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances? 
Yes -No 
9. Mosell Equities suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the 
false statement? Yes - No 
10. The amount of damages: $ __________ _ 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
the propositions has been proved, then you should answer questions 1 - 9 
"yes" and complete question 10. If you find from your consideration of all of 
the evidence that' any of these propositions has not been proved, then you 
should answer that question "no." 
5 
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DANIELE, WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: {208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ill 0002/0034 
• NQ. ___ ----::::-::r---.-----,,.---A.M ____ F_rlLE.~ , ~ •• oS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYIULL & COMPANY, INC.,an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYIIlLL ID and ) 
AMY BERRYHILL, Individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill III hereby submit their 
Requested Jury Instructions, numbers 1 through 26, in addition to the customary IDJis. 
7(~ 
DA TED this ,.2..1... day of August, 2010. 
mel E. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, P. 1 
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CERT~ OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thi~ day of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
EricR Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
~a Facsimile: 939-7136 
__ Via U.S. Mail 
Daniel E. Williams 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, P. 2 
-
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if 
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably 
true than not true. 
IDJI2d 1.20.1. 
GIVEN-:@-_....,_.. __ _ 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
001211
09....->2/2010 09:04 FAX la] 0005/0034 
~ If INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
&11./ 'f/J f'-~'Wvdc = U, ~ l 
~lamtiff has the burden o prbving each of the following propositions: 
1. A contract existed between Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, and Defendant 
Berryhill & Company, Inc.; 
2. The defendant breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
ou find from your conside tion of all the evidence that each of t 
IDJl2d 6. 10.1.(modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED ,ljlll#i,i::,,----COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
t inst tion. If you · d from your 
ns in this i~n has not been 
001212
09J02/2010 09:04 FAX ~ 0006/0034 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do or not do something that is 
supported by consideration. 
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four 
elements. The four elements are: 
1. Competent parties; 
2. A lawful purpose; 
3. Valid consideration; and 
4. Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms. 
It is not disputed that the following elements are present in the contract alleged in this 
case: The parties were competent to enter into a contract, the alleged contract was for a lawful 
purpose and there was valid consideration. The parties do dispute whether there was mutual 
agreement between them to all essential terms 
IPJl2d 6.01. 1 (modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
In order for a contract to be formed, there must be a meeting of the minds on all material 
terms to the contract. 
Panike ~ Vns Farms, Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562, 567 (Idaho 2009); Barry v. Pacific West 
Constr,,r., 140 Idaho 827, 831, 103 P.3d 440,444 (2004). 
GIVEN _/Jy~--
REFUSED 
MODIFIED COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
A contract must be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain 
provisions which are capable in_themselves of being reduced to certainty. 
Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346,348,670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983) (citations omitted) 
GIVEN ff REFUSED.----
MODIFIED 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
In this case, Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., claims that all parties did not agree to 
all essential terms of the contract. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the "meeting of 
the minds," and means that all parties to a contract must have understood and accepted all of the 
essential terms of the contract. 
There is no contract unless all of the essential terms have been communicated to all 
parties, understood by all parties, and accepted by all parties. 
IDJI2d 6.05.1. (modified) 
GIVEN 
REFusEo e,m,m,,,,! :fAH~, ~ ~~ ~ 1(\1~ ~\ ~ in,1.-.&3, ta___.-----Moo1F1eo , ~ ----- u · ·o···--- '~ ~ 
COVERED 
OTHER 
001216
09/~2/2010 09:05 FAX ~0010/0034 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
If the provisions of a contract are ambiguous, the interpretation of those provisions is a 
question of fact which focuses upon the intent of the parties. The determination of the parties' 
intent is to be determined by looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the 
document, the circumstances under which it was made, the objective and purpose of the 
particular provision, and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by 
their conduct or dealings. 
J.R. Simplot v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006): Univ. of Idaho Found., 
Inc. v. Civic Partners, Inc. (In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. Project), 146 Idaho 527, 536 
(Idaho 2008) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
In this case the defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., has asserted certain affirmative 
defenses. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted. 
Defendant has raised the affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel and waiver. 
If you fin from your consideratio of all the evidence tha each of the propo · ions 
required of defendant has been pr ed, then your verdict s e. If you 
our consideration of a the evidence that any of e propositions has not been proved, 
then e defendant has not ved the affirmative defe e in this case. 
IDJl2d 6.10.4. (modified) 
GIVEN tf'Jt--
REFUSED-~----
MODIFIED 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
The defeflElam. Berryhill & Company, Inc., has assuted the affirmative defense-of 
~uitable estoppe~ 'Fms is a legal term which means the plaintiff may be prevented from 
~
enforcing a contract or term of contract by reason of the plaintiff's own conduct. 
To establish the defense of equitable estoppel, the defendant has the burden of proof on 
each of the following ·propositions: 
1. The plaintiff falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the defendant; 
2. The plaintiff knew or should have known the true facts; 
3. The defendant did not know and could not discover the true facts; 
4. The defendant relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the defendant's 
prejudice. 
IDJI2d 6.22.1. (modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED ~ COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
001219
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by conduct. 
by words, or by acquiescence. 
IDJI2d 6.24.1. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
001220
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the contract 
are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the performance by 
the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance. The 
implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding. 
Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 287, 869 P.2d 1378, 1382 (1994) (citing Clements v. 
Jungert, 90 Idaho 143,153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965)). Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584,587, 
930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION N0.12 
A 'course of dealing' is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular 
transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for 
interpreting their expressions and other conduct. 
Idaho Code§ 28-1-205(1) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
L 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
In order to establish unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show that there was: (1) a 
benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such 
benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the 
defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof. 
King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 910 (Idaho 2002), citing, Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. 
Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88,982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999), citing, Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378,382, 
941 P.2d 350,354 (Ct. App. 1997). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
L 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
001223
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INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
The measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim is not the actual amount of the 
enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between two parties it would be unjust for 
one party to retain. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant received a benefit 
and of proving the amount of the benefit which the defendants unjustly retained. The value of 
services rendered can be used as evidence of the value of the benefit bestowed under the theory 
of unjust enrichment. Although damages need not be proven with mathematical precision, the 
damages, i.e., the value of any benefit unjustly received by the defendant in an action based upon 
unjust enrichment, must be proven to a reasonable certainty. 
Gray v. Tri-Way Constr. Servs., 147 Idaho 378, 389 (Idaho 2009), citing and quoting, Barry v. 
Pacific West Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004), Blaser v. Cameron, 
121 Idaho 1012, 1017, 829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct. App. 1992), Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock 
Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463,466, 797 P.2d 863,866 (1990), Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 
101 Idaho 663,667,619 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1980) 
GIVEN ~ C .,;,,/4 --~•Al~__,/ "' .,. 
REFUSED It /JI._,~ '?':.._~ 
MODIFIED 7~1 i~ ~ .. ~ PJ,, ~a,,,J~~ 
COVERED ____ ~ f:.luF~ · 
OTHER ____ u//,; p-- J O •. -
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
To prevail for unjust enrichment, plaintiff must show not simply that Berryhill & 
Company, Inc., benefitted from the efforts of plaintiff; instead, it must be shown that a party was 
unjustly enriched in the sense that the term 'unjustly' could mean illegally or unlawfully. 
Schumacher v. Schumacher, 627 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); see also, Knight v. 
Post, 748 P.Zd 1097, 1101 (Utah 1988) ("misleading act" or something similar necessary) 
GIVEN ~~~A-A- \ ~  REFUSED ~"LUJC ~ ~ .A,,,J a.I-/~ Hv 
MODIFIED____ ~ ~k 
COVERED____ . 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
To sustain a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must show that the party against 
whom recovery is sought either wrongfully secured or passively rec~ived a benefit that it would 
be unconscionable for9,tetain. However, a claim for unjust enrichment requires more than a 
showing that the defendant may have benefitted in some way from the disputed conduct. 
2008 Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 181 (3rd Cir.) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
Not every possession constitutes conversion. To prove conversion, the plaintiff must 
show facts establishing that he owned or had a sup~rior right to the materials in question, that he 
demanded their return, and that defendant refused to deliver them. A conversion action cannot 
be based on a mere breach of a contractual obligation. 
Priel v. Heby, 2004 NY Slip Op 50820U, 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED ;/(~D~ ~ tt2-~ $fr~~~ 
COVERED,:: /dJ ,,~-~- J ??._? 7 . (I OTHER _____ ~ ., ~ • 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
~f(L,~IJ,r/,}~JUu~~ ~Q~ 
""fpie plaintiff ha/ tl,e b~rd~n of proving each of the following' propositions by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendant John Berryhill stated a fact to the plaintiff[s]; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it 
in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The plaintifrs reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false 
statement. 
t~i . ~llfOy. ou 
6
To
10
de nfraotumreyaonurd ecxotensni· tdoerfathti· e damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof. 
~ of all the evidence that the eleme ts of fraud have 
<I ~ 
been proved by ear and convincing evidence, ili our verdict should be for e plaintiff on 
this issue. If you · d from your consideration of all th 
roved by clear and convincing evidence, en your verdict ·should be 
for the defendant 
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IDJl2d 4.60. (modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED -~.-- t/6- ,;. ~ 
MODIFIED ?!P9p.uJ_,., '"J-~fkk- 0~ IM{//. 
COVERED (, 
OTHER ____ 2 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing 
evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true. 
This is a higher burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than 
not true. 
IDJI2d 1.20.2. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
'One who has special knowledge, experience and competence may not be permitted to 
rely on statements for which the ordinary man might recover, and that one who has acquired 
expert knowledge concerning the matter dealt with may be required to form his own judgment, 
rather than take the word of the defendant.' 
W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 108, at 751 (5th ed. 1984), cited in, 
Stanley Weiss Assocs., LLC v. Energy Mgmt., 2004 R.l. Super. LEXIS 72 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004). 
~~~},~g ~~~~-ft;~ 
COVERED 
OTHER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to 
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
IDJI2d 9.00. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER 
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DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswflliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and ) 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
DEFENDANTS' 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill III hereby submit their 
proposed form of Special Verdict. 
·c/~ 
DATED this..)( __ day of August, 2010. 
DEFENDANrS' SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 1 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants 
001233
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thi~ of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P, 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 2 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
~Via Facsimile: 939-7136 
__ Via U.S. Mail 
' 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company, ) Case No. CV OC 0909974 
) 
Plaintiff , ) 
vs. ) SPECIAL VERDICT 
) 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL Ill and ) 
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:· 
M!Mil:ID BREACH OF Y-A~N~CT , LJ.-,,, ~AitJ "'-" tl-'t aYU flyr 
Question No. 1: Was there ~contract between Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, 
... :- -~ ..... - . 
and Defendant Berryhill. & Company, lnc.rwhic;h d1m:w111t1ated a wecth,g oflbe minds bet,;,e.m 
t:Jie patties OR all esseBtial elements of tbe parties' agreemeflt? 
Answer to Question No. 1: Yes[_] No[_] 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 1 
001235
09/-02/2010 09:09 FAX 
- -
~ 0029/0034 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 5. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 2: Did Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., breach the contract? 
Answer to Question No. 2: Yes[_] No[_._] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. If If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 3: Was Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, damaged on account of the breach? 
Answer to Question No. 3: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 1,. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 4: What is the amount of damages incurred by Plaintiff Mosen Equities, 
LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.' s breach? 
Answer to Question No. 4: $ ____ _ 
If you answered Question No. 4, skip to Question No. 1$. 
AM I: llf> BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT 
'I 
Question No. 5: Did the conduct of the parties give rise to an implied contract,7 which 
dP.p;;ionstrated a ffleeliftg ef the 1ninds betweefl too partiei of all essential elentehts of the pm ties" 
agreeroemz 
Answer to Question No.5: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 9. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 2 
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Question No. 6: Did Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., breach the implied contract? 
Answer to Question No. 6: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 14" If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 7: Was Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, damaged on account of the breach 
of an implied contract? 
Answer to Question No. 7: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 1j. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 8: What is the amount of damages incurred by Plaintiff Mosell Equities, 
LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.'s breach of an implied contract? 
Answer to Question No. 8: $ ___ _ 
If you answered Question No. 8, skip to Question No. tf 
1}tJ~~=S~TENR~~11 
Question No. 9: Was thei:e ab~ upon Defundant Berryhill &.-9~mpany, /' 
,...-"""""' ~ tu-~ f'l1-~ -~ 'fl; .~ ~~ l 
Inc., 
Answer to Question No. 9: . Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this que ion, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next questi . 
Question No.10: Was there appreciati by Defendant Berryhill & Company, fuc., of 
such benefit? 
Answer to Question~ No[_] 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 3 
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H you answered "No" to this questn, skip to Question No, 13. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next quest~n. 
to retain the benefit without payment to the Plaintiff o 
Answer to Question No. 11: No[_J 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question o. 13. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
I! -us-r Question No~: What is the value of th~enefit conferred upon Defendant Berryhill & 
Company, Inc., by Plaintiff? 
/{;) 
Answer to Question Noy $ ____ _ 
Continue to Question No/j. 
____ M§f,E81!iD CONVERSION ~-;!' 
Question No. if: Did Plaitttiff Mosen Equities, U.C; prove that i 
&dpCliOt right1e mft«ials iR the possession of Borryhill & Company, Inc.~~ 
~~~~~/~v· I • ~ 
Answer to Question No. 13: Yes[_] No[_) ', 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. YI. If you answered this 
. (3 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 14: Did laintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, demand eir return? 
uestion No. 14: Yes[_] o[_] 
d "No" to this question, skip to Questio o. 17. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 4 
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Question No. 1S: Did Defe clant Berryhill & Compan , Inc., refuse to deliver them? 
No[_] 
If you answered "No" o this question, skip to estion No. 17. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue t the nextquestion. 
V 
Question No. }6: What is the valu~f the materials? 
Answer to Question No. f: $_____ · 
Continue to Question No. ~-
~ .-~\UD 
(~tiff Mos,cWEquities, LLC, against Defendant John Berryhill1 
Question No. ~ Did Defendant John Berryhill ~ :;'ii:!.~ \i~ ~ .I} ea,illliB!I +iff Mosen Equities, lLC? 
' Answer to Question No. 1~ Yes[_] No [_J 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No@lf you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 18: Was the statement material? 
Yes[_] [_] 
If you answered "No" t this question, skip to Question o. 26. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to th next question. 
Question No. 19: Di Defendant John Berry · know that the statement was false? 
Answer to No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this questio , skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next q 
SPECIAL VERDICT. P. 5 
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If you answered ''No" to , s question, skip to Questio~ If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue the next question. / 
Question N°YWh•t is the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiff Masell Equities, 
l.LC, proximately caused hy Plaintiff's reliance o~ the wJit~t? · · · 
Jt/, 
Answer to Question No.JS: $ ____ _ 
Continue to Question Nolf. ~ 
~RAUD 
(Be!:ryAHl & Company, me., against Mosen Equttles, LLC}-
f~ ia~~t- fj;Lcu£ l"--Question No . .,26: Did Plaintiff's agent, Glenn Mosell, ll'lftl~ ae st:a menc of then-
.... existiog '61ot te Berryhill & Company, Inc? 
1/ 
Answer to Question N<;:)6: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 27': Was the s ent material? 
Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to is question, sign the verdict form. 
question "Yes," continue to next question. 
Glenn Masell of behalf of Mosell Equities , know that the 
statement was false? 
Answer Yes[_] 
If you answere "No" to this question, sign the verdict 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
If you answered this 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 7 
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If you answered "No" to this que~e verdict form. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to th~estion. 
lk 
Question No. 'j4: What is the amount of damages suffered by Berryhill & Company, Inc., 
proximately caused by Plaintiff's reliance cithe fal=ierrt? 
Answer to Question No!µ. $ ____ _ 
Now, sign the verdict fonn below. 
DATED this __ day of September, 2010. 
Foreperson 
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 9 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIALPo.ISTRICT FiLED 1.P ',st 
OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTtttJF ADA P.M. 
SEP 1 5 2010 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, ) 
Liability Company ) 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, c:erk 
By RiC NELSON 
DEPUTY ) Case No. CV OC 0909974 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and JOHN E. ). 
BERRYHILL, individually, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
___________ ) 
ORIGINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Attached hereto are the originals of the instructions given to the jury in the 
above-captioned case. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _J_A-_ 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this 
case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those 
facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and 
objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is 
your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not 
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the 
manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If 
you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try 
to clarify or explain the point further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you 
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an 
attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, 
I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered 
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my 
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my 
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or 
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speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not 
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer. 
If there are occasions during the trial where an objection is made after an answer is given 
or the remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instruct that the answer or remark be 
stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds, 
during your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as 
though you had never heard it. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the 
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what 
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience 
and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your 
everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how 
much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more 
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in 
your deliberations in this case. 
2 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ h:~A 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly 
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one 
or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree 
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such 
convincing force as it may carry. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -~·g~A ........ 
There are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their 
employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2 You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case 
with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the 
case, you must report it to me promptly. 
3. You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to 
deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and 
have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case. 
5. You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gam a greater 
understanding of the case. 
6. You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred. 
7. You must not conduct your own independent research regarding any of the matters 
presented in trial. 
8. You must not search the internet for additional information regarding any of the 
matters presented during this trial, or regarding any of the parties or witnesses involved in this 
trial. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ f_A-4--
The corporation and company involved in this case are entitled to the same fair and 
unprejudiced treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances. You should decide 
this case with the same impartiality that you would use in deciding a case between individuals. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~l ........ p ........ A_ 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence 
and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted 
from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show them 
to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -..-I_ 
Ladies and Gentlemen, all the evidence has been presented in this case. I am now going 
to read you instructions on the law that you are to follow in reaching a decision during your 
deliberations. I will not read again the instructions I gave you at the beginning of the trial; if you 
have any questions about those instructions please review them during your deliberations. After 
I finish reading the instructions, the attorneys will make their closing remarks, and you will be 
escorted to the jury room to begin your deliberations. 
001249
- -
INSTRUCTION NO. 
----
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if 
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably 
true than not true. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3-' 
On the breach of an express contract claim, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each of 
the following propositions: 
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
2. The defendant breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ If,___ 
An express contract is an oral or written agreement between two or more parties to do or 
not do something that is supported by consideration. 
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four 
elements. The four elements are: 
1. Competent parties; 
2. A lawful purpose; 
3. Valid consideration; and 
4. Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms. 
It is not disputed that the following elements are present in the contract alleged in this 
case: The parties were competent to enter into a contract, the alleged contract was for a lawful 
purpose and there was valid consideration. The parties do dispute whether there was mutual 
agreement between them to all essential terms. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
In this case, the defendant alleges that all parties did not agree to all essential terms of the 
contract. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the "meeting of the minds," and means 
that all parties to a contract must have understood and accepted all of the essential terms of the 
contract. 
There is no contract unless all of the essential terms have been communicated to all 
parties, understood by all parties, and accepted by all parties. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __k_ 
A contract may be written or oral, or may contain both written terms and oral terms. So 
long as all the required elements are present, it makes no difference whether the agreement is in 
writing. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _J_ 
Ordinarily, a contract results when negotiations are complete and all essential terms have 
been agreed upon. This is true even though the parties expect to put their agreement in writing. 
However, if the parties have agreed not to be bound until their agreement is reduced to writing, 
no contract results until this is done. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _1 ____ _ 
An express contract may consist of an offer by one party that is accepted by another 
party. 
An offer is any proposal that is intended to become binding upon the party making the 
offer if it is accepted by the party to whom it is directed. 
An acceptance of an offer is an expression by the party to whom the offer was directed 
that accepts the offer in accordance with the terms of the offer. 
To complete the express contract, the acceptance must be absolute and unqualified. If the 
response to the offer changes the terms of the offer in any manner, it is a counter offer but not an 
acceptance. 
The acceptance is not complete until it has been communicated to the party making the 
offer. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. J_ 
Silence does not operate as acceptance of an offer unless 
• 
(1) The silent party accepts services from the offering party, after a reasonable 
opportunity to reject, with knowledge that the offering party expects compensation; or 
(2) Because of the past dealings of the parties, it is reasonable that the silent party 
should notify the offering party that the silent party does not accept; or 
(3) The offering party has notified the silent party that the offer could be accepted by 
silence, and the silent party does intend to accept the offer by silence. 
If you find any of these circumstances exist, silence is an acceptance of the offer. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ____._/_(}_ 
An express contract may be amended or modified by an agreement of the parties. This 
requires all of the elements of any other express contract. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. --I-' I_ 
The terms of the contract are in dispute. 
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the contract in this 
case. In making this determination you should consider, from the evidence, the following: 
1. The contract must be construed as a whole, including all of the circumstances 
giving rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every part of it. 
2. Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you find from the evidence 
that a special meaning was intended. 
3. Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties 
showing what they intended and how they construed the doubtful language may be considered, 
provided that such may not completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently 
with the remainder of the terms. 
4. The contract should be construed to avoid any contradiction or absurdities. 
Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted with reference to any 
generally known and customarily accepted language in that field, unless you find from the 
evidence that this was not intended. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. / ~ 
A 'course of dealing' is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular 
transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for 
interpreting their expressions and other conduct. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.----'-{}>'-----
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by any 
witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the written agreement, 
which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement. While you may 
consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider 
such testimony to completely change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in 
such a fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or parts. 
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INS"rRUCTION NO. ,1 
----
Where there is ambiguous language in a contract, and where the true intent of the parties 
cannot be ascertained by any other evidence, the ambiguity can be resolved by interpreting the 
contract against the party who drafted the contract or provided the ambiguous language. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
---
When a contract expresses no specific time for its performance, the law implies that it is 
to be performed within a reasonable time, as determined by the subject matter of the contract, the 
situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance. If you find a contract 
exists in this case, you are to determine what a reasonable time would be for the performance of 
this contract under these circumstances. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. //p 
----
The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the "principal," to act 
for or in the place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any act of the agent within the 
agent's scope of authority. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ / 7 __ 
An agency relationship exists where one, called the "principal," has authorized another, 
called the "agent," to act on behalf of the principal. 
Agency requires the consent of the principal, which consent may be expressed or implied. 
The term "principal" includes employers, and the term "agent" includes employees. When an 
agent represents more than one principal, the agent is termed a "dual agent." 
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INSTRUCTION NO. Ji 
If you do not find a written or oral express contract, Plaintiff has claimed, in the 
alternative, an implied-in-fact contract. An implied-in-fact contract is a contract where the terms 
and existence of the contract are demonstrated by the conduct of the parties, with the request of 
one party and the performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending 
the performance. To find an implied-in-fact contract, the facts must be such that the intent of the 
parties to make a contract can be inferred from their conduct. An implied-in-fact contract is 
given the same legal effect as any other contract. 
To establish an implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of 
the following propositions: 
1. The circumstances imply a request by the defendant for performance by plaintiff; 
and 
2. The circumstances imply a promise by the defendant to compensate the plaintiff 
for such performance; and 
3. The plaintiff performed as requested. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __.)_q_ 
In addition, if you do not find an express contract or an implied-in-fact contract, 
plaintiff has claimed, in the alternative, unjust enrichment. On plaintiffs claim of unjust enrichment 
against the defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant; 
2. The defendant accepted the benefit; and 
3. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit 
without compensating the plaintiff for its value. 
4. The amount that would be unjust for the defendant to retain. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2,.{) 
The Defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel. This is a 
legal term which means the plaintiff may be prevented from enforcing a contract or term of 
contract by reason of the plaintiffs own conduct. 
To establish the defense of equitable estoppel, the defendant has the burden of proof on 
each of the following propositions: 
1. The plaintiff falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the defendant; 
2. The plaintiff knew or should have known the true facts; 
3. The defendant did not know and could not discover the true facts; 
4. The defendant relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the defendant's 
prejudice. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. J,/ 
A "material fact" is one which constitutes substantially the consideration of the contract, 
or without which it would not have been made. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. P-J-
The Defendants have also asserted the affirmative defense of waiver. The Defendants 
have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. Plaintiff knew it had a right, and 
2. Plaintiff voluntarily relinquished the right. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2 3 
On plaintiff's claim for conversion, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the 
following propositions: 
1. That the defendants kept plaintiff's property without a right to do so; 
2. The nature and extent of the damages to plaintiff and the amount thereof. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _Jfj_ 
On plaintiffs Fraud claim against defendants, the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it in 
a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false 
statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. J.[° 
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing 
evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true. 
This is a higher burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than 
not true. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
----
"Materiality'' refers to the importance of the representation in determining the party's 
course of action. A representation is material if ( a) a reasonable person would attach importance 
to its existence or nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the transaction in question, 
or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that the recipient is likely to 
regard the matter as important in determining the choice of action, whether or not a reasonable 
person would so consider. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. i-~ A-
When I use the expression "proximately caused," I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the complained damage, and but for that cause the damage would 
not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in 
bringing about the damage. It is not a proximate cause if the damage likely would have occurred 
anyway. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2!j__ 
On defendant's Fraud claim against plaintiff, the defendant has the burden of proving 
each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That the plaintiff stated a fact to the defendant; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The plaintiff either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. The defendant did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The plaintiff intended for the defendant to rely upon the statement and act upon it in 
a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The defendant did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The defendant's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. The defendant suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false 
statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the defendant, and the amount thereof. 
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INSTRUCrlON NO. __._/:_({;_ 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any 
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to be 
awarded you may not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the 
method of determining the amount of the damage award. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2!i_ 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to 
whether the plaintiff or defendant is entitled to damages. 
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INSTRUC1"10N NO. '3:S? 
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants on the plaintiff's 
claim of express contract or implied-in-fact contract, the jury must determine the amount of 
money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved by the 
evidence to have resulted from the defendants' breach of contract. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -1:_L 
The measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim is not the actual amount of the 
enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between two parties it would be unjust for 
one party to retain. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant received a benefit 
and of proving the amount of the benefit which the defendants unjustly retained. The value of 
services rendered can be used as evidence of the value of the benefit bestowed under the theory 
of unjust enrichment. Although damages need not be proven with mathematical precision, the 
damages, i.e., the value of any benefit unjustly received by the defendant in an action based upon 
unjust enrichment, must be proven to a reasonable certainty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. Jd 
If the jury decides that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants on the 
theory of conversion, the jury may consider the following damages: 
The fair market value of the property kept. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. $ g 
When I use the term "value" or the phrase "fair market value" or "actual cash value" in 
these instructions as to any item of property, I mean the amount of money that a willing buyer 
would pay and a willing seller would accept for the item in question in an open marketplace, in 
the item's condition as it existed immediately prior to the occurrence in question. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. J!j_ 
If the jury decides in favor of either or both parties on their respective claim of fraud, the 
jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the party 
for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the other party's fraud. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ,3 5' 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a Presiding Juror, who will 
preside over your deliberations. 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the 
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions 
on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as 
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you 
should fill it out as instructed, and have it initialed and signed. It is not necessary that the same 
nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your Presiding Juror alone will sign it; 
but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the 
verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff, who 
will then return you into open court. 
The verdict is self-explanatory but I will read it to you as part of these instructions: 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Question No. 1: Was there an express contract between PlaintiffMosell Equities, LLC, 
and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc. which was breached? 
Answer to Question No. 1: Yes[_] No [_J 
Juror initials 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 3. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
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Question No. 2: What is the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly 
compensate PlaintiffMosell Equities, LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, lnc.'s 
breach? 
Answer to Question No. 2: $ ____ _ 
Juror initials 
If you answered Question No. 2, do not answer Question Numbers 3, 4, 5 and 6, but 
answer question No. 7. 
BREACH OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT 
Question No. 3: Did the conduct of the parties give rise to an implied-in-fact contract 
which was breached? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes [_J No L_J 
Juror initials 
If you answered ''No" to this question, skip to Question No. 5. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 4: What is the amount of damages incurred by PlaintiffMosell Equities, 
LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.'s breach of an implied-in-fact contract? 
Answer to Question No. 4: $ ____ _ 
Juror initials 
If you answered Question No. 4, skip to Question No. 7. 
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UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Question No. 5: Did PlaintiffMosell Equities confer a benefit upon Defendant Berryhill 
& Company, Inc., which would be unjust for Berryhill & Company, Inc. to retain without 
payment? 
Answer to Question No. 5: Yes[_] No [_J 
Juror initials 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 7. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 6: What is the value of the unjust benefit conferred upon Defendant 
Berryhill & Company, Inc., by Plaintiff? 
Answer to Question No. 10: $ ____ _ 
Juror initials 
Continue to Question No. 7. 
CONVERSION 
Question No. 7: Did Plaintiff Berryhill & Company, Inc. convert property to its own use 
which is owned by Mosell Equities? 
Answer to Question No. 7: Yes [_J No [_J 
Juror initials 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 9. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 8: What is the value of the property converted? 
Answer to Question No. 8: $ 
-----
001286
Juror initials 
Continue to Question No. 9. 
DEFENDANT'S FRAUD 
Question No. 9: Did Defendant John Berryhill and Berryhill & Company, Inc., commit 
fraud on Mosen Equities, LLC? 
Answer to Question No. 9: Yes [_J No [_J 
Juror initials 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 10: What is the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiff Mosen Equities, 
LLC, proximately caused by Plaintiffs reliance on Defendants' fraud? 
Answer to Question No. 10: $ 
-----
Juror initials 
Continue to Question No. 11. 
PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD 
Question No. 11: Did Plaintiffs agent, Glenn Mosen, commit fraud on Berryhill & 
Company, Inc? 
Answer to Question No. 11: Yes [_J No [_] 
Juror initials 
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If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 12: What is the amount of damages suffered by Berryhill & Company, 
Inc., proximately caused by Defendants' reliance on Plaintiffs fraud? 
Answer to Question No. 12: $ ____ _ 
Juror initials 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 (P 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send 
a note signed by one or more of you to the Bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me 
by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of 
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding 
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes 
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for 
your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the 
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of 
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the 
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense 
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it 
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for 
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and 
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. '3 ?{ 
As I have already instructed you, on retiring to the jury room, select one of your number 
as a Presiding Juror, who will conduct your deliberations in a fair and orderly fashion. 
The bailiff will escort you to the jury deliberation room, with my instrucitons, exhibits 
admitted and verdict form. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff, who 
will then return you into open court. 
Dated this /~ptember, 2010. 
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ORIGINAL 
INSTRUCTION NO. --M--
You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you 
to reach a verdict. You must consider the instructions as a whole, not picking out one 
and disregarding others. The order in which the instructions are given has no 
significance as to their relative importance. Whether some of the instructions will apply 
will depend upon your determination of the facts. You will disregard any instruction 
which applies to a state of facts which you determine does not exist. You must not 
conclude from the fact that an instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any 
opinion as to the facts. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL Dis1i1ct OF THEpi~=ta.5-~ : 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ADA SEP 1 5 2010 
J. DAVID i'-!/\VARRO, C!3rk 
By R:C N~LSON 
D[fUTY MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, 
Liability Company, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
Plaintiff, 
vs. SPECIAL VERDICT 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, me., an Idaho 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Question No. 1: Was there an express contract between PlaintiffMosell Equities, LLC, 
and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc. which was breached? 
Answer to Question No. 1: Yes [_J No LXJ 
Juror initials ~ 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 3. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 2: What is the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly 
compensate PlaintiffMosell Equities, LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.'s 
breach? 
Answer to Question No. 2: $ 
-----
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Juror initials 
If you answered Question No. 2, do not answer Question Numbers 3, 4, 5 and 6, but 
answer question No. 7. 
BREACH OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT 
Question No. 3: Did the conduct of the parties give rise to an implied-in-fact contract 
which was breached? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes [_J No [_){] 
Juror initials ~-
~ -
fSkf) 
~ 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 5. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 4: What is the amount of damages incurred by PlaintiffMosell Equities, 
LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.'s breach of an implied-in-fact contract? 
Answer to Question No. 4: $ 
-----
Juror initials 
If you answered Question No. 4, skip to Question No. 7. 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Question No. 5: Did Plaintiff Mosen Equities confer a benefit upon Defendant Berryhill 
& Company, Inc., which would be unjust for Berryhill & Company, Inc. to retain without 
payment? 
Answer to Question No. 5: Yes[_] No [,X.] 
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If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 7. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 6: What is the value of the unjust benefit conferred upon Defendant 
Berryhill & Company, Inc., by Plaintiff? 
Answer to Question No. 10: $ 
-----
Juror initials 
Continue to Question No. 7. 
CONVERSION 
Question No. 7: Did Plaintiff Berryhill & Company, Inc. convert property to its own use 
which is owned by Mosell Equities? 
Answer to Question No. 7: Yes[~_] No [_J 
Juror initials ~ 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 9. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 8: What is the value of the property converted? 
Answer to Question No. 8: $ ~O I l, .}?S-
Juror initials ti 
Continue to Question No. 9. 
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DEFENDANT'S FRAUD 
Question No. 9: Did Defendant John Berryhill and Berryhill & Company, Inc., commit 
fraud on Mosell Equities, LLC? 
Answer to Question No. 9: Yes[_J No[j(J 
Juror initials ~ 
If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 10: What is the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiff Mosen Equities, 
LLC, proximately caused by Plaintiffs reliance on Defendants' fraud? 
Answer to Question No. 10: $ ____ _ 
Juror initials 
Continue to Question No. 11. 
PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD 
Question No. 11: Did Plaintiffs agent, Glenn Mosell, commit fraud on Berryhill & 
Company, Inc? 
Answer to Question No. 11: 
0.Jf"((f( 
Juror initials ~ 
Yes [_] No L)(J 
If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this 
question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
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Question No. 12: What is the amount of damages suffered by Berryhill & Company, 
Inc., proximately caused by Defendants' reliance on Plaintiffs fraud? 
Answer to Question No. 12: $ ____ _ 
Juror initials 
Now, sign the verdict form below. 
~ DATED this~ clay of September, 2010. 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL& COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Counter Claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT 
EVIDENCE: OTHER LITIGATION 
Judge Goff 
* * * * * * 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Mosell Equities, LLC, by and through its 
undersigned counsel, and requests that this Court exclude testimony or documents relating to any 
prior or continuing legal matter or litigation to which Glenn Mosell, a non-party, may have been 
involved. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: OTHER 
LITIGATION - 1 
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ARGUMENT 
During the deposition of Glenn Mosell, the Defendants inquired about prior or 
contemporaneous legal matters or litigation involving Glenn Mosell. The Plaintiff believes the 
Defendants may try to introduce evidence of legal conflicts or litigation involving Mr. Mosell 
regarding real estate or prior business dealings with other parties not involved in this case. 
The Plaintiff, Mosell Equities, and Defendant John Berryhill, were involved in litigation 
as co-plaintiffs in John Berryhill, and Mosell Equities, LLC., v. Broadway Park, Inc., and 
Michael G. Matzek, Ada County Case No. CV OC 07-00987, and the proceedings in that case are 
relevant to the issues raised in this case. However, Glenn Mosell personally was not a party to 
the Broadway Park case. 
Any legal proceedings involving Mr. Mosell personally, or Plaintiff Mosell Equities, 
other than the Broadway Park case, are irrelevant to these proceedings and therefore should be 
excluded according to Rule 402, IRE. Moreover, even if such evidence is somehow relevant, 
any probative value would be outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice, or the potential to 
confuse or mislead the jury, and therefore should be excluded according to Rule 403, IRE. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of August, 2010. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: OTHER 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of August, 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via facsimile transmission to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
TIIOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
ERIC R. CLARK 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LlMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: OTHER 
LITIGATION - 3 
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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SEP 2 1 2010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Counter Claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 090997 4 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT, 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Judge Goff 
COMES NOW the PlaintiffMosell Equities and provides the Court with its 
memorandum in support of motion for JNOV and new trial. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - I 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fortunately, aggrieved parties are not without recourse when a jury fails to follow the 
Court's instructions, when it appears the jury purposefully ignored evidence, and when the jury 
subsequently renders a verdict that borders on the ridiculous. Neither party believed Mosell 
Equities intended to simply give Berryhill & Company, Inc. over $400,000.00 without any 
consideration, yet, that apparently is what the jury determined. 
After four days of trial, the jury returned its verdict finding no express contract existed 
which had been breached, no implied-in-fact contract existed which had been breached, and that 
neither party had defrauded the other party. The jury also determined that although Berryhill & 
Company received $405,000.00 the delivery of which was premised on Berryhill's promise of 
the sale of half of the business, and the promise the money would remain a loan pending the 
"buy in," that it was not unjust that Berryhill kept every penny and Mosell Equities received 
nothing in consideration. The jury also awarded Mosell Equities a mere 20% of its claim for 
conversion. 
Mosell Equities now requests that the Court set aside the jury's verdict that no express 
contract existed which had been breached, set aside the jury's verdict that no implied-in-fact 
contract existed which had been breached, and set aside the jury's verdict on Mosell Equities' 
unjust enrichment and conversion claims. Mosell Equities also requests in the alternative that 
the Court grant a new trial. 
II. MOSELL EQUITIES IS ENTITLED TO JNOV 
A. STANDARD APPLICABLE TO JNOV ISSUE 
"In determining whether a district court should have granted a j.n.o.v. motion, this Court 
employs the same standard the district court used in ruling on the motion." Coombs v. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
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Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, _, 219 P.3d 453,460 (2009). A district court will deny a j.n.o.v. 
motion "if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable 
minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury." Bates v. Seldin, 146 
Idaho 772, 774, 203 P.3d 702, 704 (2009). Thus, a verdict will be upheld when it is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach. Shop, Inc., 
131 Idaho 242, 247, 953 P.2d 992, 997 (1998). _." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 
567, 97 P.3d 428, 434 .(2004) (quoting Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 736, 
518 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974)). 
In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the district court may not weigh the 
evidence, attempt to judge the credibility of the witnesses, or compare its factual findings 
with those of the jury. Bates, 146 Idaho at 774-75, 203 P.3d at 704-05. Instead, "[a] trial 
court reviews the facts as if the moving party admitted any adverse facts and draws all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Id. at 775, 203 P.3d at 705. 
High Valley Concrete v. Sargent, Idaho Supreme Court Doc. No 35313 (July 8, 2010) Pg. 5-6. 
B. THE JURY DISREGARDED THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
When considering whether to grant or deny a motion for JNOV, as identified above in the 
High Valley Concrete case, "if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that 
reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury," the Court must 
deny the motion. However, the Court must take into consideration the criteria stated in the jury 
Instruction when making its ruling. As an example, while Instruction No. 13 allows the jurors 
latitude in their deliberations, it specifically prohibits the jury from deciding the case in a manner 
contrary to the instruction. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by 
any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the 
written agreement, which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of 
the written agreement. While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if 
necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to 
completely change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in 
such a fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or 
parts. (Emphasis added) 
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If the Instructions prohibit such evidence, then clearly that evidence cannot be use when 
deliberating and deciding a JNOV motion. As an example, if Berryhill testifies "loan" really 
means "equity," but the term "equity" "is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the 
written agreement," then the Court would be prohibited from using Berryhill's self-serving 
testimony as "substantial evidence" when considering this motion. The Court would also be 
prohibited from using Berryhill' s testimony that "loan" really meant "equity" as substantial 
evidence if "equity" does not fit "with the other, non-ambiguous terms or parts." As Mosell 
Equities argued at trial, if "equity" really meant "equity," as Berryhill claims, then the language 
in Exhibit 1, "It will be transitioned ... " would be superfluous and unnecessary. Obliviously, you 
do not need to "transition" equity if equity already is equity. 
C. MOSELL EQUITIES PROVED AN EXPRESS CONTRACT. 
The jury answered the "express contract" questions on the verdict form as follows: 
Question No. 1: Was there an express contract between Plaintiff Mosell Equities, 
LLC, and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc. which was breached? Answer: 
"No." 
Question No. 2: What is the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly 
compensate Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & 
Company, Inc.'s breach? No response. 
A finding however that no express contract existed or that no express contract was 
breached is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
The parties stipulated to the admission of Plaintiffs Exhibits 1-11, 1 Berryhill' s 
handwritten note and each of the loan checks Mosell delivered at Berryhill' s request and 
based on Berryhill's promise he was selling one-half of his business to Mosell Equities. 
1 Mosell Equities has attached copies of the admitted exhibits for the Court's convenience. 
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1 Loan Agreement with first loan check 
2 Check No. 5127 -June 28, 2007 "Loan" "$50,000" 
3 Check No. 5137 -July 30, 2007 "Loan" "$25,000" 
4 Check No. 5139 -August 7, 2007 "Loan - Tl's" "$25,000" 
5 Check No. 5140 - August 16, 2007 "Loan #4" "$25,000" 
6 Check No. 5141 -August 16, 2007 "Loan #5" "$25,000" 
7 Check No. 5196- October 9, 2007 "Kitchen Equip Loan" "60,000" 
8 Check No. 5201 - October 26, 2007 "Loan" "100,000" 
9 Check No. 5154-December 4, 2007 "Loan" "$25,000" 
10 Check No. 5164 - December 19, 2007 "Loan" "$50,000" 
11 Check No. 5247 -April 30, 2008 "Suite 101 Tl's" "20,000" 
Jury Instruction No. 8 addressed the requirements to create and "express contract." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
An express contract may consist of an offer by one party that is accepted 
by another party. 
An offer is any proposal that is intended to become binding upon the party 
making the offer if it is accepted by the party to whom it is directed. 
An acceptance of an offer is an expression by the party to whom the offer 
was directed that accepts the offer in accordance with the terms of the offer. 
To complete the express contract, the acceptance must be absolute and 
unqualified. If the response to the offer changes the terms of the offer in any 
manner, it is a counter offer but not an acceptance. 
The acceptance is not complete until it has been communicated to the 
party making the offer. 
Mosen Equities proved offer and acceptance. Glenn Mosen testified he delivered 10 
checks to Berryhill, and had done so at at Berryhill's request. Thereafter, the evidence was 
uncontraverted that Berryhill or his company endorsed the checks, and that Berryhill accounted 
for the checks as loans to his company. Berryhill also confirmed receiving the first check as a 
"loan," as Berryhill wrote "this is a loan" on Exhibit 1, in reference to a $50,000 check he 
acknowledged receiving from Mosen Equities (Ex. 2.). 
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D. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SUFFICIENT QUANTITY AND PROBATIVE 
VALUE THAT REASONABLE MINDS COULD HA VE REACHED THE CONCLUSION 
THAT "LOAN" REALLY MEANT "EQUITY." 
As discussed above, if the jury instructions prohibit the consideration of testimony, then 
that testimony cannot be used to defeat a motion for JNOV. 
In Instruction No. 11, the Court instructed the jury the contract existed, but the terms 
were in dispute. Mosell con~ended "loan" meant loan, and Berryhill contended "loan" really 
meant something else. At trial, Berryhill testified that he wrote loan, but actually meant 
"equity." The issue before the jury then was to determine the parties' intent -"loan" or "equity." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
The terms of the contract are in dispute. 
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the 
contract in this case. In making this determination you should consider, from the 
evidence, the following: 
1. The contract must be construed as a whole, including all of the circumstances 
giving rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every part of it. 
2. Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you find from the 
evidence that a special meaning was intended. 
3. Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties 
showing what they intended and how they construed the doubtful language may 
be considered, provided that such may not completely change the agreement or 
construe one term inconsistently with the remainder of the terms. 
4. The contract should be construed to avoid any contradiction or absurdities. 
Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted with reference to 
any generally known and customarily accepted language in that field, unless you 
find from the evidence that this was not intended. 
First, regarding criterion 1, throughout the pre-trial process, Berryhill contended the 
parties had never reached an agreement regarding the terms of the "buy in." However, at trial, he 
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testified he believed the parttes had reached an agreement and the terms were identified in 
Exhibit 21. That testimony appeared to contradict his deposition testimony where Berryhill 
claimed that Deposition Exhibit 10, which was Trial Exhibit 21, did not reflect the parties' intent 
and failed for the same reason he refused to sign the Meier's document. 
At trial, Mosell Equities argued that if the parties had agreed to the Terms in Exhibit 21, 
which was drafted in April 2007, then Exhibit 1 was unnecessary. If the parties had agreed to the 
terms in Exhibit 21, Mosell Equities would have been "buying in" when it made its payments to 
Berryhill beginning in June 2007, so there would have been no need identify any "transition." 
Moreover, assuming the parties desired to somehow confirm the money Mosell started 
paying in June 2007 was part of the "buy in," then Exhibit 1 would have simply said "this money 
is part of the buy in," and any mention of the term "loan" or "transition" would have been 
pointless. The mere fact that Exhibit 1 exists, contradicts Berryhill's claim "loan" really meant 
"equity." 
Regarding criterion 2, at trial, Mosell Equities argued that the term "loan" has an 
"ordinary meaning." Mosell also supported that argument with undisputed evidence that 
Berryhill himself used the term in Exhibit 1; that Berryhill instructed his General Manager to 
account for the money as loans; and that Berryhill' s own attorney created "buy in" documents, 
after a lengthy meeting with Berryhill, (Ex. 35.) which clearly and unambiguously refer to 
Mosell Equities' money as loans to Berryhill & Company, Inc. that were being transitioned to 
stock ownership. Mosell Eqµities also proved that Berryhill used the term "loan" when 
conferring with his CPA. (Ex. 37.) 
Moreover, Mo sell testified in the Broadway Park case that he believed the funds were 
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and remained a loan to Berryhill & Company pending the "buy in," confirmed that testimony in 
this case, and testified that Berryhill was present during Mosell's deposition and did not dispute 
Mosell's testimony. 
And: 
Pg. 61. 
20 Q. Well, with respect to the 385,000 that you've 
21 already loaned B'erryhill, is he paying interest on that? 
22 Or what are the terms of that loan? 
23 A. No details, no formal note has been put 
24 together. Right now if I decided not to be a part of 
25 Berryhill and Company, we could separate and I could say 
Pg. 62. 
1 "Give me back $385,000 and we'll go our separate ways." 
2 Right now we're moving forward with that 
3 understanding. The same could be said about Polo Cove. 
Pg. 63. 
10 Q. Mr. Mosell, is it your understanding today 
11 that if -- you have the absolute right to walk away from 
12 the restaurant, demand your 385,000 back? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Is that correct? 
15 A. Yes. That would not relieve me of my 
16 obligation on cosigning of that space, though. 
17 Q. So is it your iutent today to go forward with 
18 the purchase of fifty percent of the Berryhill 
19 operations? 
20 A. That is my intent, yes. 
21 Q. But you have the absolute right to walk away 
22 from that intent if you chose to? 
23 A. Yes. 
Regarding criterion 3, the same evidence supporting criterion 2 apply. Additionally, 
Glenn Mosell wrote "loan" prominently on 9 checks totaling $385,000.00 each of which he 
delivered to and was accepted by Berryhill. 
Finally, regarding criterion 4 oflnstruction No. 11, Mosell Equities argued that in Exhibit 
1, if you replaced the term "loan" with "equity" the statement would be nonsensical because if 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 8 
001308
Mosell Equities' money was equity, it would be unnecessary to later "transition" the money to a 
"buy in." Purchasing "equity" is buying interest in the company, so there would be no reason to 
transition "equity" to "equity." 
Mosell Equities also argued that no reasonable person would agree to pay in "equity" 
when the terms of the "buy in" were unresolved, as what the party was actually purchasing was 
unidentified. Construing the contract as Berryhill presented - that he gets to keep all monies 
paid as "equity" if the "buy in" did not occur, Mosell Equities argued created an absurdity. No 
reasonable person would have agreed to those terms. 
The Court then identified in Instruction No. 13, the limits of the jury's consideration of 
contradictory terms. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by 
any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the 
written agreement, which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of 
the written agreement. While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if 
necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to 
completely change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in 
such a fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or 
parts. (Emphasis added.) 
Based on the evidence, which must be considered in light of the criteria identified in 
Instruction Nos. 11 and 13, the jury's verdict is not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. To find no express contract existed and the parties did not intend the Mosell Equities 
funds to be a loan, subject to change only upon completion of a future and potential "buy in" 
ignores the plain meaning of the term "loan" and the parties' conduct in relation to Exhibit 1 and 
the checks. Eight checks were marked "loan" and Berryhill accounted for all 10 of the checks as 
loans to his company. (Ex. 52, 53, 55.) Additionally, Joy Luedtke, Berryhill's General 
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Manager and bookkeeper, testified Berryhill personally directed her to account for these funds as 
loans to Berryhill & Company. 
Both Instruction Nos. 11 and 13 prohibit consideration of Berryhill's self-serving 
testimony that "loan" really means "equity." Consequently, as there was no evidence to 
corroborate Berryhill's testimony that "loan" really meant "equity," there is no substantial 
evidence or any evidence to support an interpretation of Exhibit 1 or the parties subsequent 
conduct to support a conclusion the contract was NOT for a loan. 
Considering the evidence presented when analyzed with the criteria stated in the relevant 
jury instructions, there is no evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable 
minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury. The only reasonable 
interpretation is an expressed contract existed and that the 9 checks marked loan were loans, 
consistent with Exhibit 1, and as accounted for by Berryhill & Company, Inc. 
E. MOSELL EQUITIES PROVED BERRYHILL BREACHED THE EXPRESS 
CONTRACT. 
Assuming for the sake of argument, the jury found an express contract existed, but 
responded "no" to the "which was breached" language of Question 1, there is no evidence of 
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar 
conclusion. Mosell Equities presented testimony that it made demand on Berryhill to either 
consummate the "buy in" or pay back the loan. On cross examination, to impeach Berryhill's 
contention that Mosell Equities had "run away" and that Mosell Equities had never requested its 
funds, Mosell Equities presented evidence of Berryhill' s prior inconstant statement that Berryhill 
through counsel denied the loans existed. "First and foremost, the funds described in your letter 
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and claimed by Mr. Mosell qr Mosell Equities did not constitute a loan to John Berryhill or 
Berryhill & CO., Inc." 
Applying the standard required for establishing entitlement to judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, there is no "evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds 
could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury." The Court therefore must set aside 
the verdict on this issue and grant Mosell Equities' Motion for JNOV. 
F. MOSELL EQUITIES PROVED AN IMPLIED IN FACT CONTRACT EXISTED - AT 
LEAST 8 OF THEM 
Mosell Equities also pursued a claim for an implied-in-fact contract in the alternative to 
its express contract claim. Mosell Equities believed that if for some reason the jury could not 
understand the complexities of the express contract jury instructions, the checks Mosell Equities 
presented to Berryhill & Company, Inc. and the parties' conduct related to the delivery of those 
checks (including Ex. 1.) and thereafter created an implied-in-fact contract. Mosell Equities has 
contended throughout this litigation that the facts establish BOTH an express contract and an 
implied-in-fact contract and the facts presented at trial corroborated and substantiate that 
contention. 
As discussed above, there is a question as to whether or not the jury found an implied-in-
fact contract, but also found there was no breach. 
Question No. 3: Did the conduct of the parties give rise to an implied-in-fact 
contract which was breached? Answer: "No." 
Question No. 4: What is the amount of damages incurred by PlaintiffMosell 
Equities, LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.'s breach of an 
implied-in-fact contract? No response. 
Again, however, a finding that no implied-in-fact contract existed or no such contract was 
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breached, is not supported by substantial and competent evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
If you do not find a written or oral express contract, Plaintiff has claimed, in the 
alternative, an implied-in-fact contract. An implied-in-fact contract is a contract 
where the terms and existence of the contract are demonstrated by the conduct of 
the parties, with the request of one party and the performance by the other often 
being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance. To find an 
implied-in-fact contract, the facts must be such that the intent of the parties to 
make a contract can be inferred from their conduct. An implied-in-fact contract is 
given the same legal effect as any other contract. 
To establish an implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on 
each of the following propositions: 
I. The circumstances imply a request by the defendant for 
performance by plaintiff; and 
2. The circumstances imply a promise by the defendant to 
compensate the plaintiff for such performance; and 
3. The plaintiff performed as requested. 
Glenn Mosell testified that he drafted and delivered each check to Berryhill & Company, 
at John Berryhill' s request, and that Mosell prominently indicated "loan" on 9 of the 10 checks 
delivered. (Mosell testified he did not use the term loan as he delivered the last check (Ex. 11.) 
after hearing Berryhill's testimony in January 2008 that the deal was done - Mosell already 
bought in.) Thereafter, Berryhill accounted for each check as a loan to his company- right up to 
the day of trial. 
Thus, Mosell's uncontradicted testimony that Berryhill requested the money established 
criterion 1. That Mosell writing "loan" on each check, Berryhill accepting the checks as 
presented, and then Berryhill accounting for the received funds as loans, satisfied criterion 2. 
And, finally, it was uncontraverted that Mosell Equities provided the requested money, satisfying 
criterion 3. 
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As noted above, however, despite this uncontradicted evidence, this jury could not find 
an implied-in-fact contract. Applying the JNOV standard discussed extensively above, there 
simply is no "evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could 
have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury." Mosell Equities is therefore entitled to 
relief from the jury's verdict on this issue. 
G. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
BERRYHILL'S EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
This defense may apply only if the jury were to find an express or implied-in-fact 
contract existed. Consequently, the jury would have had to have marked either Verdict Question 
1 or 3 as "yes," but then indicated either "0" or an amount less than Mosell Equities requested 
for damages. If the jury found no express or implied-in-fact contract existed, then this defense is 
not applicable. 
Assuming the Defendants are contending the misrepresentation was Mosell' s alleged 
statement "we have to call it something," the only evidence presented was Berryhill's self-
serving testimony. However, there is no substantial or competent evidence that Berryhill 
reasonably and detrimentally. relied on the alleged statement. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
The Defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel. This 
is a legal term which means the plaintiff may be prevented from enforcing a 
contract or term of contract by reason of the plaintiffs own conduct. 
To establish the defense of equitable estoppel, the defendant has the burden of 
proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The plaintiff falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the defendant; 
2. The plaintiff knew or should have known the true facts; 
3. The defendant did not know and could not discover the true facts; 
4. The defendant relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the 
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defendant's prejudice. 
The undisputed facts are Berryhill used the term "loan" on Exhibit 1, Mosell placed the 
term "loan" prominently on 8 checks totaling $385,000.00, Berryhill then accepted these checks 
and accounted for the funds as loans to his company on the company financial records. Berryhill 
also referred to the funds as loans in communications with his CPA and attorneys. 
Based on these facts alone and as it is the Defendants' duty to establish a factual basis to 
support each element of the defense, the defense fails as Berryhill presented no evidence of 
detrimental reliance. Even assuming Mosell made the statement "we have to call it something," 
Berryhill considered and processed the funds as loans - and that evidence is undisputed. 
H. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF NO MEETING OF THE MINDS 
This defense would appear to apply only as a defense to an express contract claim. In the 
context of the implied-in-fact claim, the parties' intent is presumed from their conduct. In other 
words, if the facts establish an implied-in-fact contract exists, those facts would also refute a no 
meeting of the minds defense. 
Moreover, as discussed above, Berryhill's self-serving testimony that he believed "loan" 
really meant "equity" is refuted and contradicted by the mountain of evidence, including 
Berryhill's own statements and his conduct, that Berryhill really meant and understood Mosell 
Equities was making a loan to Berryhill that "will be transitioned" if and only if the parties 
finalized the "buy in." 
Finally, assuming the jury determined there was no "meeting of the minds" to create an 
express contract, then the proper remedy is rescission. The contract Berryhill seeks to avoid was 
executory - Mosell Equities had performed and delivered over $400,000.00 to Berryhill. If this 
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defense applies, the Court must return the parties to pre-contracting positions. The Court 
therefore must order Berryhill to return these funds if the jury concluded this defense applied. 
I. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE JURY'S VERDICT ON MOSELL EQUITIES' CLAIM FOR UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 
There is no dispute that if an express or implied-in-fact contract exists, as an equitable 
remedy, unjust enrichment would not apply. Consequently, assuming the jury determined no 
express or implied-in-fact contract existed, and the Court determines the jury erred, the unjust 
enrichment claim is moot. 
For the sake of argument, assuming no contracts exist, the undisputed facts indicate 
Mosell Equities delivered money to Berryhill based on Berryhill's promise that he was selling 
one-half of his company. Glenn Mosell testified unequivocally he did not intend the $405,000 to 
be a gift to Berryhill & Company, and he delivered the money based on Berryhill's offer to sell 
and promise the funds delivered remained a loan until the "buy in" was complete. Mosell's 
testimony was undisputed. 
Neither party disagrees that each party desired in June 2007 to consummate the "buy in" 
and finalize the business relationship. Jim Tomlinson and Joy Luedtke testified they both 
believed, after observing Mosell and Berryhill interact, that Mosell actually was an owner in 
Berryhill & Company in 2008. Even Berryhill testified in the Broadway Park case the deal was 
done, the attorneys just had to draft the paperwork 
Pg. 77. 
12 Q. For ease of discussion I'm going to call it 
13 500,000; but I'm noting that you said it's slightly 
14 under. 
15 A. Okay. 
16 Q. What did Mosell Equities get in exchange for 
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17 this half a million dollars? 
18 A. Fifty percent of Berryhill and Company. 
In response, Berryhill claimed that he would have never moved the restaurant downtown 
or moved his catering business and offices downtown without Mosell's promise regarding "Polo 
Cove." However, despite repeated cross-examination questions, Berryhill was unable to identify 
a single statement regarding Polo Cove that Berryhill contended Mosell stated that was false or 
misleading. Berryhill conceded he had testified in the Broadway Park case in January 2008 -
after he had received $385,000.00 from Mosell, that Berryhill understood that Polo Cove was an 
"ameba" and ever changing.· Berryhill thus conceded he understood that Polo Cove was a 
speculative venture. 
Pg. 227. 
15 Q. I'm sorry. What does that mean? I'm sorry, 
16 what do you mean, "put out to venture"? What does that 
17 mean? 
18 A. People that we venture with in a development; 
19 hotelier that wants to be a part of the project, 
20 investors that want to be a part of the project. The 
21 project is an amoeba. It's ever changing. Every 
Berryhill also testified that Mosell never guaranteed the success of Polo Cove and 
conceded Bob Tauton's credible opinion was accurate, Polo Cove's failure resulted from the 
economy and collapse of the real estate market over which Mosell had no control. 
Berryhill testified that he understood that Mosell was relying on Berryhill's expertise and 
experience as a restaurateur, and that he had made a similar statement in the Broadway Park 
case. Berryhill also testified he "ran the numbers" - as he always did, and determined both the 
move downtown and expansion were economically feasible, based on Berryhill's, not Mosell's 
projections. Berryhill also testified he did not consider any potential income from Polo Cove in 
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his projections. 
Despite these undisputed facts, it appeared at trial that Berryhill was blaming Mosell for 
his financial predicament and was trying to establish "damages" to offset the $405,000.00 he 
knew he owed Mosell Equities. Berryhill presented testimony that his company was 
$150,000.00 in debt to the landlord for the "expansion" space, but acknowledged his company's 
owner's equity was negative $250,000.00 because of money he had personally taken out of the 
company. (Ex. 52, 53, 54.) In other words, the company lacked money to pay the landlord, 
because Berryhill had removed that money, not because of anything Mosell Equities had done. 
If the undisputed facts establish Berryhill took the money out of his company, rather than paying 
the rent, why is Berryhill entitled to equity? 
Berryhill also contended that Mosell Equities owed Berryhill & Company rent for the 
"Polo Cove" space of approximately $16,000.00. In response, Mosell testified he had paid for 
the build out of the space and another $20,000 plus in rent. Mosell also testified that in the 
summer of 2008 when it appeared he was going to have to scale down the Polo Cove efforts, he 
contacted Berryhill and offered to help sublease the space. Mosell testified Berryhill refused to 
sublease, and Jim Tomlinson testified that Berryhill is using the space as a "lounge" and has not 
attempted to sublease the space in recent history. 
Moreover, Berryhill confirmed there was no sublease signed between Mosell Equities 
and Berryhill & Company regarding the 1200 sq. ft. "Polo Cove" space. Consequently, by law 
the lease was for 30 days, and no longer. 
Assuming that Berryhill has established any damages to offset the amount he received 
from Mosell Equities, that amount was minimal. 
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Additionally, Berryhill attempted to establish that Mosell was using Berryhill's "good 
name" and "branding" to add value to Polo Cove, and attempted to offer expert opinion 
testimony of that alleged "value" through Steve Inch. However, the Court properly sustained 
Mosell's objections as Inch was never disclosed as an expert witness. Consequently, although 
Berryhill claimed Mosell used his name and he should be compensated, Berryhill failed in his 
burden to establish a dollar figure of his alleged damages. Moreover, Mosell claimed he was 
promoting Berryhill & Company, which owned the "Berryhill" brand, at Polo Cove because 
Mosell believed he was buying in or already owned half of the company - as Berryhill confirmed 
in his testimony in the Broadway Park case. 
Additionally, Mosell Equities paid Berryhill $25,000.00 in consulting fees (Ex. 12, 13, 
14, 15.) through the summer of 2007. Thereafter Berryhill was not involved in Polo Cove, as he 
testified in the Broadway Park case. 
7 A. I've been in focus on opening a new 
8 restaurant, so I've pushed back from focusing on Polo 
9 Cove. For the last six months2 I haven't even been going 
10 to the Polo Cove meetings because -- And I'm -- and I'm 
11 an important part of Polo Cove. But I've had a 
12 different focus; to make a restaurant successful in a 
13 new location. So any answer that I'm going to give in 
14 relation to a recent time line, who's coming in, the 
15 changes, et cetera, might steer you from the closest 
16 truth or the truth that you would get much better from 
17 my partner, Glenn Mosell, who you are deposing next 
18 week. 
Mosell also paid Berryhill another $20,000.00 which went into the Berryhill & 
Company's "General Account." (Ex. 16, 17.) 
2 Berryhill testimony was taken in January 2008. 
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Mosell established h~ had provided $405,000 to Berryhill based on Berryhill's promise to 
Mo sell sell one-half of Berryhill' s company. Even for the sake of argument, if Berryhill had 
established damages entitling him to an equitable offset from this $405,000 figure, there was no 
legal or factual basis for the jury to determine - assuming they addressed the unjust enrichment 
issue, that Berryhill was entitled to an offset of the entire $405,000.00. 
The Defendants conceded this fact during closing argument. Clearly, Berryhill's analogy 
of this case to a "divorce" indicated that Berryhill knew he was not entitled to a free lunch. The 
clear intent was to knock as much money off of the $405,000.00 as he could to reduce the 
amount of money he conceded he owed Mosell Equities. 
The jury's verdict finding that Berryhill was not unjustly enriched to any degree, 
although having received $405,000 to build out his restaurant, from which he continues to make 
money, is a travesty. There simply is no evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that 
reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion - that it is equitable for Berryhill to 
keep over $400,000 under the circumstances and Mosell Equities received nothing. Mosell 
Equities is therefore entitled to JNOV on this issue. 
J. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE JURY'S VERDICT ON MOSELL EQUITIES' CONVERSION CLAIM 
During trial Mosell testified he purchased the relevant property; furniture, tables and 
chairs, and a cement bar, and stated the prices he paid. Mosell testified the value of the property 
was what he had paid for it. Berryhill did not contradict this testimony nor offered any evidence 
the value of the property was anything other than Mosell's opinion. 
"For more than eighty-five years, this Court has followed the rule that the owner of 
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property is a competent witness concerning its value." Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo 
Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 43, 896 P.2d 949,951 (1995), citing Howes v. Curtis, 104 Idaho 
563, 568, 661 P.2d 729, 734 (1983); Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho 625, 632-33, 99 P. 108, 110 
(1908). 
Notwithstanding Mosell's uncontradicted testimony, however, the jury awarded Mosell 
Equities a mere 20% of the amount claimed. Again, there simply is no evidence of sufficient 
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion. 
Mosell Equities is therefore also entitled to JNOV on this issue. 
III. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
In the alternative, Mosell Equities requests that this Court grant its Motion for New Trial. 
Mosell Equities contends there are grounds for new trial according to Rule 59(a), 6, IRCP. 
Rule 59(a). New trial - Amendment of judgment - Grounds 
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against the law. 
A. STANDARD FOR NEW TRIAL 
Under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), a district court may grant a new trial based on the ground 
of "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision." I.R.C.P. 
59(a)(6). "A trial judge may grant a new trial on that ground if, after making 
his or her own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the 
evidence, the judge determines that the verdict is not in accord with the clear 
weight of the evidence." Hudelson v. Delta Intern. Machinery Corp., 142 Idaho 
244,248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005) (citing Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,568, 
97 P.3d 428,435 (2004)). Any motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of 
the evidence must "set forth the factual grounds therefore with particularity." 
I.R.C.P. (59)(a)(7). (Emphasis added) 
Johannsen v. Utter beck, 196 P .3d 341, 348, 146 Idaho 423, 430 (2008). 
When considering whether to grant a new trial, the Court essentially sits as a 13th juror. 
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B. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THE PARTIES HAD 
AN EXPRESSED CONTRACT FOR A LOAN AND BERRYHILL BREACHED 
Mosell Equities incorporates its previous arguments in this portion of its memorandum. 
To summarize the evidence briefly, Mosell testified Berryhill drafted Exhibit 1 because the 
parties had not reached terms of the "buy in," and Mosell did not want to simply give Berryhill 
over $400,000.00 without some security. 
Both Mosell and Berryhill testified that in June 2007, when Mosell Equities 
presented the first check (Copied on Ex. 1, and in evidence as Ex. 2) they fully intended 
the "buy in" to occur. 
Berryhill testified during his deposition in January 2008 in the Broadway Park 
litigation, that he believed Mosell owned half of Berryhill & Company - that the "buy in" 
referenced in Exhibit 1 had occurred, which was cash for half interest in Berryhill & 
Company, Inc. 
Pg.77 
12 Q. For ease of discussion I'm going to call it 
13 500,000; but I'm noting that you said it's slightly 
14 under. 
15 A. Okay. 
16 Q. What did Mosell Equities get in exchange for 
17 this half a million dollars? 
18 A. Fifty percent of Berryhill and Company. 
19 Q. So today Mosell Equities owns fifty percent of 
20 Berryhill and Company? 
21 A. There's actually -- No. That paperwork is 
22 being drawn up .. 
23 Q. But that's your understanding? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. So you're having somebody do the paperwork? 
Pg.78. 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. So he's -- or Mosell Equities is going to be a 
3 fifty percent shareholder? 
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4 A. Yes. 
Mosell testified that he presented checks (Ex. 2-11) at Berryhill' s request, signed the 
checks, and annotated "loan" prominently on the front of 8 of the checks. Mosell then delivered 
the checks to Berryhill. Berryhill did not deny receiving the checks, which totaled $405,000.00. 
Of those checks, $385,000.00 worth were marked with "loan." 
Thereafter, there is no dispute that Berryhill & Company accounted for these moneys 
received from Mosell Equities as loans on the Berryhill & Company "Quickbooks" accounts and 
in its financial statements. (Ex. 33, 52, 53, and 54.) Berryhill's attorneys; Gourley and Meier 
drafted documents that identified Mosell Equities' contribution to the "buy in" was cash. (Ex. 
34, and 35 - relevant documents from these exhibits attached) And Meier's documents, created 
after a lengthy meeting with Berryhill, clearly and unequivocally refer to Mosell Equities' money 
as "loans." As part of the "buy in" documents, Meier even drafted a "Loan Release" document 
for Mosell to sign. 
Moreover, Joy Luedtke testified that Berryhill told her that when Mosell wanted either to 
consummate the "buy in" so he could take his stock and sell it or he wanted his money repaid, 
Berryhill did not deny at that time Berryhill & Company did not owe the money to Mosell 
Equities. To the contrary, Luedtke testified that Berryhill reviewed the business financial 
resources to determine whether or not he had the financial resources to pay Mosell Equities back. 
Finally, it was undisputed that all of the money Mosell Equities delivered was used to pay 
liabilities for Berryhill & Company and $50,000 went directly into Berryhill's pocket. (Ex. 23.) 
When considering whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial, the Court may also 
consider the credibility of the witnesses. Mosell Equities asserts that when comparing 
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Berryhill's testimony in light of the written evidence, in light of his conduct upon receiving the 
money, and when considering his testimony in the Broadway Park case, Berryhill's testimony 
during the trial was less than credible. 
First, Berryhill refused to answer simple and direct questions, and was evasive 
throughout his testimony. 
Then, in contradiction to his deposition testimony, Berryhill testified that he believed the 
parties were moving forward and had agreed to the terms he proposed in Exhibit 21. However, 
he denied Exhibit 21 was the final contract in his deposition in this case and testified Exhibit 21 
was not complete for the same reason he testified the Gourley and Meier documents were 
incomplete. 
Berryhill's testimony in this case also contradicted his testimony in the Broadway Park 
case where he stated the deal was cash for half of his company - with no additional terms. 
Finally, when pressed to explain his interpretation of "loan," a term he used in Exhibit 1, 
if he really meant another meaning, Berryhill testified he meant "equity." However, as argued 
above, the term "equity" contradicted the unambiguous terms in Exhibit 1 and Berryhill's own 
financial records. Contrary to Berryhill's testimony he intended Mosell Equities money as 
"equity," Berryhill never accounted for these funds as "equity." To the contrary, at Berryhill's 
direction, his general manager accounted for the funds as loans. 
Mosell Equities is entitled to a new trial on its breach of express contract claim as the 
jury's verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence presented at trial. 
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C. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED AN IMPLIED-IN-
F ACT CONTRACT AND A BREACH. 
Again, as argued previously the evidence at trial indicated Mosell delivered 10 checks to 
Berryhill after Berryhill requested the money. Mosell marked 9 of the 10 checks with the 
unambiguous term "loan" on the front. Berryhill never questioned the annotation on the checks, 
and thereafter accounted for the funds as loans. 
Additionally, as noted above, Instruction No. 18 addressed the criteria to establish an 
implied-in-fact contract, and Mosell Equities satisfied each criterion. Mosell's uncontradicted 
testimony that Berryhill requested the money established criterion 1. Mosell writing "loan" on 
each check, Berryhill accepting the checks as presented, and then Berryhill accounting for the 
received funds as loans, satisfied criterion 2. And, finally, Mosell Equities provided the 
requested money, satisfying criterion 3. 
Considering the clear weight of the evidence presented at trial it was error for the jury to 
conclude Mosell Equities had not proven an implied-in-fact contract existed establishing that as 
Mosell Equities had presented funds, that the parties agreed the funds would remain a loan until 
they consummated the "buy in" which never occurred, and that consequently the funds remained 
a loan. 
D. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED BERRYHILL & 
COMP ANY WAS UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY $405,000.00. 
Again, Berryhill's "divorce" analogy is a tacit admission that Berryhill understood he 
was not entitled to a free lunch. It literally shocks the conscience considering the evidence, that 
11 people could conclude Berryhill was entitled to keep $405,000.00 which he obtained by first 
representing he was offering"half ownership in his company, and then representing that until he 
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and Mosell worked out the exact terms of the buy in, Berryhill would consider the Mosell Equity 
funds as loans pending the "buy in." 
At trial, while Berryhill attempted to vilify Mosell, and apparently that was a successful 
tactic, the clear weight of the evidence established Berryhill was unjustly enriched. Most of 
Berryhill's evidence centered on the parties relationship regarding a project - Polo Cove, but 
Berryhill could not articulate a single false statement Mosell allegedly made regarding that 
project. Berryhill conceded Mosell did not guarantee the success at Polo Cove, or that Mosell 
provided any financial information regarding Polo Cove that Berryhill used when calculating the 
financial viability of moving the restaurant downtown or for the expansion. Berryhill also 
conceded that Bob Taunton's assessment was accurate, that Polo Cove failed due to the real 
estate market, and not do to anything that Mosell did or could have done differently. 
Berryhill attempted to establish he suffered damages in an attempt to claim an equitable 
offset to Mosell Equities' $405,000 claim for damages. However, as argued above, assuming 
Berryhill was entitled to an offset for any amount, there was no evidence to establish Berryhill 
was entitled to an equitable offset of over $400,000.00. 
While this issue appe.ars moot as there clearly was an express and implied-in-fact 
contractual relationship, the clear weight of the evidence does not support the jury's finding on 
this claim and should also be set aside. 
E. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED BERRYHILL & 
COMPANY CONVERTED MOSELL EQUITIES' PROPERTY AND THE 
UNDISPUTED VALUE WAS OVER $10,000.00. 
Mosell makes the same argument on this issue as he did above. Mosell was competent to 
testify as to the value of his property, that testimony was undisputed, and consequently, the clear 
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weight of the undisputed evidence establishes Berryhill converted Mosell Equities' property and 
the value exceeded $10,000.00. As the clear weight of the evidence confirms Mosell Equities 
was entitled to the $10,000.00 it claims was converted, Mosell Equities is entitled to a new trial 
on this issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Mosell Equities very respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion for JNOV as 
there is not substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's verdict on any claim or 
defense. 
In the alternative, Mosell Equities very respectfully requests the Court grant its Motion 
for New Trial as the jury's verdict was not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence 
presented at trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of September, 2010. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Plaintiff 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of September, 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via the manner indicated to: 
The Honorable Dennis Goff 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
To chambers via e-mail and US Mail 
Via facsimile transmission and e-mail 
ERIC R. CLARK 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 27 
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John Berryhill 
Subject: 
Start Date: 
Due Date: 
Priority: 
Status: 
Percent Complete : 
Total Work: 
Actual Work : 
Owner: 
• 
JB,Glenn Mosell-Berrytiill's/MBlnc/Polo Cove 
Thursday, July 14, 2005 
Thursday, March 01, 2007 
High 
In Progress 
50% 
0 hours 
O hours 
John Berryhill 
John Berryhill's responsabilities: 
• 
Berryhill & Co. - daily duties common to running a company as it's president. owner and executive chef, weekly cafe specials. 
recipe design. cooking class research and development and teaching, working in the kitchen at times. team leader and front man 
for the company. tasting-choosing-writing-editing my wine and restaurant menus. continually revising gtg and catering menus, 
marketing and advertising including our website, plan short and long term development strategies (like gtg development in places 
like Eagle. Nampa. and Tamarack). working on my cookbook (which I really need to finish). etc, etc, etc. 
MoBerry Corporation - working with Glenn. dealing with this lawsuit against Mike Matzek. focusing on the move downtown (how 
we will fit in the Estrella space, the ti of seats that make the most sense, design and setup of two kitchens. dining, banquet room 
and offices . working on what happens to the current Berryhill space. working on Glenn's involvement with Berryhill and the buy in. 
etc. 
Polo Cove - working wilh Glenn. being a front man for the resort phase, coordinating the design/architectual team on the resort 
phase buildings (mainly Berryhill's Restaurant and Collages Inn), coordinating the website design and development with Tom 
Foerstel, developing the hospitality concept at polo cove which includes food-beverage-catering, event and concierge services. 
research and development design of the Berryhill's Restaurant there . designing the menu style as executive chef, etc. etc . and 
everything else that will potentially come my way as this starts to unfold .. 
John Berryhill's Compensation and Glenn Mosell's Berryhill Buy In : 
1} We will work out the details of Glenn's Berryhill & Co . buy in amounts with our attorney Kim Gourley : 
a) MoBerry. a c-corp. is formed by Glenn and I, as a 50¾/50% partnership 
b} I bring 100¾ of BCO stock (1000 shares) to the table valued at $387,000.00 
c) Glenn matches my 100¾ with $387,000.00 cash 
$187,000 to wipe out BCO debt 
$75,000 to ti's for downtown location and the move 
Distribution tbd: 
$125,000 to me ($50,000.00 cash payment I $75,000.00 into the Plaza 121 Building equity) 
2) I will stay an employee of BCO. and will continue to receive my salary plus perks as it's president-ceo 
3) Profits from BCO will be filtered through to MoBerry Corporation (we will have to decide what to do with them. ie: split up and 
pocket or re-invest. and al what economic %,etc). 
4} Polo Cove will continue to be billed accordingly for it's account (ie: lunch meetings, etc). and will be paid to BCO by Mosel/ 
Equities(?). unless a change is made· later. 
5) I will still be compensated for my work and time spent on Polo Cove projects . 
B&Co000359 
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Register: Mosell Equities LLC 
From 07/01/2005 through 02/2012009 
Soncd by: Date. Type. Number/Ref 
Dare Number 
06/28/2007 5 127 
07/31/2007 
08/08/2007 
08116/2007 
I 0/09/2007 I 0/9 
10/29/2007 
12/04/2007 5154 
12/28/2007 
Payee 
Mosell Equities LLC 
Mosell Equities LLC 
Mosell EA)uitics LLC 
Mosell Equities LLC 
Mosel! Equities LLC 
Mosell Equities LLC 
Berryhill & Company Inc 
Account Memo 
·-- ···· - -·· ------ · 
Bank of America -8919 Loan for BCO ... 
Bank of America -8919 loan 
BANK OF THE CASC. .. Loan Tis 
BANK OF THE CASC. . loan #5, loan/14 
BANK OF THE CASC.. kitchen equipm ... 
BANK OF THE CASC.. 
BANK OF THE CASC... loan 
BANK OF THE CASC. .. Check to John f .. 
Page I 
• 
2/20/2009 2:27 PM 
Increase C Decrease Balance 
--··· ·· . . ----- --- --· --- -· -· -·- - -- ---·-· 
50,000.00 50,000.00 
25,000.00 75.000.00 
25,000.00 100,000.00 
50.000.00 150.000.00 
60,00000 210,000.00 
100.000.00 3 I0,000.00 
25,000.00 335,000.00 
50.000.00 385,000.00 
B&Co000462 
ME017135 
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:rom: Kimbell D. Gourley http://webmai !.att.oet'.n-US/o/w m'4 93 EA 591OOOC57F3000033 ... 
of2 
~ 
~-at&t 
From: "Kimbell 0 . Gourley" < kgourley@idalaw.com > 
To: < mosell@att.net>, < John@Berryhillandco.com > 
Subject: RE: MoBerry 
Date: Tuesday, October 16, 2007 12:04 :09 PM 
Glenn and John: 
Attached are the articles of incorporation, bylaws, inrtial corporate resolutions, stock certificates, stock 
ledger, a bill of transfer for John to transfer 90% or 180 shares of Berryhill & Co to the new corporation as his 
capital contribution, a bill of transfer for John to transfer 10% or 20 shares of Berryhill & Co to the new 
corporation as a separate purchase and sale agreement, and a generic bill of transfer . The two of you had 
discussed preparation of a redemption agreement between stockholders or putting in some version of a 
buy/sell clause the bylaws. «arts_inc_profit.pdf» «Minutes - shareholders and directors - first 
consent.doc>> <<Bylaws.doc>> <<Stock Certificate Table xis>> <<stock certificate 1.doc» 
<<stock certificate 2.doc>> <<Bill of transfer - mosell equities to moberry doc» <<Bill of transfer - berryhill 
90% to moberry .doc>> << Bill of transfer - berryhill to moberry .doc>> « Buy-Sell Clause.doc> > 
----Oajnal Message---
From: Kmbel D. Gour'ey 
Sent: Tuesday, Octob€r 16, 2007 7:41 AM 
To: mose~att.net 
Cc: John@Berryhiandco.com 
Subject: MoBerry 
Glenn: 
I am sorry I missed your phone call. I will get you drafts of the articles of incorporation, bylaws, 
initial corporate resolutions. and stock certificates. As you know we never finalized the documents but I 
dictated drafts and then had some handwritten revisions. All of this was put on hold last March but I will 
have Sherry finish my revisions and get the drafts to you. I recall that you had discussed inserting some 
language into the bylaws or executing a buy/sell agreement relating to buying each other out if certain 
events occurred. A buy/sell agreement has not yet been prepared Take care Kim 
Kimbell D. Gourley 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, PA 
225 North 9th Street, Suite 820 
PO Box1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
208-331-1170 
208-331-1529 (fax) 
kgourley@idalaw.com 
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION: The information contained in this e-ma il 
> message i s intended only for the personal and confidential use o f the 
> designated r e cipient named above . If the reader of this message is 
> n o t the inte nded re c ipient o r a n agent responsible for d e livering it t o 
> the intended re c ipient, you are hereby notified that you have rec ei v ed 
12/9/2008 10:07 AM 
001347
:rom: Kimbell D. Gourley 
-
http://webmailatt.ne./en-US/o/wm/493EA59 I000C57F3000033 ... 
of2 
> this document in e rr or, and that any revieH, dissemination, distribution 
or 
> copying of this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received 
> this commun i cat ion in e rr o r, please no tify u s immed i ately at 
> jg@idalaw. c om and delete the original mess age. 
Attachment 1: arts inc profit.pdf (application/octet-stream) 
Attachment 2: Minutes - shareholders and directors - first consent.doc (application/msword) 
Attachment 3: Bylaws.doc (application/msword) 
Attachment 4: Stock Certificate Table.xis (application/vnd.ms-excel) 
Attachment 5: stock certificate l.doc (application/msword) 
Attachment 6: stock certificate 2.doc (application/msword) 
Attachment 7: Bill of transfer - mosell equities to moberry.doc (application/msword) 
Attachment 8: Bill of transfer - berryhill 90% to moberry.doc (application/msword) 
Attachment 9: Bill of transfer - berryhill to moberry.doc (application/msword) 
Attachment 10: Buy-Sell Clause.doc (application/msword) 
12/9/2 008 10:07 AM 
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• 
It is further deemed advisable that the offer, sale and issue of such shares be 
effectuated in such a manner that qualified stockholders may receive the benefits of 
Section 1244 of the Internal Revenue codes; and 
There is not now any outstanding offering or portion thereof of the Corporation to 
sell or issue any of its stock; and 
This Corporation is a small business corporation as defined in Section 1244(c)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue codes; 
RESOLVED, that the officers of this Corporation, and each of them, are hereby 
authorized and directed to offer for sale an issue of up to shares of the common 
stock of the Corporation in a total dollar amount of not more than One Thousand 
dollars ($1,000 .00) per share. The shares shall be issued as follows: 
John Berryhill 387 shares This sum is to be paid by the in-kind transfer of 
180 shares of stock in Berryhill & Co., Inc. 
. Mose/I Equities , L.L.C. 387 shares Cash 
PURCHASE OF STOCK 
RESOLVED, the Corporation shall pay to John Berryhill the sum of $50,000 .00 
to purchase his remaining 10% (20 shares) of Berryhill & Co., lnc.'s outstanding shares 
of stock. 
UTILIZATION OF CASH RESERVES 
RESOLVED, the Corporation shall make a loan or capital contribution to Berryhill 
& Co ., Inc. in the approximate sum of $262,000 .00, which funds are to be utilized by 
Berryhill & Co .. Inc for th·e following: 
a) payment of Berryhill & Co., Inc. loan obligation owed to __ in the 
approximate sum of $187 ,000.00; 
b) payment in the approximate sum of $50,000.00 for tenant improvements 
located at Berryhill & Co ., lnc.'s new restaurant site at 121 N. 9th Street, 
Boise, Idaho; 
c) the approximate sum of $25,000.00 to be used to pay for moving 
expenses incurred to relocate Berryhill & Co ., lnc.'s restaurant to its new 
location at 121 N. 9th Street, Boise, Idaho. 
CONSENT OF SHAREHOLDERS AND DIRECTORS IN LIEU OF ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING - Page 3 
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• 
EBERLE, BERLiN, KADING, TURNBOW, MCKLVEEN & JONES, 
CHARTERED 
L. VICTORlA MEIER 
E-MAIL: vmeler@<berlt.com 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
BOISE PLAZA 
1111 WEST JEFFERSON STREET, SUITE 530 
POST OFFICE BOX 1368 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
February 27, 2008 
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 
John Berryhill, President 
Berryhill & Company, Inc. 
121 North 9th Street, Suite 102 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Glenn E. Mosell 
Post Office Box 1694 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Re: Stock Purchase Agreement 
Dear John & Glenn: 
TELEPHONE 
(208) 344-SSJS 
f'ACSIMILE 
(208) J44..S542 
Please find enclosed the following documents reflecting the proposed stock purchase by 
Glen : 
( 1) Special Meeting of the Board of Di.rectors and Shareholders of Benyhill & 
Company, Inc. 
(2) Stock Purchase Agreement 
(3) Satisfaction of Loan 
( 4) Copy of the Stock Certificate No. 3. 
Please review these documents carefully to ensure that the documents meet \vith your 
approval. If they do, please contact me and I will arrange to have final copies sent to you for 
original signature. If you have any comments or changes contact me to discuss. 
Additionally, if you have not done so already, please review the existing Bylaws and 
Restrictive Purchase and Redemption Agreement of the Company. Neither document has been 
executed. However, in the interest of saving costs and provided they meet with your approval, I can 
prepare a one-page agreement, stating that the two of you intend to be bound by these two 
agreements. 
001350
February 26, 2008 
Page 2 
LYM 
cc: A Dempsey 
• • 
smccr~~ 
~ctoria Meier 
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- • 
DRAFT 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. 
SPECIAL MEETING OF THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS 
Effective the December 31, 2007 
The undersigned, being Secretary of BERRYHILL & COMPANY, [NC., an Idaho 
corporation (the "Company"), by this instrument evidences the actions and resolutions undertaken 
at the special meeting of the Board of Directors and Shareholders of the Company. Present was 
the so le Shareholder and the Directors who waived notice of the meeting. 
WHEREAS, the Company has borrowed Four Hundred Thousand Dollars from Glenn E . 
Mosel I for the funding of the relocation of the Company's restaurant to a new location and for the 
capital improvements to be made to the restaurant and banquet rooms . 
WHEREAS, Glenn E. Mosel! desires to acquire an interest in the Company in exchange 
for , and as repayment of, the amount lent to the Company. 
WHEREAS, the Directors and the Sole Shareholder believe ii is in the best interest of 
the Company to issue Glenn E. Mose ll two hundred (200) shares of the common capital stock of 
the Company as repayment of the amount lent to the Company. 
RESOLVED, that upon receipt of the Satisfaction of Loan evidencing that the 
Company's obligation to Mosel! has been paid, the Directors are hereby authorized to issue two 
hundred (200) shares of the one dollar ($1) par value common capital stock of the Company to 
Mosel!. 
RESOLVED, that the Officers of the Company are authorized and directed to execute 
any agreements and documents in connection with the issuance of the two hundred (200) shares 
of the Company's common capita l stock. 
There being no unattended business to come before the meeting , the meeting was 
adjourned. 
DATED effective as of the 31" day of December, 2007 . 
By: 
Amy Berryhill 
Its: Secretary 
Special Meeting of the Board or Directors and Shareholders (2007) 
00161367.000 
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STOCK PURCHASE AGREEl\1ENT 
THIS STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT (hereinafter "Agreemem") is made and entered into 
effective the __ day of-----~ 2007, by and between BERRYHILL & COMPANY, 
INC., an Idaho corporation (the "Corporation"), and GLENN E. MOSELL, a married man dealing with 
his separate property ("Mosel!"). 
WIT NE S S ETH: 
WHEREAS. John Berryhill (the "Shareholder") is the sole shareholder and record owner of two 
hu.ndred (200) shares, $1.00 par value, of the issued and outstanding common capital stock of BERRYfffi.L 
& COMPANY, INC., an Tdaho corporation (hereinafter the "Corporation"). John Berryhill's shares represent 
one hundred percent (100%) of the issued and outstanding common capital stock of the Corporarion and are 
evidenced by Certificates No. I and No. 2. 
WHEREAS, during the calendar year of 2007, Mose ll loaned rhe Corporation Four Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($400,000) to fund the relocation of the Corporation's restaurant and for capital 
improvements needed for the Corporation· s restaurant and banquet rooms (the "Loan") . 
WHEREAS , the Corporation desires to issue two hundred (200) shares of the Corporarion's 
common capital stock to Mosel! as repayment of the Loan . Mose l! desires to accept the two hundred 
(200) shares of the Corporation's common capital stock as repayment of the Loan and to have the Loan 
reclass ified on the Corporation's books and records as a capital contribution from Mosel!. 
WHEREAS, after the execution of this Agreement, Mosell and the Shareholder will each own 
fifty percent (50%) of the common capiral stock of the Corporarion. 
WHEREAS, rhe Directors of the Corporation and the Shareholder have agreed that it is in the 
best interest of the Corporation to authorize and to admit Mose l! as a shareholder of the Corporation and 
to reclassify the Loan as a capital contribution from Mosel! as payment for the two hundred (200) shares 
pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements contained herein , 
Corporation , Shareholder, and Mosell agree as follows: 
l. Issuance of Stock. The Corporation shall issue two hundred (200) shares of the common 
capital stock of the Corporation (the "Shares") in the name of Glenn E. Mosell evidenced by Certificate 
No. 3. 
2. Subscription Price. The subscription pnce for the Shares shall be Four Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($400,000). 
3. Payment of Subscription Price. Mosel! shall pay the Subscription Price by canceling 
the Loan and thereafter authorizing the Corporation to reclassify the Loan on the Corporation's books and 
records as a capital contribution from Mosel! to the Corporation. 
STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT- 1 00161118.<XX> 
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• 
DRAFT 
SATISFACTION OF LOAN 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that GLENN E. MOSELL, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property, does hereby certify and declare that the certain Loan 
in the original amount of Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000) made and entered into by 
BERRYJilLL & COJ\1PANY, an Idaho corporation, as "borrower", to GLENN E. MOSELL, 
as "lender", is fully paid, satisfied and discharged. 
DATED : _ _ _ _ , 200_. 
Glenn E. Masell 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On this _ _ day of _ _____ _ , 2008, before me, the undersigned, a notary 
public in and for said slate, personaJ!y appeared GLENN E. MOSELL, known or identified lo me to 
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged lo me that he 
executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day 
and year first above written. 
Notary Public for fdaho 
My Commission Expires: ____ _____ _ 
SATISFACTION OF LOAN - 0ocoo161369.000 
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(including attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the 
purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, 
marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein. 
> 
> 
> 
>The information contai"ned in this transmission is from the office of Riche, Dempsey & 
Associates, Chtd. and is confidential and intended only for the use of the individual or 
entity named above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, the reader 
is hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication 
is strictly prohibited . If you have received this transmission in error, please notify me 
immediately by calling (208) 338-1040 and return the original to me at the address 
indicated above. Thank you. 
> 
> 
> 
>From: John Berryhill [mailto:john{@,berryhillandco.com] 
>Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 8:20 AM 
>To: Amy Dempsey 
>Subject: Re: Meeting next week? 
> 
> 
> 
>Amy, 
> I guess Glenn can't do this Thursday at all. Do you have any other time this Friday other 
than lOam? If not let's go with next Friday. 
> 
> 
>----- Original Message -----
> From: Amy Dempsey <amv(a),taxguvs.cc> 
>To: John Berryhill 
>Cc: Glenn Mosell <mosell(@mac.com>; Glenn Mosell <mose1l@,att.net> 
>Sent: Wed Mar 05 06:06:24 2008 
>Subject: RE: Meeting next week? 
> 
>Hi John? 
> 
> 
> 
>No problem! As far as a 10 am meeting I have Thursday the 6th available or Friday the 
14th. If your main concern is setting up the partnership in 2007 vs. 2008 I do not think it 
will make much difference. If you chose to continue to set it up in 2007 then Glenn 
would receive a K-1 from Berryhill, if you chose to set the buy-in in 2008 then we would 
just leave the monies Glenn donated in 2007 on the books as a loan and then reclass the 
loan amounts that are associated with the buy-in to his capital account in 2008. 
> 
MEOCD70l8 
001355
I 
- ---- --~-
B&Co000236 
001356
1:37 PM 
04/27HO 
Accrual Basls 
Berryhill & Company Inc 
Balance Sheet 
As of December 31, 2007 
ASSETS 
Current Assets 
Checking/Savings 
BANK OF THE CASCADES - 4069 
Koy Checking - 2932 
TIPPING PETTY CASH 2008 
T otaJ c hecklnglSavlnas 
Acc«lntsRecetvable 
A=ints R&celvable 
Total Accounts Recelvable 
T o1aJ Current Assets 
Flxod Assets 
Leasehold Improvements 
lnven!X>ry on Hand 
Wine 
Liquor 
Food 
Total Inventory on Hand 
Equlpmont 
Furniture and Axturo,; 
Vohlcles 
Accumulated DopreclaUon- Equip 
Total Fixod Assets 
TOTAL ASSETS 
UABlllTIES & EQUITY 
Llablllties 
Current liablr.tles 
Accounts Payable 
Accounts Payable 
Total Accounts Pay.able 
Other Current UablllUc-s 
KoyBank L-0-C #1001 (SOK) 
Loan -Amy Berryhill 
Sales Tax Payable 
Payroll Liabilities 
Federal Wlthholdlng 
FICA Company 
FICA Employoo 
RJTA Fed Unemploymcn1 
Garnishment -Ada County Sheriff 
MEDI Company 
MEDI Employee 
St.a1o Wrthholdlng 
State Unemployment -SUTA 
Total Payroll Uabllities 
BHC Gift Cards 
Total other Current Uabllltles 
Total Current Liabilities 
Long Term Liabilltias 
Contingent liabillties 
Moself Equities LLC 
Total Contingent Llabllltles 
KeyBank Commercial Loan--0001 
City of Boise SEWER - Broadway 
Keylease-Kltchen Equlp-725 
Total long Term LiabiliUes 
CONFIDENTIAL 
De1:31,07 
117,799.18 
7,446.58 
2.000.00 
127,245.76 
9,623.92 
9,623.92 
136,869.68 
117,397.72 
9,818.51 
3,271 .69 
21,703.56 
34,793.76 
204,081 .86 
163,058.68 
14,800.64 
-297.950.47 
236,182..39 
373,052.07 
TT,979.84 
77,979.84 
25,000.00 
33.52520 
13.667.64 
-138.00 
-70.25 
-70.25 
-9.07 
397.76 
-16.43 
-16.43 
-70.00 
-13.63 
-6.30 
22,280.18 
94,466.72 
172,446.56 
385,000.00 
38.5,000.00 
9,119.67 
5,632.36 
14,516.60 
414,268.63 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
~-z_ 
Page 1 
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04/ZT/10 
Accrual Basis 
-
Berryhill & Company Inc 
Balance Sheet 
As of ~ber 31, 2007 
Total Liablllties 
Equity 
CommonStocit 
Owners Draw 
Retained Earnings 
Nettneome 
Total Equity 
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Dec 31, 07 
588,715.19 
200.00 
-5.089.81 
-130.033.33 
-78,739.98 
-213,663.12 
373,062.07 
Page2 
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3:36 PM 
07/01/08 
Accrual Basis 
-
Berryhill & Company Inc 
Balance Sheet 
As of June 30, 2008 
ASSETS 
Current Assets 
Checking/Savings 
BANK OF THE CASCADES - 4069 
Key Checking - 2932 
TIPPING PETTY CASH 2008 
Total Checking/Savings 
Accounts Receivable 
House Account 
Accounts Receivable 
Total Accounts Receivable 
Other Current Assets 
Undeposited Funds 
Total Other Current Assets 
Total Cun-en! Assets 
Fixed Assets 
Leasehold Improvements 
Inventory on Hand 
Equipment 
Furniture and Fixtures 
Vehicles 
Accumulated Depreciation- Equip 
Total Fixed Assets 
TOTAL ASSETS 
LIABILITIES & EQUITY 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 
Accounts Payable 
Accounts Payable 
Total Accounts Payable 
Other Current Liabilities 
BOTC - LINE OF CREDIT 
Direct Deposit Liabilities 
KeyBank L-0-C #1001 (50K) 
Loan -Amy Berryhill 
Sales Tax Payable 
Payroll Liabilities 
Reservation Fees & Deposits 
BHC Gift Cards 
Trade Accounts 
Total Other Current Liabilities 
Total Current Liabilities 
Long Tenn Liabilities 
BOTC SBA loan 
Mosel! Equities LLC 
KeyBank Commercial Loan-0001 
City of Boise SEWER - Broadway 
City of Boise SEWER - Downtown 
Total Long Tenn Liabilities 
Total Liabilities 
Equity 
BerryHill Equity 
Mosel! Equity 
Common Stock 
Owners Draw 
Retained· Earnings 
Net Income 
Jun 30, 08 
72,722.33 
2,740.46 
3,374.69 
78,837.48 
113.18 
17,107.78 
17,220.96 
27.65 
27.65 
96,086.09 
228,311 .71 
32,158.12 
204,081 .86 
174,131.43 
14,80064 
-297,950 .4 7 
355,533.29 
451,619.38 
17,361 .91 
17,361 91 
122,299.67 
17.67 
25,000.00 
33.466 22 
9,886.38 
0.00 
500.00 
21,574.47 
1,198.16 
213,942 .57 
231,304.48 
100,000 00 
385,000.00 
5,794 .51 
5,208 .11 
9,039.12 
505 ,041 .74 
736,346.22 
-50,000.00 
20,000.00 
200.00 
-5,089.81 
-208,673.41 
-41,163 .62 
Pag(l 1 
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3:36 PM 
07/01/08 
4ccrual -Basis 
Berryhill & Company Inc 
Balance Sheet 
As of June 30, 2008 
Total Equity 
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 
• 
Jun 30, 08 
-284 , 726.84 
451,619.38 
Page:2 
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1:38 PM 
04IZ7/10 
Ac=ualBasls 
• 
Berryhill & Company Inc 
Balance Sheet 
As of December 31, 2008 
ASSEni 
Current Assets 
Checking/Saving 
BANK OF THE CASCADES - 4069 
Key Checking • 2932 
TIPPING PETTY CASH 2008 
Total Ch&ddngl'Savlngs 
Accountl; RecelvBble 
House Account 
101 Melinda Kim 
105 Lemp's Apott,eca,y 
102Stlull.e5 
Total House Accotlnt 
Accounts Receivable 
Total Accounts Receivable 
Total Current Assets 
FJxedAz;sets 
l...ea6ehold Improvements 
lrnrentoty on Hand 
Wine 
Liquor 
Food 
Total Inventory on Hand 
Equipment 
Fumllure and Foctures 
Vehicles 
Accumulated Depraciallon- Equip 
Tobi Fixed Assets 
TOTAL ASSETS 
LIABIUTIES & EQUITY 
Liabilities 
Current Uabllllles 
AccountsPayabkl 
Accounts Payable 
Total Accounts Payable 
Other Current Liabllitles 
BOTC - LINE OF CREDIT 
Direct Deposit Uabllllles 
Loan -Amy Berryhfll 
Sales Tax Payable 
Payroll Llabilltles 
Federal Wrthholdlng 
ACA Company 
ACA Employee 
ftJTA Fed Unemployment 
MEDI Company 
MEDl Employee 
State Wrlhholdlng 
State Unemployment -SUTA 
ID-Workforce Dev Fund 
Payroll Llabllllies - Other 
Tola! Payroll Uabilltles 
Resel'Vlllion files & Deposits 
BHC Gift Carm, 
Trade Account& 
Total Other Current liabilities 
Total Current Uabllltles 
CONFIDENTIAL 
• 
Dec 31, 08 
66,933.62 
1,942.16 
1,852.71 
70,728.49 
179.33 
300.51 
36.84 
516.68 
85,090.61 
65,607.29 
136,335.78 
202,003.90 
3,947.48 
2,928.83 
3,622.15 
10,498.46 
205,858.00 
178.866.50 
14,800.64 
-359.275.97 
252,751 .53 
389,087.31 
69,807.08 
69,807.08 
149.261.73 
-6,344.69 
23,525.20 
13,608.13 
-2.474.38 
-2,3TT.TT 
-2.JTT.TT 
-305.85 
-556.08 
-556.08 
-1,423.90 
-296.71 
-8.92 
-356.63 
-10,734.09 
2,000.00 
23.966.03 
2,264.25 
198,546.57 
268,353.65 
Page 1 
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041Zl'/10 
AccrUalBnls 
• 
BerryhiU & Company Inc 
Balance Sheet 
As of December 31, 2008 
Long Tenn Uabllltles 
Conllngeflt Uabllltles 
MoseB Equities UC 
Total Contingent Llabllllles 
BOTC SSA Loan 
Key8ankCOlllfflef'Ciall.oan-too1 
City of Boise SEWER· Broadway 
Cit, of Boise sewER - J)owntawn 
Total Long Tenn Llabllilles 
T ol8I Liabilities 
Equity 
BerryHIIIEqulty 
Draws 
Total 8erryHIII Equity 
eom-S1Dck 
Retained Earnings 
Netlncome 
Total Equity 
TOTAL UABIUTIES & EQUITY 
CONFIDENTIAL 
• 
DK31,08 
385,000.00 
385,000.00 
92,703.13 
2,340.36 
5,123.28 
8,315..40 
493.482.15 
761,835.80 
-50.000.00 
-50,000.00 
200.00 
-213.327.98 
-109,620.51 
-372.748.49 
389,087.31 
PageZ 
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CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
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ey CHELSIE JOYCE 
uc?liTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSElL EQUillES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as · 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: 
MOSELL EQUillES' MOTION FOR 
JNOV, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
TO: ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Wednesday, October 6, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., or as 
soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, Plaintiff will call up for hearing MOSElL EQUillES' 
MOTION FOR JNOV, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL before the 
Honorable Dennis Goff, District Judge, at the Ada County Courthouse, Boise, Idaho. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
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121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
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DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
ByLAMES 
DIPUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 0909974 
) 
) DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM 
) IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
) NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
) VERDICT, OR IN THE 
) ALTERNATIVE, MOTION 
) FOR NEW TRIAL 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John Berryhill, by and through their counsel 
of record, hereby submit their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the alternative, Motion for New Trial. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, P. 1 
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-
INTRODUCTION 
In its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (NOV) or for new trial, Plaintiff 
states the correct standards that this Court must apply in considering the two motions. Contrary 
to these standards, however, Plaintiff then goes on to draw all inferences in its own favor, rather 
than abide by the requirements of those standards. For instance, Plaintiff complains throughout 
its argument that certain parts of John Berryhill's testimony was "self-serving" and thus 
somehow should not be considered.1 This Court may not repeat, however, Plaintiff's mistake. 
Defendants' evidence and the inferences to be drawn from that evidence were of sufficient 
quality and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that 
of the mostly unanimous jury. The rules simply do not allow the Court to substitute its own 
weighing of the evidence for that of the jury, as Plaintiff requests. Even under the new trial 
standard, the jury's verdict may only be disturbed if it is contrary to the "clear weight of the 
evidence," which it is not. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict must be 
denied. 
A. The applicable standard. 
According to the most recent Idaho Supreme Court decision on the issue, 
See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial, pp. 4, 10, 13, 14. 
Subsequent reference to this filing are cited to "Plaintiff's Memorandum" by page number. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, P. 2 
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-
-
A district court will deny aj.n.o.v. motion 'if there is evidence of 
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a 
similar conclusion to that of the jury.' Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 774, 203 
P.3d 702, 704 (2009). Thus, a verdict will be upheld when it is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach. Shop, Inc., 131 
Idaho 242,247,953 P.2d 992,997 (1998). Substantial evidence is evidence of 
'such sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could 
conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper.' Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 
561,567, 97 P.3d 428,434 (2004) (quoting Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 
Idaho 732, 736, 518 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974)). 
In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the district court may not 
weigh the evidence, attempt to judge the credibility of the witnesses, or compare 
its factual findings with those of the jury. Bates,146 Idaho at 774-75, 203 P.3d at 
704-05. Instead, '[a] trial court reviews the facts as if the moving party admitted 
any adverse facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving 
party.' Id. at 77 5, 203 P.3d at 705. 
High Valley Concrete, L.L.C. v. Sargent, 234 P.3d 747, 751 (2010) (emphasis added). In this 
case, for example, the Idaho Supreme Court found, as a matter of law, that a fiduciary duty did 
not exist between the parties. Based on that legal conclusion, the jury's factual finding of a 
breach of fiduciary duty could not be based on substantial and competent evidence. 234 P.3d at 
753. Here, there is no similar legal flaw. 
In Coombs v. Curnow, 219 P.3d 453, 460-61 (2009), on the other hand, the Idaho 
Supreme Court emphasized the strict standard applicable to such motions: 
An order granting aj.n.o.v. is appropriate when 'the facts are undisputed' and 
'there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could 
have reached'--namely, that the moving party should prevail. O'Neil v. 
Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472,480, 733 P.2d 693, 701 (1986). On the other hand, a 
verdict will be upheld when it is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Jeremiah, 131 Idaho at 247, 953 P.2d at 997. Substantial evidence is evidence of 
'such sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could 
conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper.' Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 
561,567, 97 P.3d 428,434 (2004). Evidence may be substantial even though it is 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, P. 3 
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contradicted. Watson v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 658, 827 
P.2d 656, 671 (1992). 
*** 
Under Idaho law, in moving for aj.n.o.v., the moving party admits the truth of all 
of the non-moving party's evidence. Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474,478, 797 
P.2d 1322, 1326 (1990). 
( emphasis added) 
Although Plaintiff makes a passing nod to this authority regarding the applicable 
standard, it then ignores it completely. 
B. Plaintiff does not meet the standard for judgment NOV. 
Even in its Introduction, Plaintiff begins its campaign of ignoring the applicable standard 
for a Judgment Nothwithstanding the Verdict. Plaintiff contends: 
The jury also determined that although Berryhill & Company received 
$405,000.00 the delivery of which was premised on Berryhill' s promise of the 
sale of half of the business, and the promise the money would remain a loan 
pending the "buy in," that it was not unjust that Berryhill kept every penny and 
Masell Equities received nothing in consideration. 
( emphasis added) 
(Plaintiff's Memorandum: 2). Here, Plaintiff not only fails to draw inferences in favor of 
Defendants, as is required, but draws them in favor of itself. Plaintiff misrepresents the very 
language of the document it contended formed the express contract, for Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 did 
not state that "the money would remain a loan pending the 'buy in;' rather, it stated that it was a 
"loan" that "will be transitioned." There is no language of the money "remaining" a loan 
"pending" the buy-in. Plaintiff attempts to rewrite the document to suit its own purposes, which 
this Court may not do. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, P. 4 
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Defendants presented substantial evidence that, at the very least, John Berryhill did not 
consider the funds to constitute a bona fide loan. The term "loan" came from Plaintiff's 
principal, Glenn Mosell, who explained that "we have to call it something" and that it was not 
really a loan. Thus, the funds at issue were temporarily placed on the books of Berryhill & 
Company, Inc., in a holding pattern, as accountant Amy Dempsey testified, while the parties 
attempted to finalize their actual agreement. Even Glenn Mosell referred to it in his Broadway 
Park deposition as an "interim substitute." These fundamental facts provide the evidence of 
sufficient quantity and probative value that a reasonable jury could decide precisely as this jury 
did. 
C. The express contract claim. 
Plaintiff then picks and chooses the jury instructions it likes the best and argues that the 
jury must have ignored them. Plaintiff jumps to Instruction No. 13, regarding contract 
interpretation and argues the jury must have ignored it. Before getting to that step, however, a 
contract must have been formed. 
1. The jury could reasonably have found no contract was formed. 
Significantly, at trial Plaintiff did not object to Instructions No. 3, 4, 5 or 7, all of which 
put the issue of whether or not a contract was formed squarely before the jury.2 Instruction No. 4 
correctly instructed the jury that the fourth element to complete a contract was "mutual 
agreement by all parties to all essential terms." It then stated clearly the issue in dispute: "The 
2 This Court found, as Judge Williamson ruled upon summary judgment, that 
contract formation was an issue of fact left for the jury. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
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parties do dispute whether there was mutual agreement between them to all essential terms." 
Instruction No. 5 explained the requirement of "meeting of the minds," requiring all parties to a 
contract to "have understood and accepted all of the essential terms of the contract." 
Whether or not both parties actually understood and accepted that an actual loan was 
being created was a crucial dispute at the heart of the trial. The admitted truth of Defendants' 
evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it, was that John Berryhill did 
not understand nor accept that the transaction constituted a loan. The reassurance from Glenn 
Mosell that "we have to call it something" and his suggestion that it was not really a loan, make 
it entirely reasonable that the jury found that the parties had not achieved a meeting of the minds 
so as to create a contract. 
At Section Hof its briefing, Plaintiff discusses "meeting of the minds" as an affirmative 
defense (Plaintiff's Memorandum: 14-15). Here, Plaintiff misunderstands how the doctrine of 
"meeting of the minds" applies to its own claims. As Instructions No. 4 and 5 suggest, it is 
Plaintiff's burden to demonstrate meeting of the minds as to all essential terms of the contract. 
See also, Watson v. Gold N Diamonds, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95644 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 
2010) ('The party asserting the existence of a contract has the burden of proving its existence and 
that there was a meeting of the minds as to all material respects") (citations omitted). Thus, it 
was Plaintiff's burden to demonstrate meeting of the minds upon all essential terms, including 
whether or not a loan was intended by both parties.3 It is not, strictly speaking, an affirmative 
3 In its discussion of meeting of the minds, without citation or analysis Plaintiff 
makes the bald claim that the contract was executory and rescission was the proper remedy 
(Plaintiff's Memorandum: 14), despite having never pled or prayed for rescission. Executory 
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defense. 
Moreover, pursuant to Instruction No. 7, the jury reasonably could have concluded that 
negotiations and agreement as to all essential terms had not occurred until the parties reduced 
their complete agreement to writing, which never happened. 
In its discussion of proving an express contract at Section Il(C). Plaintiff once again slips 
and slides as to what the purportedly express contract actually was. Plaintiff points to Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1 and the series of checks provided by Plaintiff, which, it now claims, were "delivered at 
Berryhill's request and based on Berryhill's promise he was selling one-half of his business to 
Mosell Equities" (Plaintiff's Memorandum: 4) (emphasis added). Now, suddenly, the express 
contract was to sell one-half of the business, rather than to enter into a loan transaction. The 
difficulty Plaintiff has in deciding whether the contract represented fish or fowl itself 
demonstrates the lack of meeting of the minds as to this essential element. 
2. The alleged contract was ambiguous and the jury could reasonably 
have found no loan transaction was intended. 
At Section Il(D), Plaintiff continues to view the evidence as to the intent of the parties, 
citing its favorite witnesses and drawing every inference in its own favor. First, Plaintiff 
erroneously supposes that by giving Instruction No. 11, the Court had negated the earlier contract 
formation instructions and was thereby instructing the jury that "the contract existed" (Plaintiff's 
contracts exist when neither side has substantially performed and the obligations of both parties 
are so far unperformed that the failure to complete performance excuses the other side from 
performing. See, e.g., In re Wegner, 839 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff's own 
allegations indicate that it claimed it had completely performed, not just substantially performed. 
Thus, there is not the factual predicate for Plaintiff's new claim of an executory contract. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
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Memorandum: 6). This is wholly unsupported. Second, Plaintiff maintains its fixation on its 
own cross-examination of John Berryhill, during which he was finally badgered into choosing 
between "loan" and "equity." What Plaintiff's fixation on its own questioning ignores is that 
Mr. Berryhill also testified that he did not have a good understanding of what was even meant by 
equity in this context. 
More significant is that Plaintiff continues to insist on a false choice, as if loan or equity 
are the only two categories into which the funds could be placed. As Amy Dempsey testified, the 
funds were placed into a holding account while the parties sorted out their agreement. She did not 
consider the funds to be either a loan or equity, because the parties, including Mr. Mosell, never 
clarified the nature of the funds to her. 
Plaintiff then argues that if the word "loan" meant "equity," then Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 
would create an absurdity, since if the funds were already equity, there was no need for them to 
be "transitioned" (Plaintiff's Memorandum: 9). There are two problems with this argument: 
first, as demonstrated above, it is not just a choice between loan and equity, as Plaintiff insists; 
and second, the "transition" could easily refer to the parties' eventual, anticipated partnership 
agreement, regardless of how the funds were characterized. 
Plaintiff complains that the word "loan" must be given its ordinary meaning, as also 
pointed out in Instructions No. 11 and 13. Yet, the second part of Instruction No. 11 clarifies that 
language must be given its ordinary meaning, "unless you find from the evidence that a special 
meaning was intended." The very words "loan" that "will be transitioned" by themselves suggest 
a special meaning was intended and that a simple lender-debtor relationship was not being 
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created. There is ample basis for the jury to have concluded that, construed as a whole, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and the series of checks, did not create a loan transaction, based on the 
language of the alleged agreement and the conduct of the parties. Obviously, Plaintiff continues 
to wish the focus to remain on the word "loan" in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. The point is that the 
alleged contract must be construed as a whole, as set forth in Instruction No. 11. The jury had 
every reason to conclude reasonably that a loan transaction was not intended and thus there was 
no breach of a loan transaction. 
3. There was no breach of the alleged contract. 
Again, resolving inferences in its own favor, Plaintiff argues that it made demand on 
Berryhill to either consummate the "buy in" or pay back the loan. This claim was disputed in 
significant part, because at no time did Glenn Mosell sign any "buy in" documents, present them 
to John Berryhill for signing, or suggest that the attorneys finalize the documents. In fact, rather 
than making demand on Berryhill & Company, Inc., to consummate the "buy in," Mosell testified 
that he approached John Berryhill in the summer of 2008 and suggested an entirely new deal, 
where John could go find another investor to provide $200,000 and Plaintiff would retain 25% of 
Berryhill & Company, Inc. 
As Defendants pointed out, in this litigation Plaintiff chose its theories and elected its 
remedy - that the funds remained a loan. As shown above, the jury reasonably could have 
concluded, even if a contract existed, it was not a loan contract. Thus, Berryhill & Company, 
Inc., did not breach the contract by failing to repay it as a loan. 
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D. No implied-in-fact contract existed that was breached. 
For very similar reasons, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the parties' 
conduct and the attending circumstances did not demonstrate "the terms and existence of the 
contract," as required in Instruction No. 18. As Instruction No. 18 also indicates, to find an 
implied-in-fact contract, "the facts must be such that the intent of the parties to make a contract 
can be inferred from their conduct." Plaintiff had the burden of proof of showing all of the 
elements. As with the express contract, the jury had ample basis to conclude that Plaintiff did 
not sustain its burden in showing that the conduct at issue demonstrated "the terms and 
existence" of a loan. If the jury found an implied-in-fact contract, but decided it was not a loan 
transaction, then Berryhill & Company did not breach the implied-in-fact contract by failing to 
repay the funds upon demand like a loan. 
Plaintiff continues to argue that the mere fact that the word "loan" appears on Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1 and most of the checks should, without much more, carry the day (Plaintiff's 
Memorandum: 12). The jury obviously heard that argument, but did not believe the issue was 
that simple. As indicated above, the conduct of the parties, including Mosell's own 
equivocations to Amy Dempsey as to the true nature of the funds, belied the claim that the parties 
intended a simple loan transaction. 
E. There was adequate evidence to support the defense of equitable 
estoppel. 
The Special Verdict used by the jury did not specifically address the defense of equitable 
estoppel as a separate finding, but there was ample factual basis for the jury to conclude that the 
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elements were met. Instruction No. 20 set forth the elements at subsections 1-4. Plaintiff argues 
that John Berryhill's testimony was insufficient to provide a reasonable basis for meeting the 
elements, because it was "self-serving" (Plaintiff's Memorandum: 13). Obviously, Plaintiff 
again misconstrues the standard for Judgment NOV. Drawing reasonable inferences in 
Defendants' favor, the jury could have concluded that Berryhill & Company, Inc., relied on 
Glenn Mosell's suggestion that the only reason for the use of the word "loan," was "we have to 
call it something," not to worry about it, that it was not really a loan. Instruction No. 20 requires 
only that the defendant relied on the misrepresentation or concealment "to the defendant's 
prejudice." 
By the time that Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was formed, the principals of the parties had been 
working together for almost two years. They had already been involved in the Broadway Park 
litigation. During the dispute over the Broadway Park strip mall, John Berryhill relied on Glenn 
Mosell to tell him what to write in communications with the opposing party. They had already 
agreed to move the Berryhill & Company restaurant downtown and work had commenced on the 
space. By this time, the jury could well have concluded that Berryhill & Company relied on 
Glenn Mosell's statement to its prejudice4 suggesting that the word "loan" really did not indicate 
a loan, they just had to call it something. 
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude reasonably that the 
defense of equitable estoppel applied. 
4 Instruction No. 20 does not require "reasonable reliance," as do the affirmative 
fraud instructions. Plaintiff's discussion of reasonable or detrimental reliance in this context is 
beside the point (Plaintiff's Memorandum: 13-14). 
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F. Plaintiff did not sustain its burden regarding unjust enrichment. 
Again, Plaintiff draws every inference its own favor. Plaintiff claims that Glenn Mosell 
"delivered the money based on Berryhill's offer to sell and promise the funds delivered remained 
a loan until the 'buy in' was complete. Mosell' s testimony was undisputed" (Plaintiff's 
Memorandum: 15). Yet that testimony was hotly disputed. Neither Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 nor the 
testimony of anyone other than Mosell suggested that the promise was that the funds "remained a 
loan until the 'buy in' was complete. Rather, the handwritten note on Exhibit 1 said the funds 
"will be transitioned," not that they might or could and that the funds would "remain" a loan 
regardless. 
Plaintiff's repetition of its arguments at trial and the jury's unanimous refusal to accept 
them on the unjust enrichment claim does not render the jury's findings a "travesty" (Plaintiff's 
Memorandum: 19). John Berryhill testified credibly that, instead of $385,000 going to categories 
included in his breakdown of that total, almost $300,000 ended up building the restaurant and 
expansion space that Glenn Mosell desired. Berryhill & Company has been forced to incur 
further debt and make larger rent payments. At the end of the lease term, Berryhill & Company 
will be able to remove practically nothing, according to witness Jim Tomlinson. Additionally, 
Plaintiff did not just get a "sexy" restaurant to show potential investors in Polo Cove, Plaintiff 
obtained the Berryhill brand and used it in one form or another in all of the promotional materials 
offered into evidence. 
Plaintiff now complains that Defendants did not provide proof of the value of these items 
as a "setoff." Yet again, Plaintiff misapplies the relevant burden of proof. It always was 
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Plaintiff's own burden, as made explicit by Instruction No. 19, to prove that "[u]nder the 
circumstances, it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without compensating 
the plaintiff for its value" (emphasis added) and "the amount that would be unjust for the 
defendant to retain" (emphasis added). In Instruction No. 31, the jury was correctly instructed 
that the "measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim is not the actual amount of the 
enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between two parties it would be unjust for 
one party to retain (emphasis added). Instruction No. 31 makes clear that the Plaintiff has the 
burden of proving the amount of the benefit unjustly retained. Plaintiff never provided the jury 
with any proof of any value or amount other than the full $405,000 it was claiming as a loan, as 
was its choice. Having made that choice, Plaintiff cannot be heard to switch the burden and 
claim that Defendants were required to make Plaintiff's proof for it. 
Accordingly, there was an adequate basis for the jury's conclusion as to Plaintiff's unjust 
enrichment claim. 
G. Plaintiff's conversion claim. 
Plaintiff argues that Glenn Mosell's testimony as to certain personal property had to be 
accepted without further proof. Obviously, the jury did not believe that Plaintiff sustained its 
burden as to the entire amount claimed. According to Instruction No. 32, Plaintiff had the burden 
of proving "the fair market value of the property kept," not just what Plaintiff claims to have paid 
for it. Given the fact that the jury awarded 50% of the amount for which Plaintiff provided some 
written proof indicates that they sought more than Plaintiff's own testimony. Such a conclusion 
is eminently reasonable. If anything, Plaintiff had a complete failure of proof as to actual market 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, P. 13 
001377
value of the items asserted, but the jury nonetheless did Plaintiff a favor and estimated the value, 
applying a 50% depreciation factor. 
H. Plaintiff does not contest the jury's conclusion on its fraud in the 
inducement claim. 
Plaintiff apparently does not seek Judgment NOV on its fraud claim, having failed to 
address it in its motion or briefing. 
II. Plaintiff does not make the required showing for a new trial. 
Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6). According to 
recent authority, 
Under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), a district court may grant a new trial based on the ground 
of 'insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision.' I.R.C.P. 
59( a)( 6). 'A trial judge may grant a new trial on that ground if, after making his 
or her own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the 
evidence, the judge determines that the verdict is not in accord with the clear 
weight of the evidence. 
( emphasis added) 
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,430 (Idaho 2008) (citations omitted). In Johannsen, the 
Idaho Supreme Court cited to the district court's findings, which they explicitly quoted with 
approval: 
Here the district court judge stated, 'I exercise my discretion and can only grant 
this motion if I'm convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of 
the evidence ... ' He continued, ' .. .it was a good trial, a good issue, and the jury 
decided it one way. They could have gone the other way, but they went the way 
they did and found no breach of contract.' Here, the district court recognized 
Appellant's motion for a new trial as an issue of discretion, it acted within the 
bounds of the law, properly applied the applicable legal standard and reached its 
decision through an exercise of reason by explaining that the issue was one for the 
jury and that it made a reasonable determination based on the evidence before it. 
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We hold that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence. 
146 Idaho at 430. Finally, the Supreme Court also emphasized that "any motion for a new trial 
based on insufficiency of the evidence must 'set forth the factual grounds therefor with 
particularity.' I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7)." 146 Idaho at 430. 
As the Johannsen makes clear, the Court's role is not to second-guess or substitute its 
opinion for that of the jury, it is limited to those instances where the jury's conclusions are not in 
accord with the "clear weight of the evidence." Rather than repeat or rehash their earlier 
discussion, as Plaintiff largely does, Defendants simply state that, just as Plaintiff has not shown 
that it is entitled to Judgment NOV, because the evidence was of sufficient quality and probative 
value that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusions as the jury, Plaintiff has not shown 
that jury's verdict in this case is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence. 
Thus, Plaintiff's motion for new trial should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John Berryhill, 
respectfully request that the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment NOV, or in the 
alternative, for New Trial. 
~ 
DATED this 'Bday of September, 2010. 
HOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LL 
~k\ 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
JC}~ 
I hereby certify that on this L_L day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle. ID 83616 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
~ia Facsimile: 939-7136 
Via U.S. Mail 
Daniel E. Williams 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH n.JDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Counter Claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Judge Goff 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff Mosell Equities and provides the Court with its reply 
memorandum in support of motion for JNOV and new trial. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 1 
001381
10/1/2010 3:20 PM FROM: -39-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LA~ T-76919 PAGE: 002 OF 011 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. BERRYHILL MISREPRESENTS THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS. 
Berryhill concedes Mosell Equities' argument that the Court is constrained to evaluate 
whether there was substantial and competent evidence to support the verdict in light of and in 
adherence to the criteria established in the jury instructions. Berryhill therefore agrees that 
evidence could never be substantial or competent if it was considered in violation of the 
instructions. 
Then, in closing, Berryhill appears to argue that the standards for deciding whether to 
grant a JNOV motion or Motion for New Trial are similar and therefore the arguments he raises 
in support of his opposition to the JNOV motion also carry the day in defense of the new trial 
motion. However, that simply is not the case. While a JNOV standard is substantial as the 
moving party asks the judge to reverse the verdict and enter judgment for the aggrieved party, 
essentially disregarding the jury verdict altogether, the standard is clearly lower for granting a 
new trial, in which the judge rules the verdict was not in accord with the "clear weight of the 
evidence," and sets aside the verdict. While successfully avoiding the verdict in the present case, 
the proponent of the motion for new trial gets a new trial, not a verdict in its favor. Clearly the 
divergent standards recognize this difference. 
In considering the Motion for New Trial, the Court acts as the 13th juror and is entitled to 
weigh evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses - an issue that warrants substantial 
consideration in this case post trial. 
II. BERRYHILL'S TESTIMONY WAS INCREDIBLE. 
At trial, Berryhill testified he did not intend the term "loan" really to mean "loan," 
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although he wrote "loan" on Exhibit 1, although he accepted 9 checks on which Glenn 
Mosell had clearly indicated "loan" on the memo line, (Exhibits 2-10), checks which Berryhill 
acknowledged he freely accepted, and although loan was the term which his attorney Victoria 
Meier identified in ownership documents that Berryhill directed her to draft. 
During the trial, after repeated questions and evasive answers about what Berryhill 
believed the term "loan" really meant in the context of the agreement, Berryhill testified he 
believed "loan" meant "equity." However, in his response brief, Berryhill contends he was 
"badgered" into "choosing" "equity," when that is not what he really meant. So once again, we 
are back to square one - Berryhill contends there was no meeting of the minds - loan does not 
mean loan, but he cannot tell us just what he intended. "I know I wrote 'loan,' but I really did 
not mean 'loan,' but I don't really know what I meant." 
Moreover, although Berryhill contends Mosell told him to write "loan" on Exhibit 1, 
because "we have to call it something," testimony that Mosell emphatically denied, Berryhill 
cannot tell us, if he believed the $400,000.00 he received was not a loan, just what he believed 
"it" actually was. 
Addressing the credibility issue in support of the new trial motion, the Court must 
consider whether Berryhill legitimately believed something else (which he has been unable to 
identify) or whether his feigned ignorance is merely a fa9ade to support his contention there was 
no "meeting of the minds." One would think that to establish this defense, the proponent would 
have to prove a reasonable alternative to contradict the language used in the contract? In other 
words, the proponent would have to establish that while the contract says "x" I really meant "y", 
and that he had some reasonable basis to claim he believed the contract really meant "y." 
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However, all we have is Berryhill claiming he wrote "loan" but then cannot articulate just 
what he intended the contract to mean. How does such a contention establish substantial or 
competent evidence to support this defense? Essentially, Berryhill's contention is that he 
understood Mosell Equities was giving him checks, over $400,000.00, but cannot articulate just 
what he believed the check were for? As Berryhill 's testimony is nothing short of incredible, the 
Court should disregard this testimony when considering Mosell Equities' entitlement to a new 
trial. 
III. THERE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
A VERDICT THAT NO EXPRESS CONTRACT WAS FORMED. 
Berryhill seems to argue that whenever parties claim to disagree as to terms of a contract, 
then there is "no meeting of the minds." However, that contention is not substantiated by case 
law. First, the analysis is broad - did the parties intend to contract? In other words, regardless of 
any specific terms, was there an offer and acceptance? In Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. v. Smith, 
212 P.3d 992, 147 Idaho 562 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the two criteria: offer 
and acceptance, which must be shown to establish a "meeting of the minds"to intend to contract. 
There must be a meeting of the minds between parties for a contract to be formed. 
Barry v. Pacific West Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 831, 103 P.3d 440,444 
(2004). "A meeting of the minds is evidenced by a manifestation of intent to 
contract which takes the fonn of an off er and acceptance." Id. (Emphasis 
added) 
Instruction No. 8 is consistent with this ruling. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
An express contract may consist of an off er by one party that is accepted 
by another party. 
An offer is any proposal that is intended to become binding upon the party 
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making the offer if it is accepted by the party to whom it is directed. 
An acceptance of an off er is an expression by the party to whom the offer 
was directed that accepts the offer in accordance with the terms of the offer. 
To complete the express contract, the acceptance must be absolute and 
unqualified. If the response to the offer changes the terms of the offer in any 
manner, it is a counter offer but not an acceptance. 
The acceptance is not complete until it has been communicated to the 
party making the off er. 
The Panike & Sons Farms case, as here, the contracts were written and relatively simple. 
However, like Berryhill, the Defendant in Panike & Sons Farms case claimed there was no 
"meeting of the minds" because the Defendant claimed he did not understand the terms of the 
contract to mean what was written in the contract. The Supreme Court disagreed and found the 
parties conduct in drafting their contract evidenced an intent to contract. The Supreme Court 
ruled a subsequent disagreement as to the terms of a written contract do not invalidate the 
contract because the intent to contract was manifested by the parties drafting and signing a 
document they intended as a contract. Such analysis is equally applicable to the situation here. 
Clearly, on the 9 checks marked loan, Mosell was making an offer, and that offer was 
acknowledged and accepted by Berryhill when he accepted the checks as written. Mosell 
Equities therefore met its burden to establish an offer and acceptance. 
In Berryhill's response, he contends Mosell Equities had the burden of establishing "a 
meeting of the minds on all essential terms." However, Mosell Equities met that burden when it 
proved an offer and acceptance - 10 of them, with a separate contract, Exhibit 1, confirming the 
parties' intent regarding the 10 checks. 
Berryhill claims, despite writing "loan" in Exhibit 1, and then accepting nine checks 
conspicuously marked "loan," he did not understand the parties agreed to a loan. However, 
notwithstanding this testimony, there was no doubt the parties intended to contract. In fact, 
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Berryhill testified in the Broadway Park case that he understood and believed Mosell Equities 
already owned 50% of Berryhill & Company - pursuant to a contract to purchase that interest. 
Despite the verdict, there simply is not substantial or competent evidence to establish no contract 
was formed. 
IV. BERRYHILL FAILED TO ESTABLISH SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE OF AN AMBIGUITY. 
The real issue here is the intent of the parties regarding the terms of the contract that 
neither party denies existed. Consequently, as argued previously, the Court when considering 
whether substantial and competent evidence exists to support the verdict, Jury Instruction Nos. 
11 and 13 apply. 
At trial, Mosell testified "loan" meant loan and that is what he wrote on 9 checks. He 
also testified he confirmed with Berryhill's bookkeeper that Berryhill was accounting for those 
funds as loans. Mosell also testified the funds were loans because the anticipated "buy in" had 
not occurred. 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question oflaw, and this Court can rule as a matter 
of law the contracts were not ambiguous if Berryhill has failed to establish a reasonable basis for 
an ambiguity. In other words, Berryhill has to present compelling testimony to support his 
contention the simple and unambiguous term "loan" really means something else. When 
considering such testimony, however, as Mosell Equities argued in its initial brief, the Court 
must disregard any testimony offered to support an interpretation of the contract that would 
violate the criteria stated in Jury Instruction 11 and 13. 
Although Mosell Equities argued previously the Court should disregard Berryhill's 
testimony that "loan" really meant "equity," as this contention "is inconsistent with the plain, 
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ordinary meaning of the written agreement," (Instruction No. 13) and such an interpretation 
would create "contradictions and absurdities" (Instruction No. 11), these argument are equally 
applicable to Berryhill 's contention now that he really did not mean equity but does not really 
know what he meant. Berryhill appears to claim "loan" is ambiguous, but then cannot tell us 
why. In other words, Berryhill claims "loan" really means something else, but he just cannot put 
his finger on what it really means. 
The reality, Berryhill has presented no admissible testimony or proof that "loan" meant 
anything other than "loan." Without such testimony, the contract is unambiguous and the Court 
can interpret the unambiguous contract as a matter of law. 
In High Valley Concrete v. Sargent, Idaho Supreme Court Doc. No 35313 (July 8, 2010), 
the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of a motion for JNOV and ruled a court can 
disregard the "substantial and competent evidence" standard when addressing a question oflaw. 
We begin with an analysis of the basic question of whether substantial and 
competent evidence existed to support the determination that the jury based its 
verdict upon. Because we find, as a matter of law, that Beck did not owe Sargent 
a fiduciary duty and thus the district court erred in upholding the jury's verdict, 
the Court need not address the other issues raised by Appellants regarding Beck's 
motion for j.n.o.v. 
As is the case here, since Berryhill has failed to establish an ambiguity in the contract 
through admissible testimony, the Court, not the jury, interprets the contract. This Court 
therefore can rule as a matter oflaw, regardless of the verdict, the contract was for a loan and 
Grant Mosell Equities' motion for JNOV. 
V. THERE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL OR COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
FINDING THERE WAS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
The same argument applies to the breach of contract issue. First, "A breach of contract 
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occurs when there is a failure to perform a contractual duty." Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, 
LLC, 140 Idaho 354,361, 93 P.3d 685, 692 (2004), quoting Daniels v. Anderson, 113 Idaho 838, 
840, 748 P.2d 829,831 (Ct.App.1987). Here the facts establish both and express and implied-in-
fact contract. There is no dispute that despite the clear and unambiguous language in the express 
contract or Berryhill 's conduct confirming his understanding the funds were a loan, Berryhill 
steadfastly denied the funds were a loan and refused to tender the funds or to make payment 
arrangements when requested. 
As when considering an unambiguous contract, the Court is free to review the facts and 
rule as a matter of law whether a breach occurred, regardless of the verdict. 
In determining the intent of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a 
whole. Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 735, 9 P.3d 534, 
538 (2000). If a contract is found ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of 
fact. Id. (citing Electrical Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 
823, 41 P.3d 242, 251 (2002)). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of 
law. Boel v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 13, 43 P.3d 768, 772 (2002) 
(citing Terteling v. Payne, 131 Idaho 389, 391-92, 957 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 
(1998)). Whether the facts establish a violation of the contract is a question of 
law reviewed de novo. Barnett, 133 Idaho at 234,985 P.2d at 114 (citing United 
States v. Plummer, 941 F.2d 799, 803 (9th Cir.1991)). 
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354,361, 93 P.3d 685, 692 (2004) (Emphasis 
added). 
As there was a contract, that contract was for a loan, and Berryhill denies a loan existed 
and has refused to remit payment, the Court must conclude there was a breach of either an 
express or implied-in-fact contract. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN" SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
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VI. THERE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
BERRYHILL'S EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE. 
Berryhill contends the jury could have concluded that Mosell's alleged statement, "'we 
have to call it something" somehow misled Berryhill into believing "loan" really did not mean 
loan, but some other and still undefined term. 
There is no substantial and competent evidence however to establish, assuming Mosell 
did make this statement, the statement was false or misleading. The reality, under the 
circumstances of the parties' relationship the funds had to be either loans or payment for equity 
in the company. Despite Berryhill's contention there were other possibilities, which he is still 
unable to identify, that is the only rational and logical conclusion. "We have to call it something" 
suggests the reality that as the parties had not finalized the "buy in" agreement, they could not 
call the funds "equity." Consequently, as the parties could not call the funds "equity," "we have 
to call it something" merely referred to identifying the funds as "loans," which Berryhill 
acknowledged by drafting Exhibit 1. There simply is proof that the statement "we have to call it 
something" is a misrepresentation or is a false statement. As the statement cannot be construed 
as false, there certainly is no substantial and competent evidence to support the verdict, assuming 
the jurors even considered this issue 1. 
VII. THE COURT CAN APPLY RESCISSION AND ORDER BERRYHILL TO RETURN 
MOSELL EQUITIES' $405,000.00. 
Mosell Equities steadfa;tly asserted it had loaned fund<s to Berryhill and therefore it was 
entitled to recover those funds, plus accumulated interest. Despite the verdict however, Mosell 
Equities is not without entitlement to the equitable remedy of rescission. Recently in O'Connor 
1 Mosell Equities argued previously that in order for this defense to apply, the Jurors would have had to have found 
an express contract but then awarded no or less damages than Mosell Equities requested. As the verdict indicates 
the Jury found no express contract, it appears they did not consider this defense. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
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v. Harger Const., Inc., 188 P.3d 846, 145 Idaho 904 (2008), the Supreme Court ruled that a court 
has equitable power to grant rescission even where that party had not pled a claim of rescission, 
as long as the defendant had raised a defense from which rescission would apply, and the parties 
presented evidence to support or refute that defense to avoid the parties' contract. While the 
defense in O'Conner was mutual mistake, rescission is equally available when a party seeks to 
avoid a contact using the "no meeting of the minds" defense. Simpson v. Johnson, 100 Idaho 
357, 597 P.2d 600 (1979). 
As Berryhill sought to avoid the contract by alleging there was no meeting of the minds, 
and now contends there was substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's verdict, 
this Court must also return the parties to their pre-contracting positions. Mosell Equities is 
therefore entitled to an order directing Berryhill & Company to immediately return all of Mos ell 
Equities' $405,000.00, if the Court denies either Mosell Equities' motion for JNOV or for new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Once again, Mosell Equities very respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion for 
JNOV as there is not substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's verdict on any 
claim or defense. 
In the alternative, Mosell Equities again very respectfully requests the Court grant its 
Motion for New Trial as the jury's verdict was not in accord with the clear weight of the 
evidence presented at trial. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of October, 2010. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of October, 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via the manner indicated to: 
The Honorable Dennis Goff 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
To chambers via e-mail and US Mail 
Via facsimile transmission and e-mail 
ERIC R. CLARK 
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Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. CVOC0909974 
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL ill and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE That the Honorable Dennis Goff, District Judge, has reset this 
matter for hearing for Motion for JNOV and in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial on the 7th 
day of October, 2010 at 3:00 p.m., at the Ada County Courthouse, 200 West Front Street, Boise, 
Id. 
J. David Navarro 
Clerk of th~ 
Ada County, I 
By: _____ ~---~-
Deputy V 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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I hereby certify that on this___!_ day of October, 2010, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Eric R. Clark 
VIA: Facsimile 
(208) 939-7136 
CC: Counsel/ nt 
Notice of Hearing 
Daniel E. Williams 
VIA: Facsimile 
(208) 345-7894 
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Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
ON COUNT 1 OF ITS COMPLAINT 
Judge Goff 
****** 
THIS MATTER came before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, and in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial. The parties appeared 
through their respective counsel of record on Wednesday, October 6, 2010, according to notice, 
\ 
and each party had provided briefs in support of and in opposition to theft respective positions, 
~ 
which the Court reviewed and considered. ~ 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT - I 
DICTON 
OR INAL 
\ 
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During the hearing, the Court heard oral argument from each counsel, and thereafter 
stated the Court's decision and bases for that decision on the record. The Court now 
incorporates its comments, rationale, and ultimate decision communicated to counsel on October 
6, 2010 as if set forth herein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count I is hereby GRANTED. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on the remaining counts, and Plaintiff's Motion For New 
Trial are hereby DENIED. 
ENTERED THIS 1,1, ¢ day of October 20 I 0. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON 
COUNT l OF ITS COMPLAINT - 2 
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THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
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Friday. October 29. 2010 at 03:21 PM 
J. DA'(IQNAVARRO. CLERK OF THE COURT 
Il'J THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES LLC 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY INC 
JOHN E BERRYHILL Ill 
AMY BERRYHILL 
Defendant. 
The Court has set this matter for: 
CASE NO. CV-OC-2009-09974 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
STATUS CONFERENCE ...... WEDNESDAY. NOVEMBER 10. 2010@ 
2:45 PM. 
Dated Friday, October 29, 2010 
I\Jotice of Hearing Page 1 
DARLA WILLIAMSON 
District Judge 
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a true and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
ERIC R CLARK 
ATTORl'JEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 2504 
EAGLE ID 83616 
DANIEL E WILLIAMS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 1776 
BOISE ID 83701 
Notice of Hearing 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
~~ Deputy ourt Clerk 
Page 2 
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DANIEL E. Wll,LIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise,ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NO. 9499 P. 2 
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NOV u Jt 2010 
J. DAVID NAVAA,:tO, Clerk 
By J. FIANCALL 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS, 
BERRYIDLL & COMP ANY, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 0909974 
) 
) MOTION BY DEFENDANT 
) BERRYHILL& COMPANY, INC., 
) TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant Betryhill & Company, Inc., by and through its counsel of record, pursuant to 
Rule 60, I.R.C.P., hereby moves the Court to Amend/Correct its Order Granting Plaintiff's 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count 1 of its Complaint filed October 26, 
2010. Defendant's proposed Amended Order 1s attached as Exhibit A hereto. 
MOTION BY DEFENDANT BERRYHILL & COMPANY, lNC., 
TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER, P. l 
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DATED this _f_ day of November, 2010. 
HOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, ll..P 
J~ 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
u~ 
I hereby certify that on this _j_ day of November, 2010, a tiue and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel a.s indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
_ Via Hand Delivery 
/'Via Facsimile: 939-7136 
Via U.S. Mail 
Daniel E. Williams 
MOTION BY DEFENDANT BERRYHIIL & COMPANY, INC., 
TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER, P. 2 
., 
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DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P, 0, Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@tbomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUlTIES, an Idaho Limited, 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS, 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYIIlLL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Def end ants. 
) Case No. CV OC 0909974 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
(PROPOSED) 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTTh"G 
IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT, AND IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR 
NEWTRIAL 
THIS MA1TER came before the Court pursuant to Plaintiffs Molionfor Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, and in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial. The parties appeared 
through their respective counsel of record on Thursday, October 7, 2010, pursuant to notice. and 
(PROPOSED) AMENDED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTAND1NG THE VERDICT, AND IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEWTRIAL, P. 1 
EXHIBIT-4.-
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each party had provided briefs in support of and in opposition to their respective positions, which 
the Court reviewed and considered. 
During the hearing, the Court heard oral argument from each counsel, and thereafter 
stated the Court's decision and bases for that decision on the record. The Court now incorporates 
its comments, rationale, and ultimate decision communicated to counsel on October 7, 2010 as if 
fully set forth herein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiffs Motion For Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count I as to contract fonnation is hereby GRANTED. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion for New 
Trial on the remaining elements of Count 1 is hereby GRANTED. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS FURTIIER ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict on the remaining counts, and Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial on 
the remaining counts are hereby DENIED. 
DATED this __ day of _______ ., 2010. 
District Judge 
(PROPOSED) AMENDED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 
PLAINTlFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. AND IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, P. 2 
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DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NO. 9499 P. 6 
J. DAVIO NAVAAPIO, Clerk 
By J. RANDALL 
DEPU"rf 
IN tHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited, 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) Case No. CV OC 0909974 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION BY DEFENDANT 
) BERRYIIlLL & COMPANY, INC., 
) TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
On October 26, 2010, the trial court issued an Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count 1 of its Complaint filed October 26, 2010 ("the 
subject Order") in a fonn provided by Plaintiff's counsel. The subject Order was Plaintiffs 
MEMORANDUM 1N SUPPORT OF MOTION BY DEFENDANT BERRYHil.L & 
COMPANY, INC., TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER, P. 1 
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second proposed form of Order. An earlier version had simply prnvided for a new trial on Count 
One, the breach of express contract claim against Defendant. 
Pursuant to Rule 60(a) and 60(b)(6), I.R.C.P., Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., 
moves the Court to amend/correct the subject Order in the following areas: 
I. Plaintiff's proposed form of Order misidentified the date of the relevant hearing 
on Plaintiff's Motion. The subject Order refers to and incorporates the trial court's comments, 
rationale, and ultimate decision communicated on October 6, 2010. The relevant hearing took 
place on October 7, 2010, at 3:00 p.m., because of a conflict with another trial being heard by the 
trial court. 
2. Plaintiff's proposed form of Order inaccurately suggests that Judgment NOV is 
granted as to all of Count One of Plaintiffs Complaint. This directly contradicts the clear 
instmctions of the trial court on October 7, 2010. Toe trial court indicated that it was granting 
Judgment NOV only as to the issue of contract formation. All other issues as to Count One were 
to be the subject of a new trial. Immediately after the October 7, 2010, hearing, Defendant 
requested that a transcript of the hearing be prepared, but Defendant has not yet received lhe 
transcript. Defendant anticipates, however, that Plaintiff will agree that the Court's directions in 
this regard were clear. 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., respectfully requests 
that the Comt grant its Motion to Amend/Correct the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstancling the Verdict and enter an Amended Order in the form attached to 
Defendant's current motion. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION BY DEFENDANT BERRYHILL & 
COMP ANY, INC., TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER. P. 2 
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DATED this ..I._ day of November, 2010. 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants 
NO. 9499 P. 8 
CERTIF1CATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ce1tify that on this~ November, 2010, a nue and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attomeys 
P. O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
--Via Facsimile: 939-7136 
_ Via U.S. Mail 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION BY DEFENDANT BERRYHILL & 
COMPANY, JNC., TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER, P. 3 
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
-
NO.-----::iF1:ii:L.Et>;-:_:::~/ < = 
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NOV O 5 2010 
J DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
. By A. GARDEN 
OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Counter Claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
OBJECTION AND OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
AMEND/CORRECT ORDER 
Judges Williamson & Goff 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff Mosell Equities and provides the Court with its Objection 
and Opposition to the Defendant's motion to amend/correct order. 
OBJECTION AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND/CORRECT 
ORDER- I 
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ARGUMENT 
Mosell Equities has filed an affidavit in support of this objection and in opposition to the 
Defendant's motion, which includes an e-mail string between counsel and between counsel and 
Judge Goff. Mosell Equities also provided a copy of the order as proposed, and a copy of the 
order that Judge Goff ultimately signed. 
In Exhibit 1, the e-mail string, Defendant's counsel writes to Judge Goff on October 14, 
2010 and states his objection to the order as drafted according to the Judge's recollection. The 
Defendant's motion now contains the same objection. 
Notwithstanding the Defendant's objection, however, Judge Goff reviewed, considered 
and signed the Order attached as Exhibit 3, which is the same order, Exhibit 2, to which 
Defendant's counsel voiced his objections to Judge Goff. 
The Defendant claim~ that it is entitled to a new trial on the remaining elements of the 
contracts claim, which apparently means whether the contract was ambiguous, the terms if it 
was, and whether or not there was a breach. At the JNOV hearing, Mosell Equities argued that 
for Berryhill to establish that "loan" really did not mean loan, then he had to provide a 
reasonable alternative definition to establish the contract was ambiguous. The record clearly 
established that Berryhill contended that loan did not mean loan, but could not articulate just 
what he thought it meant. He once testified that it really meant "equity," but he then recanted 
that statement, but never offered any other explanation. "For a contract term to be ambiguous, 
there must be at least two different reasonable interpretations of the term." Armstrong v. Farmers 
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 139 P.3d 737 (2006). However, despite 4 and a half days of 
OBJECTION AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND/CORRECT 
ORDER-2 
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trial, Berryhill never provided a reasonable interpretation of the term "loan." In fact, Berryhill's 
conduct related to the money established that he understood and treated the money as a loan. 
As Berryhill failed to establish the unambiguous term loan meant anything other than the 
ordinary and reasonable meaning, the contract was not ambiguous. In other words, Judge Goff 
could easily have concluded that the contract was unambiguous and therefore ruled as a matter of 
law it was a loan. 
Additionally, having found the contract was unambiguous, Judge Goff could then have 
very reasonably concluded there was no evidence of "sufficient quantity and probative value that 
reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury," regarding the 
breach issue. The unambiguous contract was for a loan; Berryhill received the money and 
accounted for it as a loan, then he acknowledged through his Attorney (Victoria Meier's 
documents - Exhibit 35.) that the money was a loan, and then untimely denied the money was 
ever a loan and refused to pay the money back. Consequently, having found a contract existed, 
having found the contract was unambiguous, Judge Goff could easily and appropriately have 
found there was no credible evidence presented that Berryhill's conduct constituted anything but 
a breach of the loan. 
CONCLUSION 
Comparing Defendant's objections in Exhibit 1 with the Defendant's objections in this 
motion, the Defendant clearly is seeking relief that Judge Goff has considered and rejected. The 
Defendant claims Judge Goffs order is incorrect, when in fact, Judge Goff clearly stated 
otherwise. Considering the Defendants made the very same arguments and Judge Goff refused 
to correct/alter the Order after reviewing and considering the Defendant's e-mail, there does not 
OBJECTION AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND/CORRECT 
ORDER-3 
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appear to be any legal or factual basis on which this Court could possibly grant the Defendant's 
Motion. Mosell Equities respectfully requests the the Court sustain this objection and refuse to 
grant the Defendant's Motion. 1 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of November, 2010. 
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day ofNovember, 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via the manner indicated to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Via facsimile transmission and e-mail 
ERIC R. CLARK 
1 The Plaintiff has no objection to the motion as it pertains to correcting the date of the hearing. 
OBJECTION AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND/CORRECT 
ORDER-4 
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
~~======~~F_.-1=~~~-,-Qg..,_.,.,,___ 
NOV O 5 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By A. GARDEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC R. CLARK 
FILED IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
CORRECT/AMEND ORDER 
Eric R. Clark, being first duly sworn, and upon personal knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances recited herein, deposes and states: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years, and I have personal knowledge of the facts as stated 
in this affidavit. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC R. CLARK - I 
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2. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of an e-mail "string" containing 
numerous e-mails relating to the presentation to Judge Goff of the order in question in the 
Defendant's Motion to Correct/Amend Order, including Dan Williams'e-mail to Judge Goff in 
which Mr. Williams voiced his objection to the order as presented. 
3. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the proposed order the Affiant 
submitted to Judge Goff. 
4. Attached as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the Order Judge Goff signed on 
October 22, 2010. 
Further your affiant s.ayeth naught. 
DATED this 5th day ofNovember 2010. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5th day ofNovember 2010. 
,,,,,u 1111 ,,,,, 
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NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of Idaho 
Residing at: APA-, C-o"' "4/ r-?; 
My Commission expires: (p ~ I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of November 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via facsimile transmission to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
ERIC R. CLARK 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC R. CLARK - 3 
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Windows Live Hotmail Prin.essage 
RE: PROPOSED ORDER 
From: ERJC CLARK (eclark101@hotmail.com) 
Sent Thu 10/14/10 3:04 PM 
To: Dan Williams (danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com) 
Cc: Judge Goff (dcgoff69@msn.com) 
I'm not sure why you didn't tell me that when I asked you for your input originally? 
Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER 
Date: Thu. 14 Oct 2010 14:55:19 -0600 
From: Danw@Thomaswilliamslaw.com 
To: eclark101@hotmail.com; dcgoff69@msn.com 
CC: dctyleni@adaweb.net 
Page 1 of 4 
This is incorrect. My notes indicate that Judge Goff granted the motion JNOV only as to 
contract fonnation, not as to all of the allegations of Count I. He granted new trial as to the 
balance of the issues regarding breach of contract. 
Dan Williams 
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP 
Plaza One Twenty One 
121 N. 9th Street, Suite 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 345-7800 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS 
& PA AK . 
From: ERIC CLARK [mailto:eclark101@hobnail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, October 14, 2010 2:53 PM 
To: Judge Goff 
Cc: Nichol; Dan Williams 
Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER 
Judge Goff: 
Thank you for your response. I have made the corrections as indicated In your e-mall, and I have 
attached the modified proposed order. I have also attached a COJJY in Word format which should be 
easier to 'WOrk with In case you would like to add or modify my language. I wlll deliver envelopes to 
Nichol today or tomorrow. 
Thank you, 
EXHIBIT 
Eric 
http://sn 109w.snt 109 .mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=e882ee23-4ae l-48b4-... 11/4/l0 I 0 
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Windows Live Hotmail PriAessage 
From: dc.goff69@msn.com 
To: eclarkl01@hotmail.com 
Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER 
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 2010 13:49:39 -0600 
Eric, 
Page 2of 4 
I attempted to correct your proposed order but was unable to do so with my limited skills. I granted 
your JNOV with regard to Count One express contract rendering moot your New Trial motion. I denied 
your JNOV as well as the New Trial motions as to all other counts. I hope this acklresses any concerns 
Dan had. I wlll be In Boise next week and will be able to sign it or have Nicole modify it. Thank you. 
Dennis 
~- .. -----·-----------rror, ••••••• K K•rr•-----•-•ro•K-----••• ····---··· 0 ·----·· ••••--~-------
From: eclark101@hotmail.com 
To: dctyleni@adaweb.net; dc.goff69@msn.com 
CC: danw@twplegal.com 
Subject: FW: PROPOSED ORDER 
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 2010 11:56:13 -0600 
Dear Judge Goff: 
Attached Is the Plaintiff's proposed order regarding the Court's decision granting a New Trial. 
I previously submitted the order to Mr. Williams, and his response is attached below. If you would like 
to make any changes, corrections, etc ... please let me know and I wlll either make the revisions or 
provide a copy in Word format to Nichol for the revisions. 
Thank you, 
Eric 
- ...... ------........ ···--············---- ........................ _ .................... __ . ., ........... ---·-- --~~ -·---.. -------
Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER 
Date: Thu, 14 0d: 201010:44:43 -0600 
From: Danw@Thomaswilliamslaw.com 
To: eclark101@hotmail.com 
I am not sure whether or not this reflects what the Court intended. Why don't you submit and see what 
he does. Just don't tel him I have stipulated to it. 
Dan WIiiiams 
Thomas, WIiiiams & Park, LLP 
Plaza One Twenty One 
121 N. 9th Street, Suite 300 ' 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 345-7800 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS 
A PA.AK., 
From: ERIC OARK [mailto:edark101@hotmail.com] 
sent: Wednesday, October 13, 2010 1:23 PM 
http://sn 109w.sntl 09.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=e882ee23-4ae l-48b4-... 1 / /20 I 0 
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To: Dan WIiiiams 
Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER 
Ok. I removed the sentence containing the language you objected to. Let me know if this works. 
Thanks, Eric 
-----------------------------
Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER 
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2010 13:05:01 -0600 
From: Danw@Thomaswllliamslaw.com 
To: eclarklOl@hobnall.com 
Not really. 1 think what you said is what he said too. 
Dan Williams 
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP 
Plaza One Twenty One 
121 N. 9th Street, Suite 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 345-7800 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS 
& PARK . 
From: ERIC CLARK [mallto:eclark101@hobnail.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, October 13, 2010 11:49 AM 
To: Dan WIiiiams 
Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER 
Do you have proposed language? 
Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER 
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2010 11:28:47 -0600 
From: Danw@Thomaswilliamslaw.com 
To: eclark1Ql@hotmail.com 
There is nothing upon which to base the assertion that the jury found otherwiseH as to whether there 
was an express contract. 
Dan Williams 
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP 
Plaza One Twenty One 
121 N. 9th Street, Suite 300 
Boise, IO 83702 
(208) 345-7800 
http://sn 109w.sntl 09.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=e882ee23-4ae 1-48b4-... J 1/ /2010 
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Windows Live Hotmail PriAessage 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS 
& PAAK_. 
From: ERIC CLARK [mailto:eclark101@hotmail.com] 
sent: Tuesday, October 12, 2010 3:29 PM 
To: Dan WIiiiams 
SUbject: PROPOSED ORDER 
Dan: 
Page4 of 4 
Attached is our proposed order regarding the Judge's decision last week. Plea;e let me know if you 
have any objections, corrections, suggestions, etc ••• 
Thanks, Eric 
http://sn 109w.sntl 09 .mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=e882ee23-4ae 1-48b4-... 11/4/2010 
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
ON COUNT 1 OF ITS COMPLAINT 
Judge Goff 
* * * * * * 
THIS MATTER came before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, and in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial. The parties appeared 
through their respective counsel ofrecord on Wednesday, October 6, 2010, according to notice, 
and each party had provided briefs in support of and in opposition to their respective positions, 
which the Court reviewed and considered. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON 
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT - I 
EXHIBIT~ 
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During the hearing, the Court heard oral argument from each counsel, and thereafter 
stated the Court's decision and bases for that decision on the record. The Court now 
incorporates its comments, rationale, and ultimate decision communicated to counsel on October 
6, 2010 as if set forth herein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count 1 is hereby GRANTED. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on the remaining counts, and Plaintiff's Motion For New 
Trial are hereby DENIED. 
ENTERED THIS ____ day of October 2010. 
Dennis Goff 
Senior District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON 
COUNT 1 OF ITS COMPLAINT - 2 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _____ day of October, 201 0, I served the 
foregoing, by having a true and complete copy delivered via US Mail, postage prepaid, and 
addressed to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOC IA TES, A ITORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 839 l 6 
Clerk of the District Court 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON 
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT - 3 
001418
- V ,1 
NO·---.---.,,..:~-=--___:._t _ 
ERIC R. CLARK. Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, A ITORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax:208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
,\,M_,...........,,_,____..,. ----
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STA TE OF 
IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL &COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
ON COUNT 1 OF ITS COMPLAINT 
Judge Goff 
THIS MA TIER came before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. a11d in the Airemative, Motion/or New Trial. The parties appeared 
through their n:spective counsel of record on Wednesday. October 6, 2010. according to notice, 
and each party had provided briefs in support of and in opposition ro their respective positions, 
which the Court reviewed and considered. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON 
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT • I 
EXHIBIT__,_ 0 RIG I NA L 
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ti 
During the hearing, the Court heard oral argument from each counsel, and thereafter 
stated the Court's decision and bases for that decision on the record. The Court now 
incorporates its comments, rationale, and ultimate decision communicated to counsel on October 
6, 2010 as if set forth herein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count 1 is hereby GRANTED. 
NOW. 111EREFORB, IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiffs Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on the remaining counts, and Plaintiff"s Motion For New 
Trial are hereby DENIED. 
ENTERED nns 13,,11/ day of October 2010. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON 
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT - 2 
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CLERK'S CERTIFJCA ~F SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~f day of October, 2010, I served the 
foregoing, by having a true and complete copy deli vercd via US Mail, postage prepaid. and 
addressed to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, Wll.LIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID. 83701 
ERIC R. CLARK. Esq. 
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, A TIORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
ORDER ORANTINO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWrrHST ANDING THE VERDICT ON 
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT - 3 
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J. D,,' (, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIA~...f}ll~m!,f;fllF7A~-H-~=-t 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITITES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
BERRYHILL & COMP ANY, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation, JOHN E. 
BERRYHILL III, individually, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CVOC0909974 
ORDER OF CLARIFICATION 
The Court having reviewed and considered each parties' arguments on the form of order, and 
the defendant's testimony at trial as to his intentions ( set forth in Exhibit 21 ), the Court now 
incorporates its comments, rationale, and ultimate decision communicated to counsel on October 6, 
2010 and orders clarification of the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict on Count I of Its Complaint dated October 26, 2010, as set forth herein. 
The Court ruled that Judge Williamson had granted summary judgment that there was an 
express contract between the parties as set forth in Exhibit 1. Judge Williamson further ruled that 
what was left at issue for the jury with regard to Count I was the ambiguity of what would occur in th 
event the parties failed to substantially perform the express contract and whether Exhibit 1 had been 
modified by subsequent agreements. This Court failed to properly instruct the jury to reflect the prior 
summary judgment order of Judge Williamson. This Court granted the Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict as to Count I only and denied the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 1 
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the Verdict and the Motion for New Trial as to all other counts and ordered a retrial on Count I in 
accordance with Judge Williamson's summary judgment order. 
The Court further commented that the jury may have been confused by the Court's jury 
instructions regarding damages as to Count I. This Court commented it was aware of only three 
different measures of damages with regard to Count I: I) Rescission, which the plaintiffrequested in 
the original trial and which defendant argued the parties could not be returned to their pre-contract 
status; 2) Specific Performance requiring the defendant to issue fifty {50) percent of stock in 
Berryhill restaurant to the plaintiff (The plaintiff did not want this remedy); or 3) The Value of the 
alleged breach of contract that defendant would have to pay plaintiff fifty percent of the value of 
Berryhill restaurant. which the plaintiff did not request in the original trial. The jury may not have 
had all jury instructions they needed to detennine the issues of Count I. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion For Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count I: express contract is hereby GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTIIER ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial as to Count I: express 
contract is moot 
r 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Nonvithstanding the 
Verdict and Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial on the remaining counts are hereby DENIED. 
"l!z--· 
Dated this~ day of November, 2010. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER~ Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, J. David Navarroi the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by Unite 
States Mail, on this ~<v\tay of November, 2010, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISIO 
AND ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this caus 
in envelopes addressed as follows: 
Eric R. Clark 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
PO Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701-1776 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 3 
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12/2/2010 9:51 AM FROM: .39-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW -76919 PAGE: 002 OF 003 
~~~~ 
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DEC DI 2010 
J. DAVID NAVAIIIPIO C' -4, 
By J. RAND , ,e,n 
ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-685-2320 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DE'PUTy All. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
BERRYHILL & COMP ANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR 
TRIAL SETTING 
The Plaintiff, by and through counsel, hereby requests that this Court, in light of Judge 
Goff's recent Order of Clarification entered November 23, 2010, reset this case for trial. 
The Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court set the trial within six months to allow 
the Plaintiff to move to amend its Complaint, according to Rule 15( d), IRCP, to again pursue a 
.. ' REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING - 1 ;. ..,__ ,. 
l ....... 
001425
12/2/2010 9:51 AM FROM: .39-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW .76919 PAGE: 003 OF 003 
claim for piercing the corporate veil. Mr. Berryhill presented testimony at trial that his company 
was insolvent and unable to meet its current financial obligations. 
Additionally, this timeframe would allow the Plaintiff to pursue summary judgment. The 
Plaintiff believes that based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court can rule as a matter of 
law the contract was unambiguous, and further, that no genuine issue of material fact exists 
regarding a breach of that contract. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2010. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark, 
For the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of December, 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via US Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
ERIC R. CLARK 
REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING - 2 
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• 
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellant 
• :: .. ~ • tf:l/7 
DEC Q 6 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By CARLY LATIMORE 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
-vs-
BERRYHILL & COMP ANY, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN E. 
BERRYHILL III and AMY BERRYHILL, 
individually, and as husband and wife, 
Defendants/ Appellant. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, MOSELL EQUITIES, AND ITS 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ERIC R. CLARK, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Defendant, Berryhill & Company, Inc., appeals against the above-named Plaintiff, 
to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict entered on the 26th day of October, 2010, by the HonorableDennis 
Goff, Senior District Judge. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
001427
, • 
2. Appellant hereby appeals as a matter of right to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
above-referenced Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
which is deemed to include all interlocutory judgments, orders and decrees as provided under 
Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e). 
3. The issue the Appellant intends to assert on appeal is that the court erred in 
granting Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, which also mandated a 
new trial. 
4. Appellant, Berryhill & Company, Inc., has a right to appeal since the Order 
described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 
1 l(a)(5) and (6). 
5. Appellant requests the preparation of the reporter's transcript in hard copy and 
electronic format. 
6. Appellant requests a scanned copy of the clerk's record to include the following 
documents in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
(a) all correspondence directed by the parties to the Court; and 
(b) all correspondence between the parties which the Court received copies of. 
7. I hereby certify that: 
(a) a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
(b) the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript of the September 7-15, 2010 trial; 
( c) the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid; 
( d) the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
( e) service of this notice has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
001428
• • 
. / .P-
DATED this _D_ day of December, 2010. 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants/ Appellant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this~ of December, 2010, I served a copy of the foregoing 
instrument on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
and mailed a copy to the court reporter at: 
Sue Wolf 
Ada County Transcript Dept. 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St., Room 4171 
Boise, ID 83702 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
....JL... Via Facsimile - 939-7136 
Via U.S. Mail 
001430
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
eclark@Clark-Attomeys.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
- NO. A.M===::-=.'7!.:_J1.1Lll,,~rbb+{~~~~L-
D£C 1 7 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerh 
ByE,HO!.Mes 
OE?lfTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
vs. 
Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross 
Appellant, 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants/ Appellants/Cross-
Respondents. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. AN IDAHO CORPORATION, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III, 
AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, DANIELE. WILLIAMS, AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 1 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Parties. Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, appeals against the above-named 
Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill, to the Idaho Supreme Court from 
the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict entered on the 
26th day of October, 2010, by the Honorable Dennis Goff, Senior District Judge. 
2. Designation of Appeal and Jurisdictional Statement. Mosell Equities, LLC 
hereby appeals as a matter of right to the Idaho Supreme Court from the above-referenced Order 
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, which is deemed to 
include all interlocutory judgments, orders and decrees as provided under Idaho Appellate Rule 
17(e). Mosell Equities, LLC has a right to cross appeal since the Order described in paragraph 1 
above is an appealable order as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(5) and (6). 
3. Issues on Cross Appeal. While Mosell Equities, LLC agrees wholeheartedly with 
Judge Goffs ruling that Mosell Equities, LLC was entitled to JNOV regarding the existence of 
an express contract, Mosell Equities, LLC asserts on cross appeal that Judge Goff erred by not 
granting Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict in its entirety on Count I. 
4. No additional reporter's transcript is requested. 
5. The cross-appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those designated by 
the appellant in the initial notice of appeal: None. 
6. The cross-appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered 
or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court in addition to those requested 
in the original notice of appeal: None. 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 2 
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7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal and any request for additional transcript 
have been served on the reporter. 
(b) (1) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation 
of the reporter's transcript and any additional documents requested in the cross-appeal, if 
necessary. 
( c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of December, 2010. 
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS 
~---
Eric R. Clark 
Attorney for Cross-Appellant 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of December, 2010, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via the manner indicated to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
Via facsimile transmission 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Sue Wolf 
Ada County Transcript Dept. 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St., Room 4171 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Via US Mail 
~---
ERIC R. CLARK 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 4 
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NO.-------;:;'.:-;:-;::--:-;-;:i0--
FILED l : J {L t.,_M ____ P.M.-+-. ~---
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITITES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation, JOHN E. 
BERRYHILL ill, individually, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CVOC0909974 
JUDGMENT 
The Court having entered its Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count 1, Express Contract, of Its Complaint on October 26, 2010 
and its subsequent Order of Clarification dated November 23, 2010; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict on Count I: express contract is hereby GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial as to Count I: express 
contract is moot. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict and Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial on the remaining counts are hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ~Y of January, 2011. 
JUDGMENT - Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, I. David Navarro, the undersi~} do hereby certify that I have mailed, by 
United States Mail, on this I ~ay of O 10, one copy of the JUDGMENT as notice 
pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed 
as follows: 
ERIC R. CLARK 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
POBOX2504 
EAGLE, ID 83616 
DANIELE. WILLIAMS 
1HOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
PO BOX 1776 
BOISE, ID 83701-1776 
JUDGMENT - Page 2 
I. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ad~ 
By lA ~ 
DeputycierkY 
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TO: CLERK OF THE COURT, IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
451 WEST STATE STREET, BOISE, IDAHO 
FAX ( 2 0 8) 3 3 4 - 2 616 
B:oc A.M.___, ______ _,pM--+---
SEP O 6 2011 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RIC , Clerk 
By BRADLEY J. THIE 
DEPUTY 
MOSELL EQUITIES, ) DOCKET NO. 38338-2010 
) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., 
et a 1, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
) 
) Case No. CRFE-2008-0023268 
) 
) 
) NOTICE OF LODGING 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------------
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT(S) LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on September 6, 2011, 
I lodged five (5) transcript (s), totalling 1,034 pages, 
for the following dates/proceedings: 
09-07-10 Jury Trial., Day 1 
09-08-10 Jury Trial., Day 2 
09-09-10 Jury Trial., Day 3 
09-14-10 Jury Trial., Day 4 
09-15-10 Jury Trial., Day 5 
for the above-referenced appeal with the District Court 
Clerk for Ada County, in the Fourth Judicial District. 
Susan M. Wolf, D 
RPR, CSR No. 72~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent, 
and 
JOHN E. BERRYHILL, III, 
Defendant-Cross Respondent, 
and 
AMY BERRYHILL, 
Defendant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 38338 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 25th day of August, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
1 
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IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOUR1H JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE 
STATEOFIDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Judge Goff /Ric Nelson 
District Judge Clerk 
MOSELL EQUITES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMP ANY ET AL, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs Counsel: 
ERIC CLARK. 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY 
· BY NO. DESCRIPTION 
Pltf. 1 Loan Agreement w/Check 
Pltf. 2 Check #5127 6/28/07 
Pltf. 3 Check # 5137 7 /30/07 
Pltf. 4 Check #5139 8/07 /07 
Pltf. 5 Check #5140 08/16/07 
Pltf. 6 Check #5141 08/16/07 
Pltf. 7 Check #5196 10/09/07 
Pltf. 8 Check #5201 10/26/07 
Pltf. 9 Check #5154 12/04/07 
Pltf. 10 Check #5164 12/19/07 
Pltf. 11 Check #524 7 04/30/07 
Pltf. 12 Check #5009 09/21/05 
Pltf .. 13 Check #5046 09/09/06 
Pltf. 14 Check #5070 08/07 /06 
Pltf. 15 Check #5102 02/13/07 
Pltf. 16 Check #5112 05/01/07 
Pltf. 17 Check #5117 05/29/07 
9/07/2010-9/15/ 10 
EXHIBIT LIST 
Case No. 
CVOC0909974 
(JURY TRIAL) 
Defendants Counsel: 
DANIEL WILLIAMS 
DEFENSE ATTONREY 
STATUS DATE 
Adm 09/08/10 
Adm 09/08/10 
Adm 09/08/10 
Adm 09/08/10 
Adm 09/08/10 
Adm 09/08/10 
Adm 09/08/10 
Adm 09/08/10 
Adm · 09/08/10 
Adm 09/08/10 
Adm 09/08/10 
Adm 09/07/10· 
Adm 09/07/10 
Adm 09/07/10 
Adm 09/07/10 
Adm 09/08/10 
Adm 09/08/10 
Pltf. 18 Berryhill's BCO Development Outline Adm 09/07/10 
Pltf. 19 Berryhill's Offer #1 Adm 09/07/10 
Exhibit List Page 1 of 3 
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Pltf. 20 Berryhill' s Offer #2 Adm 09/15/10 
Pltf. 21 Berryhill' s Offer #3 Adm 09/09/10 
Pltf. . 23 Check from BH&C to John Berryhill 1125/08 Adm 09/08/10 
Pltf. 25 BH&CFlyer Adm 09/09/10 
Pltf. 27 Polo Cove Business Card Adm 09/08/10 
Pltf. 30 Boise Urban Liaison Article Adm 09/09/10 
Pltf. 31 Mosell Comps Adm 09/08/10 
Pltf. 32 Berryhill Comps Adm 09/08/10 
Pltf. 33 BH&C Register Mosell Equities Adm 09/09/10 
Pltf. 34 Kim Gourley Documents Adm 09/07/10 
Pltf. 35 Victoria Meier Documents .Adm 09/08/10 
Pltf. 37 Dempsey - Berryhill Email 03/05/08 Adm 09/08/10 
Pltf. 38 Email String Mosell/Berryhill Sept/Oct 2008 Adm 09/14/10 · 
Pltf. 39 Epitome Bill for Furniture Adm 09/08/10 
Pltf. 44 Polo Cove Exec Summary 02/29/07 Adm 09/07/10 
Pltf. 45 Polo Cove Exec Summary 08/18/08 Adm 09/07/10 
Pltf. 46 BH&Co Transaction Acct~Polo CoveAdm 09/15/10 
Pltf. 50 BH&Co Balance Sheet 12/31/05 Adm 09/15/10 
Pltf. 51 BH&Co Balance Sheet 12/31/06 Adm 09/15/10 
Pltf. 52 BH&Co Balance Sheet 12/3 l/(J7 Adm 09/15/10 
Pltf. 53 BH&C Balance Sheet 06/30/08 Adm 09i08/10 
Pltf. 54 BH&Co Balance Sheet 12/31/08 Adm 09/15/10 
Pltf. 55 BH&C Profit - Loss 2005 Adm 09/14/10 
Pltf. 56 BH&C Profit - Loss 2006 Adm 09/14/10 
Pltf. 57 BH&C Profit - Loss 2007 Adm 09/14/10 
Pltf. 58 BH&C Profit - Loss 2008 Adm 09/14/10 
Pltf. 59 BH&C Profit - Loss 2009 Adm 09/14/10 
Defd E Personal Guaranty Adm 09/14/10 
Defd G Restaurant Lease Berryhill & Comp Adm 09/14/10 
Defd J Sketch of Crackerbox Space Adm · 09/09/10 
Defd K Boise P&D Cert of Value Adm 09/14/10 
Defd L Boise P&D Cert of Occupancy. Adm 09/14/10 
Defd N John Berryhill Business Card Adm 09/09/10 
Defd s Email from Mosell to Berryhill 6/28/07 Adm 09/14/10 
Defd T Email from Mosell to Foerstel, BH 06/28/07 Adm 09/14/10 
Defd V Email String Mosen to Angie Riff Adm 09/08/10 
Defd 00 Invoice Berryhill & Polo Cove 01/01/08 Adm 09/14/10 
Defd QQ Memo to file from Victoria Meier 0l/22/08Adm 09/09/10 
Defd uu Polo Cove Exec Overview 'Adm 09/08/10 
Defd xx Ron Bitner Business Card Adm 09/09/10 
Defd zz Letter from Tomlinson to Berryhill Adm 09/09/10 
Defd AAA Blue Prints Expansion · Adm 09/14/10 
Defd BBB Concepts & Illustrations of Polo Cove Amd 09/14/10 
Exhibit List Page 2 of 3 
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Defd CCC-I Summary Cost Breakdown Adm 
Defd CCC-2 BH&C Itemization Adm 
Defd ODD Polo Cove Exec Overview 06/18/08 Adm 
Defd EEE Polo Cove Exec Overview 02/29/08 Adm 
Defd GGG Web Si~ Design (Foerstel) Adm 
Defd ill Narrative, to Canyon Co P&Z Adm 
Oefd JJJ Report Potential Market Demand Adm 
Defd KKK Polo Cove Exec Overview 03/10/08 Adm 
Defd LLL Polo Cove Exec Overview Adm 
Defd MMM Email From Mosell to Berryhill 9/3/08 Adm 
Defd BBBB Executive Overview Adm 
. Defd EEEE Mosell Entities Adm 
Defd FFFF Timeline Adm 
Defd YY-1 . Email (Russell Case-Hawley Troxell)Pulblished Only 
Defd Depo of Glenn Mosell Published Only 
Exhibit List Page 3 of 3 
09/14/10 
09/14/10 
· 09/08/10 
09/14/10 
09/14/10 
09/08/10 
09/08/10 
09/14/10 
09/14/10 
09/08/10 
09/14/10 
09/08/10 
09/14/10 
09/07/10 
09/08/10 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, 
VS. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent, 
and 
JOHN E. BERRYHILL, III, 
Defendant-Cross Respondent, 
and 
AMY BERRYHILL, 
Defendant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 38338 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: 
SEP O 6 ZUll 
--------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ERIC R. CLARK 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
EAGLE, IDAHO 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
ByQ,~' 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an ldaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent, 
and 
JOHN E. BERRYHILL, III, 
Defendant-Cross Respondent, 
and 
AMY BERRYHILL, 
Defendant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 38338 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
6th day of December, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
By------=-==-=-""--__,.__--='-"-............. _ 
Deputy Clerk -
' 
